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PREFACE
The manufacture, processing and use of chemicals is inherently risky.
News headlines routinely announce fires, explosions, worker injuries, and
environmental damage associated with chemical releases. Can these accidents be
prevented? The Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office (CEPPO)
has been working with industry, trade associations, labor, professional societies,
environmental groups, and other government agencies at all levels to find
answers to this question.
As part of this effort, EPA continuously solicits the views of experts in
academia, industry, and professional organizations on accident prevention
options. CEPPO supported the recent analysis, The Encouragement of
Technological Change for Preventing Chemical Accidents: Moving Firms from
Secondary Prevention and Mitigation to Primary Prevention, by Nicholas Ashford
et al., of the Center for Technology, Policy and Industrial Development,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This report argues that most current
chemical accident prevention approaches can be characterized as "secondary"
prevention. These measures are aimed at reducing the probability of an accident
rather than eliminating the hazards associated with existing technologies. The
report asserts that we need to work toward inherently safe technologies that
remove the hazard and thus the possibility of an accident. The report calls this
approach "primary" prevention. Professor Ashford recommends the use of a
Technology Options Analysis (TOA) which would expand the process hazard
evaluations conducted by industry to include alternative production technologies.
As Professor Ashford notes, "the scope of the TOA will depend on the technical
options open to the firm in terms of scale, performance, and costs." TOA indeed
deserves more attention by all stakeholders -- government, labor, industry,
professional societies, trade associations, etc. For example, TOA may be useful
when a new process is being developed, when a substantial change can be made to
a process or facility, or at other appropriate times.
The approach that EPA believes is most appropriate for accident prevention
is a combination of good process safety management and the development of a
safety culture within industry in close coordination with the community. This
approach encompasses management systems, process design and technology,
operations, maintenance, workforce training, detection, mitigation and response,
integrated into a comprehensive safety effort. EPA views process safety
management as a continuum that includes all elements of accident prevention.
Because process safety management and the- development of technology for
chemical accident prevention are constantly evolving, we must be careful to
provide a regulatory and economic environment that encourages industry and
others to learn more about the hazards and risks of existing processes and to
develop new ways to reduce the hazards and risks. The challenge is for
government, industry, and the public. to find a shared approach that promotes
continuing improvement of chemical processes and moves toward inherently
safer technology without stifling innovation.
In the last few years, industry and government have promoted good process
safety management to help prevent accidents and reduce the impacts of those that
do occur. The 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act (CAA) add new requirements
related to accidental release prevention. These requirements emphasize the
importance of management commitment to safety and an integrated system for
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managing process safety. The process safety management system continually
evaluates the safety of a facility so that hazards are managed in a way that
minimizes the likelihood and severity of accidental releases. Under the CAA
requirements, a facility will have to analyze process hazards to identify those
events that could lead to a loss of containment of a regulated substance. This
evaluation should also review the efficacy of accidental release prevention and
control measures. The analysis will encourage facilities to consider the
management and technology options available to address risks, hazards, and
accidental releases. The analysis will also help identify pollution prevention
opportunities. Changes in procedures, equipment, controls, or chemicals that will.
prevent pollution may lessen the likelihood of an accidental release and often
increase the operating efficiency of a facility. These benefits will move firms
toward the use of inherently safer technologies and approaches. In addition, the
CAA requires facilities to submit risk management plans to public authorities and
explain or defend the presence of an inherent hazard. These plans may prompt a
search for less hazardous substances, processes, or practices.
CEPPO supports the need for further research into inherently safer
processes. The responsibilities to move in that direction must be shared by
government, industry, academia, and research institutions, all of whom have a
unique and collaborative role to play. Preventing chemical accidents is an issue of
great importance to society. Human lives, public health and the environment are
at stake. Technological and regulatory reforms are sometimes complex and costly.
This report provides an excellent context for exploring issues associated with
potential technical and regulatory options for the prevention of catastrophic
accidents. We strongly urge the readers of this report to provide comments and
suggestions that may lead to long-term and practical oals for chemical accident
prevention.
Jim i, rector
Ctmial Emergency Preparedness and
Pre ntion Office
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
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FOREWORD
The chemical-producing and chemical-using industries have been increasingly
concerned with property, financial, and human consequences of chemical accidents. Loss
control efforts have increasingly focused on the root causes of chemical accidents
(including management systems and attitudes) to uncover opportunities for accident
prevention. However, most efforts to date have concentrated on improving management
systems for extrinsic or "secondary" prevention and mitigation, thereby focusing on the
integrity of production technology and the implementation of emergency responses for
reducing the probability and consequences of chemical accidents. In order to achieve the
next major advancement in reducing accidents, the basic culture of the chemical
producing and using firms must change with regard to both prevention and managing
technological change.
Fundamental technological process change for primary prevention, while
commercially risky, also presents opportunities for accident prevention as well as for
improvements in pollution prevention, occupational health, and industrial productivity.
Some firms have made impressive progress in this direction. It is widely acknowledged
that different attitudes and skills are needed to undertake fundamental technological
change than to manage existing production systems. Such changes may involve input
substitution, product reformulation, and process redesign for the purpose of preventing
chemical accidents. In this regard, primary accident prevention is analogous to pollution
prevention.
Technological changes can occur either from the diffusion of technologies already
used by others or from technological innovation. The chemical firm's success at
implementing technological change to improve safety may be influenced by the firm's
attitudes and capabilities both with regard to technological change and with regard to
chemical accident prevention.
This report reviews the distinctions between primary and secondary accident
prevention, discusses the dynamics of encouraging technological change in the firm,
addresses the barriers and incentives relevant to shifting the firm's traditional emphasis
on secondary prevention to a more appropriate balance between primary and secondary
prevention, and finally, suggests policy instruments to achieve this shift.
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THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE FOR PREVENTING CHEMICAL
ACCIDENTS: MOVING FIRMS FROM SECONDARY PREVENTION AND MITIGATION TO
PRIMARY PREVENTION
Abstract
This report reviews the distinctions between primary and secondary chemical accident prevention,
discusses the dynamics of encouraging technological change in the firm, addresses the barriers and incentives
relevant to shifting the firm's traditional emphasis on secondary prevention to a more appropriate balance
between primary and secondary prevention, and finally, suggests policy instruments to achieve this shift.
o Primary prevention relies on the development and deployment of inherently safe technologies that
prevent the possibility of an accident. Secondary prevention reduces the probability of an accident.
Mitigation and emergency responses seek to reduce the seriousness of injuries resulting from accidents.
Most chemical safety efforts to date have concentrated on secondary prevention and accident
mitigation. Some reductions in inventory of hazardous substances, while heralded as primary
prevention, may simply shift the locus of the risk and increase the probability of transport accidents.
o Secondary prevention and mitigation, by themselves, are unable to eliminate the risk of catastrophic
chemical accidents, although improved process safety management can reduce their probability and
severity. Most chemical production involves "transformation" processes, which are inherently complex
and tightly coupled. "Normal accidents" are an unavoidable risk of systems with these characteristics.
However, the risk of serious, or catastrophic, consequences need not be. Specific industries use many
different processes. In many cases, alternative chemical processes exist which completely or almost
completely eliminate the use of highly toxic, volatile, or flammable chemicals. Normal accidents arising
in these systems result in significantly less harmful chemical reactions or releases. Such benign
chemical processes, as well as non-chemical approaches, are examples of what we have termed primary
accident prevention.
o Several major barriers have impeded the adoption of a primary accident prevention approach. These
include: (1) inadequate information about the potential for catastrophic accidents, the significant costs
of secondary accident prevention and mitigation and the costs of chemical accidents, and the existence
of inherently-safe technological alternatives; (2) insufficient economic incentives--in the form of
workers' compensation, the tort system, regulatory fines, and insurance; (3) organizational and
managerial barriers--linked to corporate attitudes, objectives, structure, and internal incentives, and the
lack of a labor-management dialogue on safety;, (4) a lack of managerial awareness and expertise about
inherently-safe technologies; (5) inadequate worker knowledge about primary accident prevention;
(6) technological barriers limiting primary accident prevention; and (7) regulatory problems. Primary
prevention shares some of these barriers with secondary prevention and mitigation, but these barriers
are of different importance.
o A shift in the basic culture of the chemical producing and using firms is essential. The Accidental
Release Prevention provisions of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 offer the opportunity to
encourage this shift and to address many of the barriers to primary accident prevention that we have
identified. Regulations to implement these provisions must be carefully fashioned to promote primary
accident prevention. One major omission in the provisions of the Clean Air Act Amendments (as well
as in the OSHA Process Safety Management Rule) is that they do not require facilities to evaluate
alternative production technologies. Consequently, firms are not encouraged or held accountable to
consider new technologies that may be inherently safer (as well as capable of preventing gradual
pollution and occupational disease) than the ones they currently employ. To address this problem, we
propose to add the use of a Technology Options Analysis, which would expand the evaluation to
include alternative production technologies and would facilitate the development of primary accident
prevention strategies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A two-year research project was undertaken to analyze the causes of and to design
prevention strategies for, chemical accidents in the chemical-producing and chemical-using
industries. Data and theories of accident causation were explored, and models of
technological change were applied to chemical producers and chemical users in order to
clarify the roles that both technology and management play in industrial responses to the
need to reduce and prevent chemical accidents. Both regulatory factors and economic
incentives which influence management attitudes towards the reduction and prevention of
accidents were investigated.
The scope of the research effort was purposely restricted in several ways. First, only
chemical accidents at fixed industrial facilities were included in the analysis; transportation
accidents involving chemical explosions or releases were excluded. Second, the focus of the
research was on isolated chemical incidents (typically involving acute injuries if there were
human casualties) as opposed to a series of gradual chemical releases (typically involving
chronic illnesses from chemical exposure if there were human casualties). Third, the
research effort emphasized the role of inherently safe production technologies (defined
below) in preventing chemical accidents rather than extrinsic safety devices or other
secondary prevention and accident mitigation responses. Finally, because of the major
recent research effortI already conducted in the area (and because the subject is only
tangentially related to inherently safe production), we did not explore, in detail, the
important issue of contract labor as a contributor to chemical accidents.
Every study that examines chemical accidents and analyzes accident trends makes
underlying assumptions regarding causation. The reliance placed by a given analyst on the
various theories of causation in turn influences that analyst's choice (and omission) of
specific preventive strategies. Below we briefly summarize the major views of accident
causation traditionally cited in the literature and their implications for preventive
approaches.
Human Error: Frequently, the cause of a chemical accident is attributed to human
error, or more specifically, operator error. Examples of operator error include the
inadvertent or deliberate opening of valves to atmosphere, misreading or ignoring
information on a display console and thus responding inappropriately to an emergency




situation, and adding excess reactant to a process. Accident reports which designate human
error as the cause often attribute the error to "accident proneness," "laziness" or
"inattentiveness." (A contrasting view would admit of human propensity to err and argue
that technology should be made as "foolproof' as possible.)
Prevention efforts predicated on human error as the accident cause generally focus
on education or training procedures. If well thought out and tailored to a specific facility
and type of operation, education and training can indeed contribute to accident prevention.
As useful as education and training might be, however, such measures are sometimes
inadequate because they attempt to adapt the human to a given set of circumstances which
may not be conducive to reliable operations in the first place. An example of a low
reliability condition is one where an operator is faced with a confusing array of stimuli,
such as may be found in a particular control room, or when an operator is working in his
twelfth or thirteenth hour on shift. This latter condition has been mentioned by several
sources as a possible factor in recent petrochemical plant accidents. Recent work in the
area of circadian physiology has contributed to our understanding of operator errors which
occur during off-shifts and during extended periods of overtime. This research has shown
that these accidents are more properly attributable to inadequate lighting and shift cycles
which counter natural biological rhythms than to the individual operator.2
Reported figures on the proportion of accidents which are caused by human error
range from 10 percent to 90 percent. 3 One might well enquire why such a large range of
estimates exists.
Component Failure: Component failure is another one of the traditionally cited
causes of chemical accidents. Examples include failures resulting from defects in a
technological component itself or age-induced deterioration, such as seal failure and flange
gasket blowouts. Such events are often considered to be random processes, leading some
to believe that little can really be done to decrease failures.4 However, rigorous inspection,
preventive maintenance programs, and screening parts which will be used in critical pieces
of machinery (critical from both a safety and a production viewpoint) can help to prevent
failure of such components.
2See Institute for Circadian Physiology (undated).
3See Lees (1984).
4See, for example, Wright (1986).
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Utilizing high integrity components are a form of secondary prevention, meaning that
they do not eliminate the hazard potential of a given process, but they may greatly reduce
or minimize the probability of a release of hazardous materials.
Design Failure: Accident investigations have been forced to a more sophisticated
level with the realization that training operators and screening components for potential
failure points were not improving overall industrial accident trends sufficiently. 5 Theories
of design error have been developed that broaden the perspective of accident causation.
There are many ways in which a design error can contribute to a chemical accident. Glass
vessels or tubing for use in chemical reactions yielding HF as a final or intermediate
product would be an example of a clear error of design. 6 Requiring workers to inspect the
glass for fissures is an inadequate safety measure. It is easy to see how a superficial
accident investigation would attribute accidents resulting from these activities to human
error, rather than to the design of the system which the individual is trying to adjust and
respond to. However, to attribute the cause of these accidents to human error in any of
these instances would do little to prevent the same accident from happening again.
Recent developments in the field of ergonomics have contributed a great deal to our
understanding of the human-technology interface. Many accidents, while superficially
attributable to operator error, are actually the result of an inadequate design or
management system which effectively places the operator in a situation where the accident
is inevitable.
Operational Mismatch: Sometimes a production process or technology designed for
one use is improperly employed for a different purpose. For example, the o-ring used in a
flange may have been initially designed for a water-based process; subsequently using that
technology for a solvent-based process, when the solvent may deteriorate the o-ring, creates
an operational mismatch. The result may present a serious compromise in safety. This
failure represents a problem at the interface of a technology-based factor and a
management decision.
5See, for instance, Minzner (1990) and Abrams and Ward (1990).
6A recent chemical fatality provides another example. Apricot concentrate paste, which is very acidic,
was being stored in metal drums. The acids in the apricot paste reacted with the metal, causing a fatal
explosion. The paste should have been stored in a plastic or plastic-lined drum. See Johnson (May 1992), page
7.
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Management Failure7: Management failure in a more general sense has recently
been introduced as a significant "cause" of chemical accidents. It is corporate management
which generally filters or weighs economic, regulatory, organizational, and informational
factors in selecting both safety and production technologies. To make such choices,
management establishes performance measures reflecting the firm's culture and
management's attitudes. If safety is not a formal performance measure, it will not receive
formal recognition and hence adequate emphasis by the organization. Further, the
organization may restrict itself to management of existing production technology for safety
while ignoring the management of technological change to improve safety. The
organizational separation of production and safety functions would contribute to that
approach.
Organizational theorist Charles Perrow's analysis of major technological disasters,
including Bhopal, Chernobyl, the Exxon Alaskan oil spill, and Kings Cross underground
fire, indicates that 80 to 90 percent of the failures are traceable to the management and
organizational system and only 10 to 20 percent can be attributed to the operator or
equipment failure that is so often the focus of blame.8
Only by developing a broad view of causation--which includes theories of
management failure to oversee existing technology and/or to change the production
technology in order to reduce design error--will effective theories of accident causation
and, hence, accident prevention be developed. Primary prevention relies on the
development and deployment of inherently safe9 technologies or processes that prevent the
possibility of an accident. Secondary prevention reduces the probability of an accident. l0
/The reader is also referred to Chapter V, Section B, infra, for discussion of managerial and
organizational issues.
8See Perrow (1984).
9We are cognizant of the conventional wisdom that no technology is entirely safe, and that it might be
more accurate to describe various technologies as safer. However, we here make the point that some
technologies are in fact safe in some aspects (i.e., some chemicals are not flammable, or explosive, or toxic).
Some reactions carried out under atmospheric pressure simply will not release their byproducts in a violent way.
By inherently safe, we mean dramatic improvements in a hopefully comprehensively chosen number of aspects
or dimensions. The inherent safety goal is analogous to pollution prevention. Both are an ideal. Just as one
could argue that pollution prevention can never be achieved 100%, purists may argue that technologies can only
be made inherently safer, not safe. Articulating the ideal, however, makes an important point: dramatic, not
marginal, changes are needed to achieve both. Like pollution prevention, the term "inherently safe" keeps
attention on the target.
10The use of risk assessment methodologies has very different implications for primary and secondary
prevention. See the discussion introducing Chapter III, infra.
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Mitigation and emergency responses seek to reduce the seriousness of injuries resulting
from accidents. 11
While things are changing and there are important exceptions (some of which are
discussed in Chapter II) in the U.S. chemical processing industries (CPI), current chemical
risk management strategies mainly involve monitoring and alarm systems, add-on safety
technologies intended to disperse, neutralize or contain a release, and emergency response
plans for the plant and the surrounding community.12 Process safety management is the
term used by industry to characterize its current approach to the chemical safety problem.
However, as we discuss in greater detail later in this report, the current approach does not
go far enough in examining substitute technologies in addition to modifying existing
production systems.
Despite aggressive accident prevention policies in Europe, risk management
activities there appear to parallel those in the United States, with a focus on accident
mitigation and secondary prevention rather than primary prevention strategies. l 3
The limitation of the strategies discussed above is their lack of attention to actually
preventing the possibility of a release in the first place. In order to prevent chemical
accidents, management strategies must be developed which affect the initial development
of technology and which encourage reexamination of current technologies. In some cases,
existing chemical process technology can and must be made inherently safe, thereby
llln some cases, it may be difficult to distinguish between primary prevention and secondary
prevention, or between secondary prevention and mitigation, but in general the distinctions remain important.
12Both the chemical industry and professional associations have recognized the importance of
developing initiatives to address all aspects of chemical safety, including primary prevention. (See, for example,
Center for Chemical Process Safety [1989] and the Chemical Manufacturers Association's Responsible Care
Program [1991].) However, most of the emphasis of the initiatives to promote chemical safety has been on
secondary prevention and mitigation. Process safety management embraced by the chemical industry includes
primary prevention initiatives, such as those focusing on inventory reduction, but much more can be done in
fostering changes in the technologies of production.
13See, for example, United Nations Environment Programme (1986, 1988, April/May/June 1988, and
July/August/September 1988) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (January 1990,
February 1990, July 1990, and 1992).
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removing the opportunity for a hazardous release. 14 Greater opportunities for inherently
safe technologies lie in the next generation of plant design or modification.
A shift in both managerial attitudes and knowledge is needed to effect technological
and organizational change that moves firms in the CPI from accident mitigation and
secondary prevention activities as a dominant response to chemically-related risk, towards
primary prevention involving the change of basic technologies of production. These
technological changes should include:1 5
1. the substitution of chemical inputs
2. process redesign
3. final product reformulation
One of the purposes of this report is to assess the capacity of various public policy
mechanisms to encourage the development of inherently safe or safer chemical process
technologies by industry. These mechanisms must bring about a change in managerial
knowledge and attitudes towards both technological change and safety, as well as provide
managerial and institutional incentives for bringing about attitudinal and technological
change. The desired technological change should move the CPI from mitigation responses
and the transfer of secondary prevention technologies to the development and adoption of
primary prevention production technologies. In this report, policy recommendations
involving regulatory, economic, and technological factors are presented, and a coordinated
strategy is devised. Because we focus on primary prevention, these policy
recommendations are different from those that might be devised with secondary prevention
14As discussed in Chapter VII, infra, both the Accidental Release Prevention provisions under the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 and the 1992 OSHA Process Safety Management Rule require facilities to
assess and reduce the hazards that are associated with their production processes, storage, and use. In addition,
three states--New Jersey, California, and Delaware--already have in place risk management programs which
emphasize the prevention of chemical accidents (see Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act, NJ. Rev. Stat. 13:1K-19
to -35 [Supp. 1989], and regulations NJ. Admin. Code tit. 7, 33-1 to -6 [Supp. 1988]; California Health & Safety
Code, 25.500-25.521 [West 19911; and Delaware Code Ann. Tit., 7701-7718 [Supp. 1988].) However, these
accident prevention measures do not require facilities to evaluate alternative technologies. We argue in
Chapters VII and VIII, infra, for a requirement that the firm undertake a Technology Options Analysis (TOA)
that includes an assessment of these alternative production technologies.
15 The reader is referred to Hirschhorn (1989) for examples of these kinds of technological changes in
the context of waste minimization, and what later was embraced as pollution prevention.
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implicitly in mind. (For example, the issue of contract labor becomes less critical in a
facility with inherently safe technology.)
In its 1989 Chemical Accident Prevention Strategy 16, EPA considered several
approaches for preventing chemical accidents on a national scale:
o Seek federal legislation authorizing direct regulation of chemical
manufacturing, processing, and use; the regulations might require firms to
use specific technologies (or best available technologies), to conduct hazard
evaluations, or to establish risk management programs;
o Rely on states or local governments to develop prevention programs tailored
to their particular situations and needs; or
o Develop a cooperative, consensus-building program in which EPA would act
as a catalyst, working with all concerned parties to improve the state of
practice at facilities handling hazardous chemicals.
EPA chose the third approach, being reluctant to specify technologies because
production facilities differ from plant to plant and because "locking in" technologies
through regulatory fiat tends to establish minimums for safety. However, EPA did note:
If the cooperative consensus-building effort fails to attain the goal of
reducing accidents or if a clear need for regulation appears, the federal
government may have to increase its involvement in this area and consider
more stringent approaches. These approaches could include regulation of
chemical industry technologies or practices or an extension of Title III or
other legislation to require prevention planning at the state and local level.
A first step could be promulgation of a regulation requiring better accident
reporting.17
Four years of history with continued chemical accidents 18 and insufficient progress,
we believe, warrant a reexamination of the policy choices made in 1989.19 While we are
16U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (January 23, 1989), page 3.
17U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (January 23, 1989), page 4.
18In Appendix A, infra, we describe the fact that over half of the chemical releases and over half of the
injuries reported in an OSHA survey of chemical producers and chemical users occurred in facilities that had
implemented state-of-the-art process safety management (PSM) practices. However, that survey indicates that
no one company had all process safety management elements in place.
19To some extent, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 and the 1992 OSHA Rule on Process Safety
Management go partway to advance primary accident prevention. As we argue in Chapter VIII, infra, what is
missing in this legislation is a requirement that firms manufacturing or using hazardous chemicals engage in a
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certainly not advocating specifying technologies, more is needed than good intentions. The
CPI needs to implement process safety management in such a way that the capacitv of the
industry to design, develop, and adopt inherently safer technologies is enhanced. It is our
hope that this report provides a basis for further changes more strongly encouraging
primary prevention. We believe that EPA, even in the most cooperative of atmospheres
with industry, should not expect the CPI to change its safety culture from secondary to
primary prevention without considerable prodding or encouragement.
Fundamental shifts must be encouraged in the kinds of technological solutions,
especially towards those more integral to the products produced and the processes
utilized.2 0 The placement of responsibilities for technological change within the firm and
the managerial attitudes towards undertaking these changes are obviously key in the
success of their implementation. Firms tend to want to solve technical problems by
purchasing from vendors or suppliers those technologies or design changes which are "off
the shelf." These "proven" technological changes are seen to be less commercially risky
than exploring new approaches. In some cases this "diffusion" of technology from minority
use to widespread use in an industry may be appropriate. However, in other cases, and
especially for the future, technological innovation in product and process technologies is
needed. Many mature, established firms resist this kind of change. To bring it about
requires both knowledge and willingness on the part of industrial managers. 21
Knowledge bases can be improved by technical assistance to firms, demonstration
projects, continuing education of engineers, and the use of appropriate engineering
consulting services. Managerial attitudes obviously are influenced both by incentives and
by general practices and procedures of the firm. Enterprise liability is becoming
increasingly important as a factor in risk management, although insurance carriers and loss-
control advisors appear not to be particularly knowledgeable as yet about differences in
Technology Options Analysis, which would expand upon a Hazard Assessment to include consideration of
alternative production technologies and would facilitate the adoption, if not development of primary accident
prevention strategies.
20 If safety decisions are relegated to traditional safety professionals, solutions that leave production
processes, inputs, and final products unchanged are most likely to be selected. Changes involving production
require the participation of process or manufacturing engineers.
21Note that a cultural change in the firm is necessary to facilitate both adoption of primary prevention
technologies and the development of new technology. However, the latter may require a much more dramatic
shift in the internal workings and attitudes of the firm.
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technological risks and do not encourage the development of new technology. While
technological innovation involves some commercial risk, the danger in existing attempts to
improve safety is that we accept technological solutions as they exist now, without sufficient
planning for more productive and significantly safer technology.
Obviously, both educational institutions, especially engineering schools, and
professional organizations, such as the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE),
are important sources of technical information. However, in many cases, their orientation
(i.e., their culture) needs to change, and their technical responses need to shift from
technological diffusion to technological innovation in instances where the best existing
technology is not inherently safe and technology redesign is indicated.22
Of special merit are policy options that add technology options analyses (TOAs) to
hazard assessments in order to refocus the industry's safety efforts to the process
technology itself; that mandate labor-management safety committees; and that broaden
EPA's Pollution Prevention outreach programs to include inherently safer process
technologies. Community-based efforts may also need to be enhanced. As we argue in this
report, policies for accident prevention, pollution prevention, and economic advance of the
CPI must be cooptimized, rather than one compromised in order to advance another, i.e., a
carefully designed and implemented plan for changing the technologies of production can
result in dramatic reductions in accidents and pollution, as well as in productivity
improvements.
This report comes at a particularly opportune time. Regulations to implement the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 accidental releases prevention provisions are due to be
promulgated (November 1992 and 1993) for implementation three years after the
promulgation date.23 Hopefully, this report will contribute to the fashioning of those
regulations and government/industry strategies to promote primary accident prevention.
We are sensitive to the seriousness with which some firms in the CPI are re-
examining old approaches in light of process safety management goals. We mean this
report to be a constructive analysis/critique of past and current practices, not a criticism or
condemnation. More than good intentions, however, is required. The capacity , or
capability, of management to change is also a crucial element of future success. It is
towards enhancing that capacity that the options examined in this report are put forward
for discussion.
ZZWe note that some progress in this direction has been made by some universities and professional
organizations, such as AIChE's Center for Chemical Process Safety.
23See 42 USC 7412(r)(7).
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In the next chapter, we develop a model of chemical accidents that is useful for
identifying primary prevention opportunities. In Chapter II, we describe and evaluate
chemical accident databases which, we believe, have some utility for secondary prevention,
but less for primary prevention strategies. In Chapter IV we revisit the issue of causation in
the context of primary prevention. We consider innovation and organizational change
theory in Chapter V. In Chapter VI we review the adequacy of existing economic
deterrents for preventing chemical accidents. Finally, in Chapters VII and VIII we review
barriers to chemical accident prevention and strategies for overcoming them, respectively.
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II. A MODEL OF ACUTE CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS 1
In order to prevent chemical accidents, we first need to understand how and why
they arise; that is, we require a conceptual framework or model of chemical accidents. In
this chapter, we construct such a model, which is based on earlier models developed by
Roger Kasperson and others at Clark University and by Nicholas Ashford. The usefulness
of the construct here is to demonstrate that opportunities for primary prevention can be
identified and chosen over, or as supplements to, the traditional secondary prevention and
mitigation approaches.
A. DEVELOPMENT OF AN ACCIDENT MODEL
Kasperson's framework for analyzing accidents is depicted in Figure 2.1, which
provides a causal model of hazards and related hazard-control opportunities.2 The model
builds upon the customary division of hazards into events and consequences: the evolution
of an accident involves a series of stages that culminate in unintended and undesired
consequences. The "upstream" stages of the model begin with basic human needs (e.g.,
food) which are converted into human wants (e.g., increased food production through pest
control). Satisfying human wants requires the making of technological choices (e.g.,
pesticide manufacture using highly toxic chemicals in the production process), based on
considerations of benefits, costs, and risks. However, the choice of "appropriate
technologies" has traditionally been driven more by utility concerns than by concerns for
risk. Some initiating event (e.g., a break in a pipe or some other component failure) can
trigger a fire or explosion or toxic release. The "downstream" portion of the accident
sequence consists of human exposure to the released hazard and the subsequent adverse
consequences. Note that each step in the accident sequence presents an opportunity to
introduce control measures designed to prevent the unintended and undesired
consequences from being realized. These opportunities are represented in Figure 2.1 by
the bottom row of boxes.
Ashford's model, presented in Figure 2.2, focuses on intervention points in the
accident sequence and develops a three-category taxonomy of accident control measures--
£A more detailed explication of the model developed in this chapter is provided in Minzner (1990) and
in Ashford (1991).
2See Hohenemser and Kasperson (1982); Kates, Hohenemser, and Kasperson (1985); and Kasperson
et al. (1988).
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mitigation, secondary prevention, and primary prevention--based on the point of
intervention. 3
Mitigation measures are those that perform in response to a released hazard, but do
not prevent the release of the hazard from occurring. These measures correspond to the
stages of accident intervention to the right of the release of materials in Kasperson's
modeland include exposure prevention, consequence prevention, and consequence
mitigation. Mitigation measures generally exist as stand-by systems intended to minimize
the amount of personal injury and property damage given the occurrence of a release.
Many emergency evacuation procedures, initiated in response to the detection of a
hazardous release, fall into this category. Other forms of accident mitigation include add-
on mechanical systems which are designed to decrease the rate or duration of a release, or
interfere with the transport of a release or reduce its toxic concentration. Examples
include emergency vent-gas scrubbers and water sprays.
Secondary prevention measures intervene between the production system and pre-
release hazards. In Kasperson's model, these measures arise after the choice of technology
and before the hazardous release; they are to the left of, and perform prior to, mitigation
measures. Secondary prevention systems are often applied continuously to prevent an
initiating event. Examples include pressure vessels designed to withstand high pressures,
refrigeration systems designed to maintain an appropriate temperature, and pressure and
temperature monitoring equipment to detect critical deviations. Other secondary
prevention measures include seals and check valves designed to contain hazardous
substances within process chambers and safety measures to stabilize temperature and
pressure after critical deviations have been realized.
Primary prevention measures are those that are an intrinsic part of the production
technology. In Kasperson's model, activation of these measures typically coincides with, or
precedes, the choice of technology. Examples of primary prevention measures include
redesigning the production process, choosing different process technology, selecting more
benign inputs, and reformulating the final product in ways that eliminate the possibility of
(certain types of) hazard or accident. Another approach to primary prevention is to alter
the scope of the production process, such as by expanding the production process to
encompass creating and consuming small amounts of the toxic material as an intermediate
product in a closed-loop system or by shifting from an inventory system where large
I1-3
3See Ashford (1991).
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quantities of a toxic input are stored on-site to a just-in-time delivery system.4 Obviously,
there may be instances in which it is difficult to draw a sharp line between primary and
secondary prevention, but the distinction does serve a valuable purpose in thinking about
process re-design and accident prevention options.
Figure 2.3 presents a simplified accident model which integrates Kasperson's and
Ashford's models. This hybrid model facilitates a pictorial visualization of the distinctions
between primary prevention, secondary prevention, and mitigation. While also
distinguishing between various prevention and mitigation measures, this model focuses on
the concept of inherent (versus extrinsic) safety. Inherent safety is defined as being able to
withstand deviations from normal operating conditions without having to rely on safety
systems to prevent accidents. 5 Inherent safety corresponds closely to primary prevention
measures in Ashford's model, while extrinsic safety corresponds to secondary prevention
and mitigation measures. With reference to our (and Kasperson's) model, a system will be
inherently safer the further the employed prevention methods are to the left.
Factors affecting the inherent safety of a production technology include the
following: (1) the scale of production; (2) the quantity of hazardous chemicals involved;
(3) the hazardousness of the chemicals involved; (4) batch versus continuous processing;
(5) the presence of pressure or temperature extremes; (6) storage of intermediates versus
closed loop processing; and (7) multistream versus single-stream plants. These factors are
discussed briefly below.
The Scale of Production. Chemical production is typically characterized by
economies of scale. Based on a generalized formula for the chemical industry, a doubling
of plant capacity increases the capital cost by only about 60%.6 However, larger-scale
plants require a larger inventory of chemicals, which tends to increase the hazard potential
of the plant. Therefore, from a safety standpoint, the optimal scale of production may
involve smaller plants because chemical releases, though sometimes more frequent, would
be smaller and easier to control.
The Quantity of Hazardous Chemicals Involved. The amount of hazardous
chemicals on-site can be reduced by methods other than altering the scale of production.
4 0f course, if reduced inventory on-site results in greater amounts stored in another facility, or in many
more deliveries, not only may this cause a mere shift of the locus of the hazard, it may also create a greater
overall risk.
SSee various discussions in Kletz (1989) and Lees (1984), Volume 1.
6See, for example, Lees (1984), page 4.
II-4




































ii i i i i i 
·--------------·------- - II ------------- -- -- ---`11-----1-
For example, the amount of hazardous material stored on-site can often be significantly
reduced, and if not, the hazardous materials can be stored in many small containers in
separate facilities rather than in a single container. Thus, if a container fails, the size and
catastrophic potential of the release is much reduced. In addition, the amount of material
needed in the production process can be reduced by using specially-designed equipment
(such as Higee columns, which replace conventional distillation columns).7
The Hazardousness of the Chemicals Involved. An obvious method for increasing
the inherent safety of a production process is to substitute safer chemicals for more
hazardous ones wherever possible. For example, flammable chemicals might be replaced
by nonflammable ones; explosive chemicals might be replaced by less reactive ones; and
highly toxic chemicals might be replaced by less toxic ones. 8
Batch Versus Continuous Processing. Batch processing involves loading feedstock
chemicals into a process vessel, closing it, and reacting the vessel's contents to the desired
final product.9 At this point, the vessel is emptied, and the entire process is repeated.
Continuous processing, as the name implies, involves feeding raw materials to a reactor
continuously and yields a continuous stream of desired reaction product. l 0
Continuous processing is generally inherently safer than batch processing because
smaller amounts of hazardous substances are present at any one time and because of the
automated nature of the process.1l However, there may be size considerations that need to
be taken into account regarding continuous processing. Connecting and disconnecting
continuous processes may be especially hazardous (and this hazard will depend on the size
of the processing vessel). On the other hand, utilizing smaller processing volume may lead
/See Kletz (1989), page 20.
8See, for example, Zanetti (1986); Chowdhury (1987), and Kletz (1989).
9See Luyben and Wenzel (1988), pages 25-27.
10See Luyben and Wenzel (1988), page 28.
11For example, if the explosive chemical nitroglycerin is produced using a batch process, at the end of
the reaction the process vessel will be filled with highly unstable and temperature-sensitive nitroglycerin.
However, by using a continuous process, only small quantities of nitroglycerin are present at any one time,
because the dangerous product is continuously being formed and drawn off. Since the chemical reaction is
exothermic, producing more heat than it consumers, cooling is necessary to prevent the temperature from rising
above the explosion point of nitroglycerin, regardless of the processing mode. However, the temperature
control in continuous processing involves the much easier and simpler process of directly cooling the coil of
tubing that contains the nitroglycerin (rather than attempting to mix the contents of the batch process vessel to
avoid any local "hot spots," which could cause the reactor to explode). These characteristics, although specific
to the production of nitroglycerin, illustrate the inherent safety of continuous processing.
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to smaller hazards per connecting/disconnecting event, but may involve a larger number of
events, the sum of which may represent a larger total risk.
A certain scale of production is normally required to make continuous processing
feasible. For that reason, continuous production is sometimes considered to be more
hazardous than batch processing. 12 However, it is the scale of production which creates the
hazard, not the mode of production, per se. In many cases, techniques exist to adapt
continuous processing to smaller volume production. 13
The Presence of High Pressures or Temperatures. High (or low) pressure and high
(or low) temperature storage and processing of hazardous chemicals is much riskier than
the storage and processing of hazardous chemicals at ambient pressures and temperatures.
High pressures and high temperatures place storage and process equipment closer to the
failure point and thus make them more susceptible to an accidental release. In addition,
accidental releases from high-pressure vessels have a much higher rate of release than do
comparable releases from near-atmospheric pressure units. Low temperatures may make
materials brittle, and low pressures may provide significant pressure differentials which
would allow the entrance of air into reactant vessels.
The advantages of high pressures and temperatures in reactant vessels or pipes are
that smaller volume equipment is required when the chemicals are under pressure and
that, for many chemical reactions, the conversion of the reactants into desired products is
facilitated, or the rates increased, under high pressure and temperature. However, in some
cases, this latter advantage can be overcome by using catalysts under ambient conditions to
increase the rate of reaction to a comparable level achieved under high pressure and
temperature--while at the same time increasing the inherent safety of the process.14
Storage of Intermediates Versus Closed Loop Processing. Closed loop processing
involves having intermediate chemical substances formed in the conversion process (from
feedstock chemicals to the desired final product) recycled back into the process stream
until they react to form more of the final product. Both production economics and safety
generally favor closed loop processing when such technology is available because the
intermediate chemicals are completely transformed into valuable final product instead of
12See, for example, Garrison (1989), page 56.
13There are some instances where concerns with final product restrict the practicality of some primary
prevention measures. For example, in the high volume ethoxylation of esters for surfactants, batch processes
are needed to produce the required high range of molecular chain lengths.
140ne example demonstrating the successful use of catalysts under ambient conditions is in the
production of polyethylene. See Mark (1986), pages 430-431.
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remaining as an undesirable and problematic hazardous chemical byproduct. Because the
research and development required is expensive, a closed loop processing technology, in
many cases, does not exist. However, where the impetus to change has been strong (such
as in the production of carbaryl pesticides after the Bhopal tragedy), spectacular advances
in inherently-safer closed loop processing have been achieved.15
Multistream Versus Single-Stream Plants. In order to enhance production
flexibility and to take advantage of different feedstock pricing patterns, chemical plants in
some productive segments or product lines are designed to use a variety of alternative
process inputs to produce a variety of products. While economically attractive in a narrow
production sense, such multistream plants increase the interactive complexity of the
production process and thereby enhance the potential for system accidents.16 It is
inherently safer to build simpler, single-stream plants dedicated to producing one
product. 17
B. ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE MODEL APPLIED TO EXAMPLES OF ACCIDENTS
AND ACCIDENT PREVENTION
In the remainder of this chapter, we illustrate the use of our accident model (1) by
reviewing several well-publicized, large-scale accidents and (2) by examining a few recent
examples of production modifications that have been alleged to improve the chemical
plant's inherent safety. In later chapters, we argue that the accidents described here are
representative of the types of vulnerabilities that extrinsic safety systems are susceptible to
and that inherently-safe production systems avoid.
1. Examples of Chemical Accidents and the Failure of Secondary Prevention
The following well-publicized chemical accidents are discussed below:
* Union Carbide accidents at Bhopal and Institute, West Virginia
* New York City Exxon leak
* Sandoz fire in Basel, Switzerland
* Flixborough explosion in England
* Ciba-Geigy chlorine release in Basel
15See, for instance, Zanetti (1986).
16See Perrow (1984), page 70, and Section C of Chapter IV, infra.
17See Kletz (1989).
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These chemical accidents are graphically represented in Figures 2.4 through 2.9. These
figures employ the model of acute hazardous releases to demonstrate the actual release
event and the type of safety system(s) applied for accident prevention. For each accident,
the model describes the characteristics of the process, the failure event, and the
consequences. Particular attention is paid to the role of extrinsic safety devices in the
system failure, with the arrows in the figures indicating the intended point of intervention
for the particular safety device invoked.
Union Carbide. (Figure 2.4) The Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India was equipped with
secondary prevention and mitigation systems specifically designed to prevent a release of
methyl isocyanate (MIC), a deadly gas. However, inadequate design, component failures,
and lagging maintenance activities resulted in every one of these systems being
compromised. Specific elements in the causal structure of the eventual release include:
* the refrigeration unit, designed to maintain an appropriate temperature in the
MIC unit and therefore prevent an exotherm, was not in operation,
* the vent gas line, intended for carrying MIC to an emergency scrubber, leaked
MIC to directly to the atmosphere,
* the gas that did get to the scrubber was not neutralized because of a lack of
alkali in the scrubber,
* the vent gas scrubber was designed for a capacity of 5 to 8 tonnes. The MIC
tank's capacity was 70 tonnes,
* the temperature indicator on the MIC tank was not functioning,
* the flare tower for burning off the released MIC was not functioning, and
* the water curtain (high pressure water sprayers) for neutralizing MIC could
reach a height of only 10 meters whereas MIC leaked from the vent gas line at
about 33 meters.
The devastation which resulted from these failures has been documented many times
over.18
Another Union Carbide accident occurred at its Institute, West Virginia plant in
August, 1985.19 (See Figure 2.5.) In the wake of Bhopal, the plant was the focus of much
16See, in particular, Bowonder, Kasperson, and Kasperson (1985).
19See, for example, Kasperson et al. (1988), page 115.
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safety concern, since MIC is also produced there. Safety system upgrades, including a
hazardous gas detection system and a water-spray system designed to impede the migration
of a release off-site, were installed. Despite these improvements, a noxious cloud of
methylene chloride and aldicarb oxide escaped from the plant. The escape went
undetected by plant personnel due to the following factors:
* a high temperature alarm was out of service,
* a level indicator in the tank was broken,
* the newly installed gas detection system had not been programmed to test for
aldicarb oxide, and
* the water spray curtain intended to impede the migration of the gas offsite was
inadequately designed for the given release.
Citizens in four neighboring communities were affected; 135 people were hospitalized.
NYC Exxon Spill. (Figure 2.6) On January 2, 1990, an Exxon pipeline in a New York
estuary leaked 567,000 gallons of heating oil before the spill was discovered and stopped.
This release occurred despite the existence of primary and back-up leak detection systems.
The primary leak detection system had regularly been giving off false alarms since 1978
and, therefore, was ignored when the actual spill did occur. The back-up system was also
malfunctioning at the time of the spill. Regulators had attempted to oversee the proper
functioning of hazardous release monitoring systems by requiring corporations to file
maintenance and test reports with state officials on a regular basis. The reports filed by
Exxon for the last several years had been falsified.20
Sandoz. (Figure 2.7) In 1986, water used to extinguish a fire at a Sandoz chemical
warehouse in Basel, Switzerland drained some 30 tons of toxic chemicals into the Rhine
River, resulting in extensive fish kills and pollution of town water supplies for miles
downstream. In this instance, the company failed to introduce even mitigation measures,
such as an automatic sprinkler system, apparently because of the relatively few fire
exposures in the operation. The fact that over 60% of chemical industry fires at that time
in Switzerland were reportedly caused by arson was not considered in the firm's decision.
Had an adequately designed sprinkler system been installed, less than 10% of the water
21For various accounts of this incident, see The Wall Street Joumal,(March 16, 1990) and Bradford
(1990).
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Monsanto has halved its total volume of highly toxic gases in storage at facilities
throughout the world by shifting to just-in-time deliveries of raw materials, thereby
eliminating the need for intermediate storage areas. 23
Rohm and Haas has converted one of its processing systems from batch to continuous,
resulting in the replacement of its 3,000 gallon batch reactor by a 50 gallon continuous
reactor.24
Hoffman-LaRoche (Figure 2.10) had been storing 12,000 to 15,000 gallons of liquid
ammonia in a refrigerated tank. Levels have been reduced to 2,000 gallons, and a
redundant refrigeration unit was added, a combination of primary and secondary
prevention, respectively.25
Dow Chemical (Figure 2.11) has reduced chemical inventories by 25% in some 18 plants.
In addition, Dow substituted aqueous ammonia at atmospheric pressure for pressurized
anhydrous ammonia to reduce the effects of volatility in the event of a spill. Dow also
reduced by 95% its 100,000 pound inventory of phosgene at one of its plant in
LaPorte,Texas by operating the facility on an adjusted-time system--having the satellite
units run continuously off the feed unit. Before, the satellite units were drawing out of
storage. Dow also recently completed a similar phosgene reduction at its LaPorte toluene
diisocyanate facility. 26
Hoffman-Laroche (Figure 2.12) has succeeded in totally eliminating phosgene at its Nutley
facility by hiring an outside contractor to make large-volume phosgene-based materials,
thus decoupling an extremely hazardous material from the rest of the production cycle.27
For small-volume quantities the firm has switched from phosgene to ethyl chloroformate,
which reacts similarly, but is not as toxic. 28
23See Plant/Operations Progress (April 1986), page A3.
24See Chowdhury (1987), page 14.
25See Zanetti (1986), page 28.
26See Zanetti (1986), page 30.
270f course, phosgene is being produced elsewhere, and the net safety improvement may not be
significant or even positive. Thus, while identified by the firm as significant for accident prevention, the
"inherent safety" of the supplier-plus-user may not have been improved.
28See Zanetti (1986), page 30.
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PPG Industries recently developed carbonyldiimidazole, a benign phosgene substitute that
can be used in the synthesis of some of their pharmaceutical products.2 9
Monsanto has modified an acrylonitrile process to eliminate the storage of hydrogen
cyanide; now the hydrogen cyanide is consumed as feedstock by units that produce
lactonitrile and other materials.30
DuPont (Figure 2.13), which has been making a crop-protection insecticide at its plant in
LaPorte, Texas using MIC purchased from Union Carbide, has found a way to avoid
keeping 40,000 to 50,000 pounds of MIC in storage. Though it will now actually produce
MIC as an intermediate, the firm will immediately consume it in a closed-loop process.
The result is a maximum of two pounds of MIC on-premises at any one time.31
The preceding examples illustrate that, for the manufacture of many products,
primary prevention opportunities to improve chemical safety are available, and that some
firms are taking advantage of these opportunities. Given the proper incentives, both
regulatory and economic, we might expect additional innovations in primary accident
prevention to be developed and adopted by industry. However, as noted in the example
depicted in Figure 2.12, not all initiatives heralded as primary prevention do, in fact, lead to
overall improvements in inherent safety. Also, primary and secondary prevention measures
may need to go hand-in-hand, such as in the example depicted in Figure 2.10.
Z9See Zanetti (1986), page 30.
3 0 See Zanetti (1986), page 30.
3 1See Windsor (1988).
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III. PROFILE OF CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS
In the previous chapters we explored the fundamental differences between primary
prevention, which emphasizes the elimination of the possibility of an accident, and
secondary prevention, which reduces the probability of an accident. (In contrast, mitigation
reduces the probability of injury resulting from an accident.)
Quantitative risk assessment (QRA), using fault tree analysis and other analytical
techniques, represents a risk-based focus on preventing accidents and injuries. Given a
risky (or somewhat risky) production system, QRA seeks to identify and quantify the
possible system failures that result in undesirable events. Analysts and insurance carriers
interested in loss control are often involved in QRA. Choosing less risky inputs, hardware,
and operating conditions--and adding risk-reducing control devices--makes use of
probability estimates and risk-based data resulting from experience from production
histories. Statistical data on system failures and on injuries are used to provide the
probability estimates for secondary accident prevention and for injury prevention (i.e.,
mitigation). QRA as such, however, is not needed to identify primary accident prevention
options--because primary prevention by definition involves those technologies that
eliminate the possibility of an accident. Inherently safe technology is qualitatively
different--vastly different--than technology that relies on control devices and hardware to
minimize the probability of accidents. Qualitative risk assessment, not QRA, is what is
needed.
In this chapter we develop a snapshot of the safety performance of manufacturing
plants producing and/or using hazardous chemicals by reviewing accidental release data
from those facilities. In examining chemical accident statistics, we attempt to isolate the
manufacturing segments in which the most frequent and severe accidents occur and, to the
extent possible, to identify the chemicals involved, where in the production life cycle the
accidents occur, and the sources and causes of the accidents. Information of this type
could, in principle, be useful in the formulation of secondary prevention and mitigation
policies to improve the safety of manufacturing involving hazardous chemicals. Except to
point out the problems with existing production technologies, this information is not useful
in identifying specific primary prevention options. Nor, as we will argue, are the data very
useful in predicting the magnitude of risks likely to be encountered. We present this
chapter to demonstrate the limitations of using accident databases for prevention purposes.
The convinced reader may wish to skip this discussion.
We begin our profile by identifying and briefly describing, in Section A of this
chapter, the industries involved in chemical production and use. Following that, in Sections
III-1
-·- -- ·--
B, C, and D, we turn to an examination of the chemical accidents that have occurred in
these industries. Our profile of chemical accidents will rely on three major databases,
assembled by OSHA and EPA, of accidental release events in the United States. These
databases are briefly summarized below.
Fatality/Catastrophe (FAT/CAT) Accident Description Database These are a
series of computerized inspection reports collected by OSHA from the 29 state areas under
their direct control. The inspections are required in the event of a workplace accident
resulting in a fatality or a minimum of five injuries or both. The database, as it pertains to
the chemical industry, was matched with several other sources (covering 498 releases) by
Charles River Associates (CRA) in order to make it more comprehensive for the period
from 1982 to mid-August of 1988. This database is described in more detail in Appendix A.
Accidental Release Information Program (ARIP) Database Designed to give a
representative sampling of chemical releases in the United States, ARIP was assembled by
EPA from questionnaires sent to facilities experiencing a release or releases that met one
of four predetermined criteria. Preliminary results from approximately 330 releases that
occurred in the late 1980's have been reported and are discussed in Appendix B.
Acute Hazardous Events (AHE) Database This EPA database focuses on the
occurrence of severe and potentially severe releases of hazardous materials that occurred
in the United States from approximately 1981 to 1986. Although the coverage is biased
toward more severe releases, the database represents roughly 11,000 releases, making it by
far the most extensive of the databases. The AHE database is described in more detail in
Appendix C.
The purposes and data sources used for the various databases are different.
Therefore, they may be useful for analyzing different aspects of accidental releases of
hazardous substances. Since OSHA's focus is on the workplace, its database is classified
and reported according to the industry SIC codes, which allows us to observe which sectors
of the economy experience the most release incidents. The ability to categorize chemical
accidents by SIC code also allows us to account for industry safety practices, since different
sectors handle and process dangerous chemicals in different ways. One of EPA's major
objectives in gathering the statistics is to allow communities to play an informed, watchdog
role in the operation of local chemical-using facilities. Therefore, up to now, EPA has
been more concerned with the consequences of an accidental release on the community
surrounding the workplace, and its database is generally reported in terms of chemicals
involved, the circumstances surrounding the release, and the consequences following the
release. The reporting of chemicals released and the circumstances surrounding those
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releases make these statistics valuable in assessing high-risk accidental release precursors
and causative factors.
A. INTRODUCTION TO THE CHEMICAL-PRODUCING AND CHEMICAL-USING
INDUSTRIES
Economic activity in the United States is typically classified according to SIC codes,
which can be reported with 2-digit, 3-digit, or 4-digit format--depending on the level of
detail that is desired. Table 3.1 contains a description of all of the two-digit SIC codes that
are involved in manufacturing and other selected sectors. Later in this chapter, we will
have occasion to use the terms primary producers and secondary producers. In Table 3.1,
primary producers are indicated by boldface type, secondary producer codes are in normal
type, while the other sectors are italicized. In the tables that follow, four-digit SIC codes
and descriptions are presented according to this typology for those economic sectors that
produce or use significant quantities of hazardous substances.
Primary producers are the chemical and petroleum industries (the SIC codes 28 and
29), and all industries in that group are shown in Table 3.2. The major segments in the
chemical and petroleum industries are the following: industrial inorganic chemicals (SIC
281); plastics materials and synthetics (SIC 282); drugs (SIC 283); soaps, cleaners, and
toilet goods (SIC 284); paints and allied products (SIC 285); industrial organic chemicals
(SIC 286); agricultural chemicals (SIC 287); miscellaneous chemical products (SIC 289);
and petroleum refining (SIC 291). The 4-digit codes for all secondary producers are
presented in Table 3.3. Included in this classification are all other manufacturing industries
(SIC codes 20-27 and 30-39). In addition, there are six other 4-digit SIC codes that are not
in a manufacturing sector but also handle hazardous chemicals; these codes are grouped
into a classification named "Other." l These industrial segments are identified in Table 3.4.
When statistics are presented by two- and three-digit SIC codes instead of by four-digit
codes, it should be assumed, unless otherwise specified, that the number applies to all
relevant four-digit SIC codes represented in Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4.
The chemical industry (SIC 28) consists of more than 12,000 manufacturing plants in
the United States producing a total of more than 66,000 different "commonly-used"
chemicals.2 It is one of the largest industries in the United States with sales in 1987 of $230
LSee Kearney/Centaur (1990), page 2-85.
2However, the American Chemical Society had, in 1984, registered 6,500,000 chemical substances and
reported that it was registering new chemicals at the rate of 65 per hour. New chemicals are being
manufactured at the rate of approximately 600 per year. Three thousand chemicals account for over 90 percent
of total production. See Morehouse (1987), pages 22-26; U.S. Department of Labor (1987); and Chemical
Engineering Progress (March 1990), page 21.
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Table 3.1 SIC Groupings by two-digit codes (when available)
I I I ' I
Description




Lumber & Wood Products, Except
Furniture
Furniture & Fdxtures




Rubber & Plastic Products
Leather Products
















Fabricated Metals, Except Machinery
& Transportation Equipment
Machinery, Except Electrical




Motor Freight & Warehousing
Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services
Scrap & Waste Materials





















Table 3.2 SIC Codes and Descriptions For Industries Classified as Primary Producers
._ m m. .. S m mmmm. m m
Code # Description
2812 Alkalies and Chlorine
2813 Industrial Gases 
2816 Inorganic Pigments
2819 Industrial Inorganic Chemicals, NEC
2821 Plastic Materials & Resins
2822 Synthetic Rubber
2823 Cellulosic Manmade Fibers
2824 Organic Fibers, Noncellulosics
2831 Biological Products
2833 Medicinals & Botanicals
2834 Pharmaceutical Preparations
2841 Soap & Other Detergents
2842 Polishes & Sanitation Goods
2843 Surface Active Agents
2844 Perfumes, Toilet Preparations
2851 Paints & Allied Products
Code # Description
2861 Gum & Wood Chemicals
2865 Cyclic Crudes & Intermediates
2869 Industrial Organic Chemicals, NEC
2873 Nitrogenous Fertilizers
2874 Phosphatic Fertilizers
2875 ' Fertilizers, Mix'ng Only
2879 Pestiddes, Agricultural Chemicals, 




2899 Chemicals & Chemical Preparation,
2911 Petroleum Refining
2951 Asphalt Paving Mixtures & Blocks
2952 Asphalt Felts & Coatings
2992 Lubricating Oils & Greases
NEC
s, NEC
Table 3.3 SIC Codes and Descriptions of Industrial Segments that are Classified as Secondary Producers
m mmimmmm
Code # DescriDtion
2011 Meat Packing Plants
2013 Sausages and Other Prepared Meats
2016 Poultry Dressing Plants
2017 Poultry & Egg Processing
2022 Cheese, Natural and Processed
2024Ice Cream & Frozen Desserts
2026 Fluid Milk
2037Frozen Fruits & Vegetables
2038 Frozen Specialties
207 Fats and Oils
2082Malt Beverages
2086Bottled and Canned Soft Drinks
2099Food Preparations, NEC
226 Dyeing and Finishing Textiles
2295Coated Fabrics, Not Rubberized
2431 Millwork
2611 Pulp Mills
2621Paper Mills, Except Building Paper
2631 Paperboard Mills
2647Sanitary Paper Products
3041Rubber & Plastic Hose & Belting
3069 Fabricated Rubber Products, NEC
3079 Miscellaneous Plastic Products
3111 Leather Tanning and Finishing
3229 Pressed, Blown Glass & Glassware, NEC
3231 Products of Purchased Glass
3291Abrasive Products
3312Blast Furnaces & Steel Mills
3315 Steel Wiredrawing & Related Products
Code # Description
3316 Cold-Rolled Steel Sheet, Strip, Bars
3321 Gray & Ductile Iron Foundries
3322 Malleable Iron Foundries
3324 Steel Investment Foundries
3325 Steel Foundries, NEC
3341 Secondary Nonferrous Metals
3353 Aluminum Sheet, Plate and Foil
3354 Aluminum Extruded Products
3361 Aluminum Foundries
3398 Metal Heat Treating
3411 Metal Cans
3433 Heating Equipment, Except Electric
3441 Fabricated Structural Metal
3442 Metal Doors, Frames, Molding, Trim
3443 Fabricated Plate Work (Boiler Shops)
3444 Sheet Metal Work
3452 Bolts, Nuts, Screws, Rivets, Washers
3471 Plating and Polishing
3479 Metal Coating and Allied Services, NEC
3482 Small Arms Ammunition
3483 Ammunition, Except Small Arms
3496 Miscellaneous Fabricated Wire Products
3499 Fabricated Metal Products, NEC
3674 Semiconductors and Related Devices
3675 Electronic Capacitors
3677 Electronic Coils and Transformers
3861 Photographic Equipment and Supplies
--- ~ ~ ~ ~ r -I 
I _ I r
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Table 3.4 SIC Codes and Descriptions of Industrial Segments Handling Hazardous Chemicals Classified as Other
Code Description Cod Desrition
4221Farm Product Warehousing & Storage 5093 Scrap and Waste Materials
4911 Electric Services 5161 Chemical and Allied Products
4941Water Supply 5191 Farm Supplies
[[[[ E: . - : :, .. .-[ ;
- -------- ----- -I- ------------- - - ---~-`------1----- -
billion and employment of 816,000.3 The petroleum industry (SIC 29) added sales of $131
billion and employment of 116,000 in 1987; $119 billion of the sales and 75,000 of the
employment came from petroleum refining (SIC 291).4 The chemical and petroleum
refining industries are very capital intensive. The chemical industry had invested $92,300
of capital per worker in 1985 as compared with $42,900 per worker for all of
manufacturing. 5
The chemical industry (including petroleum refining) is highly interdependent.
Over a fourth of the industry's output is consumed within the industry itself; approximately
half goes to secondary producers to be used as intermediate materials; and the remaining
fourth is sold for final consumption. 6 The chemical industry (including petroleum refining)
is also characterized by a high degree of substitutability among chemical substances
(sometimes necessitating process redesign). This is true both for different types of raw
materials capable of producing the same chemical intermediate or product and for various
finished chemical products capable of the same end-use applications. One consequence is
that, in response to changes in relative factor prices or because of other pertinent
characteristics (such as safety considerations), the chemical industry could exercise
considerable flexibility over time in terms of being able to switch raw materials. Another
consequence is that a significant degree of competition exists among chemical
manufacturers within the industry even when the industry structure is highly concentrated
for a specific chemical industry segment.
A pervasive characteristic of plants in the chemical and petroleum refining
industries is economies of scale. The ability to exploit economies of scale has resulted in
significantly increased plant size over the past thirty years. In many cases, plant size during
the period has increased more than ten-fold. 7 Examples of annual production capacities
for world-scale facilities for various chemicals include:
3 Bureau of the Census (1990), page 737.
4Bureau of the Census (1990), page 737.
5 Dertouzos et al. (1989), page 189.
6 Dertouzos et al. (1989), page 189.
7See Chemical Engineering Progress (March 1990).
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o 600,000 metric tons per year for an ethylene plant8
o 350,000 metric tons per year for a propylene plant9
o 300,000 metric tons per year for a chlorine plant10
o 1,500,000 barrel (bbl) tank capacitiesl l
o 50,000 gallon polyvinyl chloride reactor capacities (from 1,000 gallons) 12
During the same period, the spacing of process equipment within plant has been reduced to
economize on the costs of energy, piping, and instrumentation. Both of these factors are
believed to contribute to the magnitude of the accident losses experienced by primary
producers. l3
The U.S. chemical industry (including petroleum refining) experienced a slowdown
in growth in the 1970s.14 The causes of the slowdown included a major energy crisis (which
increased both process energy and feedstock costs), a saturation in potential materials
substitution possibilities (related to the technological maturity of the industry), and an
increase in import competition. The performance of the chemical industry further declined
in the early 1980s due to the worst U.S. recession in fifty years and global overcapacity in
the industry. One consequence of the industry's decline in performance was a drastic
reduction in employment in the industry.
In recent years, the performance of the chemical industry has improved
dramatically. For example, whereas the refinery capacity utilization rate of primary
producers had declined below 70 percent in the early 1980s, by 1989 the capacity utilization
rate had risen to 90 percent, with some plants running in excess of 100 percent of their
"official" ratings.15
8See Barnwell (1978), page 13.
9See Barnwell (1978), page 13.
10See Helmeste and Phillips (1981), page 264.
11See Garrison (1989), page 1.
12See Garrison (1989), page 1.
13See Garrison (1989).
14The chemical industry is cyclical in nature, experiencing periods of intense capital investment,
followed by overcapacity and recovery.
15 U.S. Department of Labor (April 1990), page 43.
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In examining acute accidents involving chemicals, we will often have occasion to
group accident data according to primary and secondary producers. Even though the
manufacturing technologies and accident circumstances are hardly homogeneous within
each of these two producer classifications, there are several reasons for aggregating the
data in this crude fashion. First, as indicated above, primary producers tend to be much
more capital intensive and less labor intensive than secondary producers. As a result, the
typical chemical release from a primary producer will occur amid fewer workers and more
expensive plant equipment than a comparable release from a secondary producer, which
suggests that, for a given-sized release, the primary producer could expect more plant
damage but fewer worker injuries than the secondary producer. Second, we would expect
primary producers to be handling larger volumes of chemicals, both hazardous and
nonhazardous, than secondary producers. The AHE (MAIN) database provides some
verification for this hypothesis. The average size of primary producer releases in this
database was 5,236 pounds, while the average release for secondary producers was 3,762
pounds. Third, we would expect that primary producers, for whom chemicals and chemical
products are their primary business, would know more about the processing and hazardous
properties of chemicals they work with than firms which simply use a chemical in one step
of a complex manufacturing process. The additional knowledge and experience of the
primary producers should provide an advantage in dealing with chemical hazards before,
during, and after a release. All of these factors combine to justify examining primary and
secondary producers separately when analyzing chemical releases. l 6
B. CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS BY CHEMICAL INDUSTRY SEGMENT
One of the most striking and enduring characteristics of the chemical and petroleum
industries is their potential for catastrophic accidents. Indeed, the potential for catastrophe
appears to be increasing over time. A survey of the largest property losses over the past 30
years indicates an increase of 500 percent in the average size of the loss, holding prices
constant.17 A study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) notes that, in the Post World War II period, the incidence of major industrial
accidents was only one every five years or so, until 1980. Since 1980, the incidence has
risen to two major accidents per year.18
16This was also the conclusion of U.S. Department of Labor (1986) and Quarantelli (1984).
17 See Garrison (1989).




Despite these statistics, the safety record of the chemical and petroleum industries
has traditionally been viewed as excellent. For example, the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) reports that, in 1988, the overall injury rate for the chemical and petroleum
industries (SIC 28 and 29) was 6.5 injuries per 100 full-time workers as compared to 12.1
injuries per 100 full-time workers for all of manufacturing.19 However, the BLS data for
SIC 28 and 29 do not include the injuries of contract workers sustained while performing
work in the petrochemical industry. Instead, they are recorded under various construction
industry categories. Since contract workers account for well over 30 percent of the
workhours in the petrochemical industry and contract workers are more likely to
experience injuries than direct-hire workers,20 the extent of underreporting of injuries in
the industry is likely to be substantial.
The three major databases we used to develop a profile of chemical accidents--the
Fatality/Catastrophe Accident Description database, the Accidental Release Information
Program database, and the Acute Hazardous Events database (described in more detail in
Appendices A, B, and C, respectively)--all use data selection criteria that bias the databases
towards larger releases with more severe consequences to the exclusion of smaller, lower-
impact releases. As a result, the average harm per reported chemical release in these
databases will tend to overstate the actual average harm for all chemical releases, but the
number of chemical releases and the total harm from all chemical releases will be
understated in the databases. For example, the average incident in SIC 28 or 29 reported
in the FAT/CAT database resulted in .5 deaths and 10 injuries.21 Clearly these figures
drastically overstate the consequences of the average chemical release in those industries.
Conversely, the chemical releases reported in the FAT/CAT database during the period
from 1984 through 1987 for all industrial sectors were estimated to create a total of $900
million of economic harm from a combination of plant damage, lost production, worker
turnover, and decreased productivity.22 That these estimates seriously understate the total
economic consequences of all chemical releases during that period is illustrated by the fact
that the economic damages stemming from the October 1989 Phillips Petroleum Company
plant explosion (in Pasadena, Texas) alone exceeded $1 billion.23
19U.S. Department of Labor (April 1990), page 47. The BLS estimates are based on an annual survey
of a representative sample of 280,000 firms nationwide.
20John Gray Institute (July 1991), pages xv - xvii.
2 1Charles River Associates (1989), page 60.
22Lost production, especially for commodity chemical firms, may be the major financial loss
experienced, although these costs may be covered by business interruption insurance. Some evidence of the
relative importance of these costs is provided in Table A.8 of Appendix A, infra.
23See Fire & Marine Insurance News Digest (December 2, 1989), page 109.
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In its report on the impact of process hazard management standards on the
Chemical and Petroleum Industries (SIC 28 and 29), Charles River Associates reported the
accident statistics gleaned from FAT/CAT records, first report files, NRC data and the
regional newspaper survey broken down into 4-digit industry groupings.24 The statistics
reported include annual incidence of accidents per establishment, total property damage,
fatalities, and injuries over the time of analysis (1982-1988), all of which are given in Table
3.5. Table 3.6 ranks the most hazardous sectors in each of these categories and compares
their totals to the overall industry averages.
To get an idea of which sectors are the most hazardous for each type of
consequence reported, each sector's results for each consequence were normalized by
dividing them by the overall average. The normalized totals were summed for each sector
and divided by the number of consequences for which data were available. The final result
is how each sector performed on average relative to the other sectors, with a score of 1.00
indicating that the sector overall performed exactly as the aggregated sectors did, while a
score of 2.00 indicates that the cumulative accident performance for that sector is twice as
bad as the aggregated industry performance. The results are presented in Table 3.7. They
indicate that most of the severe accident statistics are concentrated in certain "super-
hazardous" sectors, including the following: SIC 2812-Alkalies and Chlorine, 2819-
Industrial Inorganic Chemicals (not elsewhere classified), SIC 2869-Industrial Organic
Chemicals (not elsewhere classified), SIC 2873-Nitrogenous Fertilizers, SIC 2879-Pesticides
and Agricultural Chemicals (not elsewhere classified), SIC 2899-Chemicals and Chemical
Preparations (not elsewhere classified), and SIC 2911-Petroleum Refining. Three of these
sectors, SIC 2812-Alkalies and Chlorine, SIC 2869-Industrial Organic Chemicals, and SIC
2911-Petroleum Refining, had cumulative average scores that were over four times worse
than the industry average. Note, however, that being characterized as "super-hazardous"
does not necessarily mean that a sector is negligent in the area of safety; the nature of the
production technology may simply be extremely hazardous relative to the industry average.
A cursory analysis of a recently-obtained update of the ARIP database, representing
over 1400 releases during the past three years, provides further evidence that the
aforementioned sectors are "super-hazardous." As indicated in Table 3.8, the same six
industrial sectors with the highest incidence of ARIP-reported releases were all identified
as "super-hazardous" from the FAT/CAT database. 25
2 4 Charles River Associates (1989).
250f the 1415 releases in the updated (1991) ARIP database, 843 involved primary producers, 356
involved secondary producers, and 216 involved "other" producers.
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2899 29 0.003 77
291 Petroleum Refining
2911 102 0.036 75
295 Paving & Roofing Materials
2951 8 0.001 4
2952 5 0.003 0
299 Miscellaneous Petroleum & Coal Products
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'Result of dividing the sector incidents by the number of sector facilities and by the years of the
analysis.
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Table 3.6 Most Hazardous Four-digit SIC Sectors having Accident Statistics (per Number of Estabsments




































Table 3.7 Results from a "super-hazardous" sector analysis of CRA's accident statistics classified by four-
digit SIC codes



























NOTE: The Scores reported are obtained by dividing the sectors result for that consequence by the
overall average result for that consequence. The overall average was calculated by adding up all the
scores for each sector and dividing by the number of consequences for which data was available. For
example, the total scores for sectors 2812, 2819, and 2873 were all divided by four because no data on
property damages were available.
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TABLE 3.8: NUMBER OF INCIDENTS IN THE UPDATED
ARIP DATABASE BY 4-DIGIT SIC CODE
4-Digt SIC Code Number of Incidents
1. SIC 2869 (P)* 199
2. SIC2911 (P)* 129
3. SIC 2812 (P)* 97
4. SIC 2819 (P)* 73
5. SIC 2873 (P)* 64
6. SIC 2821 (P)* 56
7. SIC 2865 (P) 42
8/9. SIC 2816 (P) 37
8/9. SIC 2611 (S) 37
10. SIC 2879 (P)* 35
11. SIC 2621 (S) 31
12. SIC 4911 (0) 30
13. SIC 3331 (S) 25
14. SIC 1041 (0) 22
15. SIC 4923 (0) 18
16. SIC 2899 (P) 17
17. SIC 3312 (S) 15
18. SIC 1311 (0) 14
19/20. SIC 2800 (P) 12
19/20. SIC 5191 (0) 12
* indicates that the industry sector is "super-hazardous"
(P) designates a primary producer
(S) designates a secondary producer
(0) designates a non-manufacturer (or "tertiary" producer)
.... ""
C. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS FOR PRIMARY
AND SECONDARY PRODUCERS
Accident data from the AHE MAIN database were disaggregated by relevant
categories for the following accident circumstances: the location of the release, the
reported cause of the release, and the process status at the time of the release. The results
of the disaggregation by accident circumstance, for primary and secondary producers, are
presented in Tables 3.9 through 3.11.
The analysis of release location produced some unanticipated findings, one of which
is the high severity of releases from storage areas for both primary and secondary
producers. This result is somewhat unexpected because of the remoteness of the typical
storage areas. However, as indicated in Table 3.9, storage releases had among the highest
severities of any location considered. The only exception was secondary producer property
damage impacts, which were surprisingly low given the tremendous quantities of chemicals
released. The large quantities of substances involved in storage incidents--the average
amounts released from storage locations were six times larger (for primary producers) to
twenty times larger (for secondary producers) than the next largest average release
amount--appear to overwhelm the remoteness of those installations to produce large
impacts.
Table 3.10 gives the results from the classification of the AHE MAIN release
statistics by the reported primary cause of the release. 26 In the analysis of the AHE report,
fire/explosion-initiated events seemed to be the most lethal. While appropriate for the
primary producer releases, this conclusion seemed to be inaccurate for secondary producer
releases. From Table 3.10, the other especially high-impact events include operator error,
which caused extensive plant damage for both sources and high lethality for primary
producers; equipment failure, associated with large amounts of plant damage for primary
producers but with high health impacts for secondary producers; and two causes associated
with high average property damages: upset condition (primary producers) and high
pressures and/or temperatures (secondary producers). The linkage between amount
released and high impacts is strengthened by the primary producer results (high-impact
operator error-triggered average release amounts were about eight times larger than upset
condition releases), but muddled by the secondary producer results. There, high average
-°These statistics are based on a rather simplistic, superficial, and perhaps inaccurate categorization of
primary accident "causation." A more thorough examination of chemical accident causation, both in theory and
in practice, is delayed until Chapter IV, infra.
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Table 3.9 Impacts of accidental chemical releases from primary and secondary producers as classified by
the release's location.
l , i i i I , 'm 
AHE EVENT SEVERITY STATISTICS: Primary Producers
# OF AMTREL CSLT.
LOCATION EVENTS PER EV. PER EV.
Processing 860 2,533 1.14
Valves & Pipes 674 9,780 0.71
Storage 321 59,264 3.69
Unknown 247 4,820 83
Disposal 194 5,324 0.14
Heat/Cool 66 3,142 0.82
Vehidce(ni.t.) 40 2,917 2.98
Other 31 1,007 0.54
TOT./AVG. 2,433 12,484 1.36
AHE EVENT SEVERITY STATISTICS: Secondary Producers
# OF AMTRMEL CSLT.
LOCATION EVENTS PER EV. PER EV.
Storage 163 468,386 6.23
Processing 146 19,614 1.88
Valves & Pipes 141 13,882 1.16
Unknown 76 446 2.91
Disposal 37 1,693 0.95
Vehicle(ni.t) 15 857 5.27
Other 14 1,000 9.28
Heat/Cool 9 519 4.78
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Table 3.10 Impacts of accidental chemical releases from primary and
the causation of the in-plant release. qwrli~u 
secondary producers as classified by
AHE EVENT SEVERITY STATISTICS: Primary Producers
# OF AMT.REL CSLT.
CAUSATION EVENTS ER EV PER EV.
Equip. Failure 1,248 4,783 0.68
Unknown 358 5,326 1.69
Operator Error 245 77,560 3.40
Upset Condition 183 9,377 1.40
High Pr./Temp. 109 2,734 2.12
Other 108 8,856 0.91
Fire/Explosion 90 3,116 3.74
Power Re..,ed 70 2,105 021
Disposal ReL 9 416 0.00
Spark./Ligkhi 8 416 1.88
Arson/V&a¢! 5 18,013 .11.40
TOT./AVG. 2,433 12,484 136
AHE EVENT SEVERITY STATISTICS: Secondary Producers
# OF AMT.REL CSLT.
CAUSATION EVENTS PER EV. PER E
Equip. Failure 266 12,035 3.77
Operator Error 107 703,431 1.78
Fire/Explosion 84 348 2.91
Unknown 61 1,574 4.45
Upset Condition 30 19,806 1.43
High Pr./Temp. 18 116,380 2.61
Other 16 399 0.63
Power Related 12 488 0.42
Spark./Lightn. 3 18 43.34
Arson/Vandal. 3 300 633
Disposal ReL 1 0 0.00




























Table 3.11 Impacts of primary and secondary producer accidental chemical releases classified by the process
status surrounding the release.
AHE EVENT SEVERITY RESULTS: Primary Producers
# OF AMT. REL CSLTS. PROPDAM.
CONTEXI EVENTS PER EV. PER E PER EV.
Steady-state 1,325 17,956 0.62 S 64,868
Unknown 705 6,396 2.21 $ 583
Load./Unload. 167 6,533 1.45 $ 23,952
Proc. Start-up 81 5,518 4.78 $1,480,000
Maintenance 73 5,127 391 $2,190,000
Proc. Shutdown 62 2,432 0.19 $ 0
Other 20 414 0.10 $ 0
TOT./AVG. 2,433 1,484 136 $ 152,203
AHE EVENT SEVERITY RESULTS: Seconry Producers
# OF ,.Z. REL CSLTS. PROPDAM.
CONTEXT EVEN'S PER EV. PER EV, PER EV.
Steady-state 316 5,741 3.71 $ 137,326
Unknown 169 11,484 2.61 $ 71,775
Load./Unload. 79 954,239 0.99 $0
Maintenance 19 4,351 6.89 S 263,000
Proc. Start-up 14 148,041 9.29 $1,360,000
Proc. Shutdown 4 217 2.75 $ 0
TOT./AVG. 601 135,268 3.26 $ 132,321
I I I l l ._ l l lll _ . 1 I . Il1 I : l I I ;I l 
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release amounts resulted from operator error, which yielded high property damage but
relatively few casualties. This is the converse of the relationship between high average
release amount and release consequences reported from the previous location analysis,
illustrating that amounts released do not always correlate with high impacts. Therefore,
reporting the number of events and the amounts released by itself provides insufficient
information with which to analyze accidental release statistics.
Table 3.11 summarizes the results for the processing status associated with primary
and secondary producer releases. Two apparent problem areas are releases that occur
during maintenance and process start-up. Both of these had very large average release
impacts (both for casualties and for property damages) for both primary and secondary
producers. High impacts from plant start-ups could stem from hurriedly restarting units
that have been down for either scheduled or unscheduled maintenance or from beginning
production in new facilities without sufficient scale-up testing of the process.
The relatively low impact of primary producer releases occurring during steady-state
processing is clear-cut and contrasts to the higher-than-average impact of secondary
producer releases. Finally, we see that the amount released does not correlate with the
magnitude of the impact, since the category with the highest reported average releases for
both producers had average severities that were far below the reported overall averages.
D. CHEMICAL PROPERTIES AS A FACTOR IN CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS
Chemical properties are a key precipitator of chemical accidents and a major
determinant of the magnitude of the damages. Relevant chemical properties include
toxicity, volatility, reactivity, and flammability. Toxicity refers to the lethality of a chemical
to human health. It is typically measured by the concentration that would produce severe,
irreversible human health damage after an hour of exposure to the chemical (therefore, the
lower the concentration needed, the more toxic the chemical). Volatility indicates a
chemical's tendency'to disperse to the gas phase. Flammability is the tendency of a
chemical to burst into flames or burn, while reactivity describes the tendency of a chemical
to release a large quantity of energy or to explode spontaneously. Chemicals are
characterized by each of these properties.2 7 For example, chlorine gas is highly toxic and
volatile, but both non-flammable and non-reactive. In contrast, acetylene gas is highly
flammable, volatile, and explosively reactive, but relatively non-toxic.




As indicated in Table 3.12, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) has
developed measures of chemical toxicity, flammability, and reactivity2 8 using an arbitrary
scale from 0 to 4. A related measure is the Substance Hazard Index (SHI), which combines
volatility and toxicity.29 Chemicals with high volatility and high toxicity (so that only low
concentrations are needed to produce lethal human responses) have high SHIs. However,
EPA has criticized the Substance Hazard Index, and OSHA has dropped its use, because of
the variation and lack of certainty in "acute toxicity concentration" and lack of data for
gases.30
1. Chemical Properties and Release Frequencies
An important factor in evaluating chemical safety is the volume of usage of a
specific chemical. To incorporate it in the data analysis, we have constructed a new
variable, the events ratio, which is defined as the number of chemical releases occurring
during an average year divided by the annual production rate.31 The ratios appear to be
meaningful for most chemicals and producers, as described below.
Ideally, we would like to have data on the number of accidental releases per billion
pounds of chemical used or processed for each process technology. In other words, the
ratios would be recalculated to consist of the annual usage of a chemical in place of the
annual production data. However, data were not available for such recalculation.
Recalling that approximately a quarter of the chemical industry's output is used by the
chemical industry for further processing and that half is used by non-chemical industries, 32
we get a rough idea of the magnitude of the error in not recalculating the event ratios for
primary and secondary producers. The usage of chemicals by the chemical industry would
be the annual production total multiplied by 1.25, since a quarter of the original production
is reprocessed. Likewise, the usage of chemicals by secondary producers would be the
M2Some aspects of reactivity, such as those associated with strong acids and bases, are not captured by
the rating system.
29The Substance Hazard Index is defined as the substance's vapor pressure at 20-25 degrees Celsius
divided by its acute toxicity concentration.
30Personal communication with Craig Matthiessen, April 8, 1992.
31Information about the number of chemical releases annually, by chemical, were derived from the
AHE database, as summarized in Appendix C, Section I, infra. Data on annual production rates, by chemical,
are provided in Appendix A, Section III, infra.
32See Dertouzos et al. (1989), page 189.
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TABLE 3.12: DESCRIPTION OF THE NFPA'S HAZARD LEVEL SYSTEM
FOR TOXICITY, FLAMMABILITY, AND REACTIVITY
HEALTH (TOXICITY) HAZARDS
Raxl Hazard Level Description
4 Materials too dangerous to health to expose fire fighters. A few whiffs of the
vapor could cause death, or the vapor or liquid could be fatal on penetrating
the firefighter's normal protective clothing. Protective clothing and breathing
apparatus available to the average fire department will not provide adequate
protection against inhalation or skin contact with these materials.
3 Materials extremely hazardous to health but areas may be entered with
extreme care. Full protective clothing, self-contained breathing apparatus,
rubber gloves, boots, and bands around legs, arms, and waist should be
provided. No skin surface should be exposed.
2 Materials hazardous to health but areas may be entered freely with self-
contained breathing apparatus.
1 Materials only slightly hazardous to health.
0 Materials which on exposure under fire conditions would offer no health
hazard beyond that of ordinary combustible material.
FLAMMABILrTY HAZARDS
Rank Hazard Level Description
4 Very flammable gases or very volatile flammable liquids. If possible, shut off
flow and keep cooling water streams on exposed tanks of containers.
Withdrawal may be necessary.
3 Materials which can be ignited under almost all normal temperature
conditions. Water may be ineffective because of the low flash point of the
materials.
1-lx-----1-- -----  -(-^-*-- -I I ---I ll----C-
(TABLE 3.12 CONTINUED)
2 Materials which must be moderately heated before ignition will occur.
Water spray may be used to extinguish the fire because the material can be
cooled below its flash point.
1 Materials that must be preheated before ignition can occur.
0 Materials that will not burn.
REACIIVITY (STABILTY) HAZARDS
Rank Hazard Level Description
4 Materials which are so susceptible to detonation that is too dangerous for
firefighters to approach the fire. Vacate the area.
3 Materials which when heated and under confinement are capable of
detonation. These materials are too dangerous to fight with handlines, but
may be kept from detonating if unmanned portable monitors or hose-holders
can be set up from behind explosion-resistant locations.
2 Materials which will undergo a violent chemical change at elevated
temperatures and pressures. Use portable monitors, hoseholders, or straight
hose streams from a distance to cool the tanks and the materials in them.
Use caution.
1 Materials which are normally stable but may become unstable in
combination with other materials or at elevated temperatures and pressures.
Normal precautions in approaching any fire should suffice.
0 Materials which are normally stable and, therefore, do not produce any
reactivity hazard to firefighers.
-----------------
annual production multiplied by 0.5, because only half of the chemical industry's
production is used by non-chemical industries.
(a) Impact of Volatility on Release Frequency
Despite their crude nature, events ratios lumping together release events from all
sources provide recognizable trends when they are plotted versus the chemical's vapor
pressure in Figure 3.1. Chemicals having a higher vapor pressure at a constant
temperature tend to have higher event ratios. Since a high vapor pressure indicates that a
high level of compression is needed to liquefy the vapors of a chemical and also indicates
that that substance will tend to exist in a highly-volatile gaseous state, vapor pressure is a
measure of a chemical's volatility. Therefore, Figure 3.1 indicates that volatile chemicals
will tend to have relatively high event ratios.
(b) Impact of Toxicity on Release Frequency
Figure 3.2 is a plot of the same lumped event ratios versus the chemical's minimum
lethal concentration (in parts per million), which directly measures the toxicity of a
chemical. Highly toxic substances exhibit very low lethal concentrations, and high lethal
concentrations are associated with relatively non-toxic chemicals. Figure 3.2 is consistent
with the proposition that chemicals having low lethal concentrations show a higher
frequency of reported accidental releases per amount of production than do chemicals
having higher lethal concentrations. This result agrees with findings from the AHE report
that accident release frequency is directly related to toxicity.
(c) Relationship between the Substance Hazard Index and Release Frequencies
These trends suggest that a plot of chemical event ratios versus the chemicals'
substance hazard index (SHI), defined as a chemical's vapor pressure over its lethal
concentration, should exhibit a positive relationship. This result is verified in Figure 3.3,
which indicates that more hazardous substances (as defined by SHI) have damaging
releases more frequently. The trend is unmistakable, but it is not a linear relationship
since the graph features a second order, best-fit line through data plotted on a log-log
graph. These results support the use of the substance hazard index as an indicator of the
relative danger posed by chemicals.
2. Chemical Properties and Release Severity
In describing the chemical selection process, three general categories of chemical
types were defined, based on the NFPA rankings for toxicity, flammability, and reactivity
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Figre 3.1 Chemical event ratios plotted versus vapor pressure at 20 -25 degrees Celsius. Note that points
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(stability). Those categories are: (1) reactive chemicals, (2) flammable chemicals, and
(3) non-reactive, non-flammable chemicals that are toxic.33 By classifying the release
statistics according to these three groupings, we can observe how each category of chemical
contributes to the average release consequences.
The results of such an analysis are presented in Table 3.13, for both primary and
secondary producers. The event severity statistics for highly toxic non-flammable, non-
reactive chemical releases, for both primary and secondary facilities, show high casualty
impacts (injuries plus fatalities) with markedly below average property damage. In
contrast, the highly reactive chemicals exhibit mixed casualty impacts (very high for
secondary while very low for primary facilities), but uniformly high property damage. The
primary producer statistics reinforce the conclusion from the AHE report that toxicity tends to
cause injuries while fires/explosions tend to cause fatalities, since the highly toxic chemicals
had the largest overall injury average while the reactive chemicals had more than twice the
average number of fatalities. The predisposition of reactive chemicals to cause large amounts
of property damage and to result in deaths (and presumably severe injuries as well) could
explain why much of the statistical literature on accidental chemical releases from the chemical
industry focuses on fires and explosions as opposed to toxic releases.
Attempts to evaluate the contribution of chemical properties to accident severity by
means of multivariable linear regression have, unfortunately, not proved successful.
Industrial Economics Inc., et a, the developers of the AHE database for EPA, tried to
regress event severity only against variables that described chemical characteristics, but
were unable to uncover any significant correlations. We attempted to regress accident
consequences against both chemical properties and accident circumstances (such as
location of the release within the plant, the chemical process involved, and the cause of the
release), but were unable to obtain meaningful results. Most of the coefficients were not
statistically significant, and several were of the wrong sign. We also attempted to regress
accident consequences against both chemical properties and industry sector safety
practices, but again most coefficients were either not statistically significant or of a perverse
sign. These unsuccessful results would tend to suggest that the various factors associated
with and contributing to the severity of a chemical accident are too complex and too
interactive to be modeled by simple linear relationships.
33See Appendix C, Section II, infra.
III-26
_______ __1_______111__11_1I_____X_.____I_____ 1__11__
Table 3.13 AHE aggregated MAIN data grouping results by chemical type for primary and secondary
producer releases.
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1Thes totals and averages are drawn from the AHE MAIN database and include the most catastrophic
events.
2These totals and averages are taken from the AHE report (US EPA 1989, pp. D-14 to D-22) and are
for every event attributed to either primary or secondary producers.
I _ __ _____,, _ _ _
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E. SUMMARY
This chapter has examined three major databases of accidental release events in the
U.S. as assembled by OSHA and EPA. Attempts were made to analyze these data for
correlations among several factors: chemical industry segment, primary versus secondary
producers, circumstances of the release, chemical properties, and accident consequences.
While some trends and conclusions are revealed, they do not serve as a firm basis for
prevention initiatives or policy design involving secondary prevention and mitigation. They
do, however, indicate the need to investigate primary prevention strategies.
III-28
 ----1._.___11_-1__
IV. THE CAUSES OF CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS
The cause of chemical accidents is a central issue throughout this report. The
model of acute chemical accidents developed in Chapter II, for example, identifies both
chemical hazards and related hazard-control opportunities. The profile of chemical
accidents developed in Chapter III contains accident data analyzed according to the
reported "primary" cause of the accident. In later chapters, our attempts to fashion broad
strategies and specific policies to prevent chemical accidents will be seen to depend
fundamentally on what we mean by "the causes of chemical accidents."
In this chapter we confront the issue of chemical accident causation head on. We
begin, in Section A, by exploring the concept of causation from various perspectives and by
defining causation in light of its intended use. Our intended use is to provide an
understanding of opportunities for change (i.e., how technology can be changed to
eliminate chemical accidents). In Section B, we consider the practical implications of our
interpretation of causation in the context of acute chemical accidents. Finally, in Section C,
we examine the causes of a special subset of accidents that have been termed "normal"
accidents.
A. THE CONCEPT OF CAUSATION
While frequently based on common sense principles and ordinary knowledge, the
concept of causation is a controversial one that has challenged scholars in numerous
disciplines, most notably in the field of law, but also in economics, philosophy, and other
sciences.1 The extent of the controversy is manifested in the range of conflicting terms
used to explain causation. For instance, in the law alone, "causal link," "but for" cause (or
"cause in fact"), and "proximate" cause, among others, offer alternative notions of
causality. 2 However, attempts to develop ever more sophisticated causational concepts are
IFor a legal analysis of causation, see Keeton (1984) and Wright (1985). The classic work on causation
from a philosophical viewpoint, although cast within the field of tort law, is Hart and Honore (1985). For an
economic analysis of causation, see Calabresi (1975), Landes and Posner (1987), and Shavell (1987).
Concerning ordinary knowledge concepts of causation, see Michotte (1963) and Lindblom and Cohen (1979).
Although ordinary knowledge and technical expertise do not typically share identical perspectives on
causation, in the case of common law concepts of causation they sometimes coincide, due to the influence of
jury decisionmaking in shaping the course of the law. For a comparison and discussion of the interplay of
technical and ordinary knowledge concepts of causation in a legal context, see Lachman (1984).
2 The concept of a causal link between acts or activities and injuries reflects an empirically-based
expectation that the recurrence of that act or activity will increase the likelihood that the injury under
consideration will also occur. A but for cause (or cause in fact) is an act or activity--typically one of many--
without which a particular injury would not have occurred. Proximate cause is an act or activity on which a
particular legal system wishes to assign at least partial causal responsibility for an accident (although without
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likely to be unavailing; unusual factual patterns for a specific accident, either real or
hypothetical, can be adduced to contradict, or at least to throw into doubt, any all-purpose
concept of causality.3
The following anecdote indicates the inherent problems involved in determining the
unambiguous cause of an accident:
Suppose an individual trips and falls down the stairs in his apartment
building and is injured. When investigators ask the victim what caused his
injury, he responds that the cause of his fall was the sudden barking of his
neighbor's dog, which startled him. The neighbor, an engineer, establishes
that the steps are uneven and therefore assigns the cause of the injury to the
faulty design of the stairs. The landlord ascribes the cause of the injury to
the reckless conduct of the victim, who was running down the stairs while
under the influence of alcohol. Meanwhile, the investigators, who are
representatives of the experimental sciences, simply report what they know to
be the true cause of the injury: the acceleration of gravity.4
The anecdote illuminates two essential points relevant to questions of causality. The first
point is the concurrence of multiple causes: it is usually not possible to identify a single,
independent cause of an accident. Instead, overlapping layers of causation emerge much
like the layers of an onion. The multiplicity of causes may arise because of the collective,
the reasons for such assignment, this concept does little to clarify causal relationships). See Calabresi (1975),
pages 69-73, and Hart and Honore (1985), pages 109-129.
3Consider, for instance, the seemingly innocuous concept of but for causation, which has been defined
as a necessary condition for an injury to occur. However, in many situations, but for actions are not causally
responsible for the ensuing accident under any reasonable interpretation, and in some situations, an action
might reasonably be held causally responsible even though the but for condition was not satisfied. A famous
case illustrating the former situation involved a motorman who, while running his trolley at an excessive speed,
was injured by a falling tree that crushed the roof of the trolley car. The motorman's speeding was a but for
cause of the accident, since if he were driving more slowly the trolley would not have been under the tree when
it fell. In general, however, speeding is unrelated to injuries from falling trees; that is obvious from the fact that
the motorman could also have avoided this particular accident by driving even faster. Because it was a
coincidence (to use the terminology developed in Shavell [1987], pages 110-115) that the motorman's speeding
placed the trolley under the tree precisely at the time it was falling, the motorman's actions were not deemed a
legal cause of the accident. (See Beny v. Sugar Notch Borough, 191 Pa. 345, 43 Atl. 240 [1899].) Another
famous case illustrates the latter situation. Two hunters carelessly fired in the direction of the plaintiff, who was
struck by a single bullet. Because which hunter's bullet it was could not be determined, both hunters were held
causally responsible, even though the actions of one of the hunters was clearly not a but for cause of the
plaintiffs injury. (See Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 [1948].) For a discussion of these and other
causal conundra, see, for example, Landes and Posner (1987), pages 228-255, and Hart and Honore (1985).




the additive, or the synergistic effects of various causal agents;5 or because of duplicative
effects of actions, each of which might be a sufficient cause; or simply because the causal
inquiry may be pursued backward in time to the causes of the causes. 6 The second point is
that questions of causation cannot be meaningfully resolved without reference to the
purpose of the causal inquiry. 7 Where the objectives of the inquiry differ, so will the
practical definition of causation.
Our objective in this report is contribute insight to the design of policies to prevent
chemical accidents.8 It follows that our view of causation must be tied to those individuals
or groups of individuals whose actions are capable of preventing chemical accidents. Thus,
even though the natural properties of a chemical contribute to chemical accidents and to
the severity of their consequences (much as gravity contributes to injuries from falls), it is
not adequate for our purposes to treat them as the accident cause. We must turn instead to
the activities associated with chemical production and use to provide an accounting of
those various human choices which could have made a difference.
B. CAUSATION IN THE CONTEXT OF CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS
Since the process of constructing a causal account of accident occurrence is rarely
easy, it is useful to examine the historical record in order to develop as sound an empirical
foundation as possible. It is for that reason we constructed an extensive profile of chemical
accidents in Chapter III. But a causal inquiry only begins with an accident profile: a
description of the circumstances surrounding individual accidents and a search for common
factual patterns. It remains to interpret these discernible accident patterns in light of the
purpose of the causal inquiry: here, the prevention of chemical accidents and their
associated consequences. Thus, our charge is to seek a broader account of the factors
5For example, in terms of lung cancer, the synergistic effects of smoking and asbestos exposure
together yield 5 times the effect of the former alone and 10 times the effect of the latter alone. See Selikoff
(1981), page 23.
6 For example, negligent hiring or supervision or inadequate training may precede the causal actions of
an employee.
7 This is presumably what Calabresi had in mind when he referred to cause as a functional concept.
See Calabresi (1975), page 73.
8 Most attempts to define causation implicitly reflect opportunities available to prevent accidents. For
example, the existence of proximate cause might best be explained as a recognition of this preventative function.
Similarly, economic models of causation, whether cast in terms of deterrence, efficient deterrence, or cheapest
cost avoider, are essentially concerned with providing incentives to prevent accidents (at least those classes of
accident whose expected costs exceed the costs of prevention). See Calabresi (1975) and Shavell (1987), pages
105-126.
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leading to specific chemical accidents or types of accidents and, in particular, to trace at
least some of those factors back to human actions or decisions--which, if taken differently,
might have led to a different outcome.
In our profile, we attempted to classify chemical accidents according to the
industrial segment in which the accident occurred, the location of the release within the
plant, the production process status associated with the release, the types and quantities of
chemicals released, the consequences of the release, and the relationship among these
factors and their incidence. However, these statistics derive causal significance only insofar
as they suggest possibilities for preventing chemical accidents of a specific type. Hence, our
causal inquiry must extend to the decisionmaking apparatus of the chemical firm which
shapes and indeed constrains future choice. Such inquiry encompasses not only individual
operators, engineers, suppliers, and purchasers associated with the chemical firm, but also
those individuals in top management in a position to mold or influence the corporate
culture,9 which, in turn, structures the incentives of those within the firm.10
Taking a broader view of the role of corporate decisionmaking in promoting
chemical safety has profound implications for those immediate factors, such as operator
error and equipment failure, which are typically posited to be the cause of chemical
accidents. In many cases, the immediate "cause" of a chemical accident may itself be
caused by prior corporate decisions--concerning choice of technology, operator training,
etc.--that invite chemical accidents. An example from another industry is instructive. Early
railroads operated on a single track, requiring precise timing by the switching engineer to
avoid train crashes. Accidents due to human error were rampant. However, when the
railroads shifted from single-track to double-track operation, the frequency of accidents
from "human error" fell drastically. The point is that ascribing causation to operator error
or equipment failure is suspect when the system is vulnerable to operator error or
equipment failure or when system safety is predicated on infallible, or an unrealistically
high level of, human and equipment performance. 11 For this reason, data on the reported
primary cause of chemical accidents, presented in the profile in Chapter III, are likely to
YCorporate leadership establishes, by its policies and their execution, as well as by its example, the
reward structure to which those within organization respond, thus creating the corporate culture. See Schein
(1985).
10To aid in our inquiry, in subsequent chapters we examine theories of organizational behavior and
actual organizational incentives related to the prevention of chemical accidents.
11See, for example, Wright (1986).
IV-4
I
reflect a superficial analysis of accident causation, and should therefore be appropriately
viewed.
The model of chemical accidents introduced in Chapter II was specifically designed
to accommodate a broader view of accident causation and opportunities for prevention.
The concepts of primary prevention and inherent safety, for example, recognize that
changes in the underlying technology are often capable of eliminating, or significantly
minimizing, the possibility of serious chemical accidents. In such cases, the corporation's
choice of an inferior technology is a (preventable) cause of the hazardous conditions that
permit a serious chemical accident to occur.
C. "NORMAL ACCIDENTS"
The nature of certain systems (or production technologies) plays a crucial role in an
important subset of accidents, which Charles Perrow has termed "normal accidents" in his
classic work of the same name.12 The oxymoron "normal accidents" refers to the integral
characteristics of a system, not to accident frequency. Normal accidents may be
uncommon, but the characteristics of certain production/manufacturing systems will
inevitably produce an accident sometimes, potentially with catastrophic consequences. The
technologies of chemical production and use as presently configured will inevitably lead to
some normal accidents.
The system characteristics which induce normal accidents are interactive complexity
and tight coupling. Complex interactions involve unfamiliar sequences, or unplanned and
unexpected sequences, which are not visible or immediately comprehensible. Feedback
loops, branching paths, common mode failures, and jumps from one linear sequence to
another because of proximity are indicative of system complexity. Normal accidents arise
from the unanticipated interaction of parts in a complex system, which magnifies the
consequences of a component failure. Examples of normal accidents include the nuclear
accident at Three Mile Island and the chemical accident in Bhopal. Of course, system
designers recognize the risk of unintended interactions and can introduce safety devices to
help prevent them. However, the number of possible interactions in complex systems is so
large that not all can be defeated by safety systems. Furthermore, attempts to improve the
safety of a complex system--such as by providing redundant components or by adding
accident mitigation equipment--frequently increase the complexity of the system in an




Tight coupling is a mechanical term indicating the absence of slack or a buffer
between two elements of a system. What happens to one directly and immediately affects
what happens to the other. Time-dependent processes which cannot wait or stand by until
attended to, invariant production sequences, and inflexible process design are all
characteristics of tightly-coupled systems. Tight coupling increases the potential for serious
accidents by not allowing sufficient time or slack for a system to recover from the inevitable
component failures that arise. When component failures trigger unanticipated and
undesirable system interactions, tight coupling can lead to a normal accident.
Complex interaction and tight coupling are not absolute characteristics. A system
might be more or less complex and more or less tightly coupled. Figure 4-1 reproduces the
relative complexity (ranging from linear to complex interactions) and coupling (ranging
from loose to tight) in various systems, as judged by Perrow.1 3 The systems in Quadrant 2
are both relatively complex and relatively tightly coupled; these are the systems most likely
to produce normal accidents. Unfortunately, chemical production is one of those systems,
and it is a system with catastrophic potential.
As Perrow notes, some systems are capable of becoming less complex, thereby
reducing the risk of normal accidents. However, such is not the case for "transformation"
processes, such as chemical production, which appear to be inherently complex and tightly-
coupled systems. But while normal accidents may therefore be an unavoidable risk of
chemical production, the potential for catastrophic consequences need not be. In many
cases, alternative chemical processes exist which completely or almost completely eliminate
the use of highly toxic, volatile, or flammable chemicals (for example, by replacement with
safe--or safer--substitutes). These chemical processes are also interactively complex and
tightly coupled, but normal accidents arising in these systems result in relatively harmless
chemical reactions or releases. Such benign chemical processes are an example of what we
have previously termed primary accident prevention.
When inherently-safe production technologies are available, the chemical firm's decision to
use a potentially-hazardous process is a cause of catastrophic chemical accidents, in the
sense that had the firm chosen differently, the catastrophic outcome could
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have been avoided. l4 Viewing the "cause" of an accident as the failure of management to
choose primary prevention--resulting in different technologies of production--is a necessary
first step to bringing about a significant change in the accident profile of the CPI.15
Of course, management failure has also been recognized as a "root cause" of
accidents in systems governed by secondary prevention approaches. At the core of the
process safety management philosophy is the improvement of the management safety
system. Our point is that the attitudinal and knowledge-based changes needed for primary
prevention are fundamentally different from those that improve secondary prevention.
They are more difficult to achieve without both capacity-building and strong signals from
corporate leadership and government. In addition, the payoffs may be significantly greater.
The organizational and attitudinal changes that must occur are the subject of the next
chapter.
140ne might argue that, because normal accidents result from the unanticipated interaction of
components in a complex system, normal accidents themselves are "freak" accidents that cannot be anticipated
and, therefore, cannot be prevented. Such an argument would be wrong for two reasons. First, while the
specific interactions leading to a normal accident may be unpredictable, the class of unanticipated interactions
resulting in normal accidents is a predictable consequence of certain systems and production technologies.
Indeed, as Perrow has shown, normal accidents are a predictable byproduct of chemical processes. Second,
what makes normal accidents in the chemical industry so undesirable is the catastrophic consequences that may
result. But, as indicated above, in many cases catastrophic normal accidents can be prevented.
15It is quite possible that major productive segments of the chemical-producing industries, like oil
refineries, may remain more inherently dangerous than productive segments in the chemical-using industries,
where more options are available for input substitution, process re-design, or product reformulation.
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V. THEORIES OF SAFETY-ENHANCING TECHNOLOGICAL AND
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
The design of policies to prevent chemical accidents and spills requires an
appreciation of those factors and conditions which motivate chemical-producing and
chemical-using firms to develop or adopt safety-enhancing measures. In this chapter, we
examine the theory of firm behavior with this purpose in mind. We first explore the theory
of technological change, focusing on regulatory and economic stimuli likely to induce
improved safety performance in chemical production and use. Second, we consider the
firm, not as a single or homogeneous entity, but as a complex organization whose structure
is a crucial ingredient in the degree of safety currently observed. To be effective, policies
designed to prevent chemical accidents must anticipate, and accommodate, how the various
individuals in the organization will respond.
Industrial firms typically regard safety (as well as worker health and environmental
concerns) as an objective to be satisfied separate from, but consistent with, production
output and efficiency. Decisions concerning production goals determine the technologies
to be used, with safety regarded as an externality to be "internalized." Thus, industrial
production planning often misses opportunities to "co-optimize" both production and safety
goals. Organizationally, the two functions are usually separated. Safety responsibility is
usually given to safety professionals expert at secondary prevention, but not particularly
expert at process design or choice of material inputs. The safety decisions are viewed as
the choice among possible (usually off-the-shelf) risk-reducing technologies and practices,
not the choice of inherently safe technologies. Thus, a different decision-making paradigm
is required to encourage primary prevention. Before this different paradigm can be
implemented, it is important to understand the dynamics of decision-making in the
industrial firm regarding both new technology and safety, as currently practiced.
A. TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK 1
In this section we explore the theory of technological change, which is based on
models of firm behavior, and develop a framework for analyzing the effects of various
stimuli on safety-enhancing innovations. This framework is then applied to assess the
influence of (1) regulation and (2) tort liability and other economic incentives on safety
innovations in the chemical industry.
1 Much of the material presented in this section has been published in Ashford and Stone (1991), as




Innovation is the first commercially successful application of a new technical idea.
Innovation should be distinguished from invention, which refers to the formulation of the
new technical idea itself, and from diffusion, which refers to the subsequent widespread
adoption of the innovation by those who did not develop it. Differentiating between
innovation and diffusion is complicated by the fact that adopters sometimes alter the
innovation in minor ways to suit their specific needs. When these modifications become
sufficiently extensive, they may properly be considered a separate innovation.
Innovations can be categorized in various ways. For example, they may be classified
according to the degree of technological change: major technical breakthroughs are
termed radical innovations, whereas minor technical adaptations are termed incremental
innovations. A basic distinction, that will prove useful in the subsequent analysis, is
between product and process innovations, the former being a marketable new end product,
and the latter a change in the production process.2
While the fact that innovations are defined as successful commercial applications
would seem to suggest that they are inherently socially desirable, this need not be the case.
If private markets functioned perfectly, then Adam Smith's "invisible hand" would ensure
that each innovation confers a net social benefit. But in the presence of externalities and
other forms of market failure, the social desirability of an innovation cannot be guaranteed.
New products or processes imposing social costs not reflected in the market, if in excess of
their market gain, are "bad" innovations in the sense that society would be better off
without them.
2. The Innovation Process
In order to be able to assess the impact of alternative policies on innovation
requires an understanding of the innovation process--to include the sources of innovative
opportunities, the incentives motivating private agents to engage in innovative search, and
the determinants of technological change. The body of literature in the field is vast and
largely unsettled, and well beyond the scope of this chapter to review. 3 However, a brief
examination of the two major theoretical strands in the innovation literature--only the
ZA "process innovation" should not be confused with the "innovation process," which represents the set
of activities by which new products or processes are developed. Innovations, whether of the product or process
variety, are the result of the innovation process. See Ashford and Heaton (1983), pages 110-111.
3 Extensive surveys of the literature on innovation and technical change are provided in Stoneman




second of which we embrace--should permit us to identify the salient characteristics of the
innovation process.
(a) "Orthodox" Theory
Consistent with contemporary microeconomic theory, the orthodox (or
"neoclassical") theory of technological change is grounded on the premise that firms are
motivated by a desire to maximize profits. Firms innovate in response to exogenous forces
that create profitable technological opportunities. Demand-pull innovations are driven by
shifts in market demand or relative prices. Technology-push innovations are developed to
take advantage of advances in scientific knowledge whose market value, in the area for
which the innovation is being considered, has not previously been determined.
Despite its simplicity, profit maximization as an explanation of firm decision rules
concerning innovation is an undeniably powerful concept. The ability to represent
maximization rules using calculus and other mathematical tools has facilitated the
construction and testing of sophisticated economic models of technological change. For
example, models employing a profit-maximization approach have been widely used to
analyze the relationship between the resources devoted to innovative endeavors and the
rate of innovation, however measured (that is, between the inputs and outputs of
innovative activities).
Nevertheless, the orthodox theory of technological change is seriously flawed in its
attempt to characterize the nature of the innovation process itself. The lack of descriptive
realism is obviously part of the problem. Even more important is the inability of orthodox
theory to reflect or to address the inherently dynamic quality of the innovation process.
Maximization models of firm behavior are static models: optimization arises only in
equilibrium. The dynamic process through which equilibrium comes about--an essential
component of the innovation process--cannot be explained within the context of orthodox
theory.4
(b) "Evolutionary" Theory
Dissatisfaction with the descriptive and dynamic limitations of orthodox theory
stimulated the development of an alternative, evolutionary theory of technological change. 5
4Mddels of adaptive behavior are an attempt to deal with this problem, but such ad hoc specifications
are incompatible with the strict maximization principles of orthodox theory. For further discussion, see
Griliches (1967).
5In reality, what we term evolutionary theory might more properly be viewed as a collection of related
evolutionary theories of innovation (despite the fact that Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter have termed their
research "an evolutionary theory of economic change"). The origins of evolutionary theory probably reside in
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According to evolutionary theory, firms are still motivated by profit and will engage in
innovative search to exploit perceived profitable opportunities, but profit maximization is
not their objective (at least not in any traditional sense). Innovation activities are subject
to extreme uncertainty (termed "strong uncertainty"). In addition to uncertainty about the
precise costs and outcomes of different alternatives which might arise in normal economic
situations, firms undertaking innovative search are likely to lack knowledge of what the
alternatives even are. Maximizing over a set of alternatives loses meaning when the
alternatives are not well-defined.
Confronted with strong uncertainty, high transaction costs for acquiring information,
and complex real-world problems, firms develop organizational routines--regular and
predictable behavioral patterns based on heuristics rather than optimizing decision rules. 6
Organizational routines guide the efforts of firms as they attempt to improve their products
and processes. Since these efforts require addressing (typically ill-structured) technical
limitations and economic impediments, innovation activity might be broadly viewed as
problem-solving under conditions of strong uncertainty.
Firms possess non-transferable technology-specific skills and institutional traits
(such as internal organizational arrangements or external business relationships). These
firm capabilities and organizational routines are modified over time, as part of an
evolutionary process, as a result of deliberate problem-solving efforts and the good or bad
fortune brought about by random events. Based on their capabilities and routines, certain
firms will become successful at exploiting specific technological opportunities and
translating them into marketable products and processes. Other firms, whose capabilities
and routines are less compatible with their economic and technical environment, will
become unprofitable (unless blessed by exceedingly good luck during innovative search)
and tend to be weeded out by a market version of natural selection.
Evolutionary theory portrays technological change as a dynamic process. Unlike
orthodox theory, innovative search is undertaken not only in response to exogenous
market-pull and technology-push forces; it is endogenously driven by a competitive process
whereby firms are continuously improving their capabilities and their products and
processes. Uninnovative firms are confronted with the "hidden foot" of competitors willing
the work of Joseph Schumpeter (1934, 1950). Other, more recent, contributions include Klein (1977),
Abernathy and Utterback (1978), and Nelson and Winter (1982). Many of the research developments
pertaining to evolutionary theory are discussed in Dosi (1988).
6The concept of organizational routine embodies many of the ideas of the behavioral theorists, who
first suggested that firms "satisfice" in response to problems of bounded-rationality. See, for example, Simon
(1959) and Cyert and March (1963), which spawned much of this literature.
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to take technological risks.7 The concept of equilibrium, as a stationary point in the
innovation process, does not arise in evolutionary theory.
3. Regulation and Safety-Enhancing Innovations in the Chemical Industry
Dynamic models of the innovation process, embodying evolutionary theory, can be
used to evaluate the effects of various stimuli on technological change. Of particular
relevance are several studies that, utilizing the dynamic model of innovation developed by
Abernathy and Utterback, assess the influence of regulation on innovation in the chemical
industry.8 These studies indicate that the innovative response to chemical regulation
depends on (1) the nature of the regulatory stimulus (for example, what is being regulated,
the regulatory mechanism, and the stringency of regulation), and (2) the stage of industrial
maturation of the regulated sector, its susceptibility to market incursions from unregulated
sectors, and the characterization of the technology at the time of the regulation. The
essential point is that the rate and type of innovation arising due to an exogenous stimulus--
here, the demand-pull force of regulation--is, within reasonable bounds, a predictable
phenomenon.
A couple of specific findings concerning the effects of chemical regulation on
innovation should be emphasized for future reference. First, excessive regulation,
regulation that is too stringent from a societal perspective, or otherwise inappropriate
regulation increases research and development costs and risks, diverts scarce managerial
resources, reduces firm profitability, and thereby discourages investments in research and
development and causes the rate of innovation to decline.9 Second, regulation that is too
lax also discourages innovation; instead it elicits adoption of on-the-shelf technology (and
usually add-on technology, such as an end-of-pipe pollution control device, which
minimizes the technological response of the firm). 10 Finally, stringent (technology-forcing)
/!Klein (1977) introduced the notion of "the hidden foot" as an integral part of his model of dynamic
efficiency.
8See, for example, Ashford and Heaton (1983) and Ashford, Ayers, and Stone (1985), as well as the
related research cited therein. The Abernathy-Utterback model focuses on the process of industrial maturation
of the firm (or productive segment) to explain the rate and nature of innovation. In the initial (fluid) stage, the
firm tends to create a market niche by introducing new products which are purchased for their superior
performance. During the following (transitional) stage, major process changes occur in response to rising sales
and the need to compete on the basis of price rather than performance. In the final (rigid) stage, the rate of
product and process innovation declines significantly. At this point in its life cycle, the technology is subject to
invasion by new ideas or disturbance by exogenous forces, causing a reversion to an earlier stage. See
Abernathy and Utterback (1978).
9See, Ashford, Heaton, and Priest (1979), pages 172-178.
10See, in particular, Ashford, Ayers, and Stone (1985), pages 463-464.
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regulation generally has a positive effect on innovative performance. Although such
regulation increases research and development costs, the innovative firm's early scrutiny of
health, safety, and environmental effects of new technology increases the success rate of
new products and processes brought to market.11 Furthermore, innovations that stringent
regulation causes to fail because they pose unacceptable health, safety, or environmental
hazards are "bad" innovations whose market failure should be encouraged. Hence,
regulation enhances the likelihood of both successes and failures of different attempts to
innovate. Regulation may also benefit some firms and disadvantage others. Ideally-
structured regulation may thus cause a shift in the nature of an industry or product line that
is precisely what is needed and intended from a societal perspective.
4. Tort Liability and Safety-Enhancing Innovations in the Chemical Industry
In terms of the innovation process, tort liability, like regulation, creates market-
driven, demand-pull opportunities for technological change. Tort liability--and other
economic consequences of a chemical accident borne by the chemical firm--forces the firm
to pay for the injuries and property damage for which its production activities are
responsible. From a static market perspective, tort liability must obviously increase
business costs and risks by the amount of harm the firm's existing products and processes
are deemed to have caused. In addition, product prices will adjust upwards to reflect tort
liability costs.12 The net result is that relatively unsafe activities will be less profitable (in
comparison to the situation absent tort liability), and some will become unprofitable.
These the firm will discontinue.
From a dynamic perspective, the costs imposed by tort liability also represent
valuable market information which firms take into account in planning their innovation
activities. Tort liability, by adding new safety dimensions to previous design considerations,
"increases the problem space of the engineer."13 In addition, firms are prompted to enlist
the support of toxicologists, epidemiologists, and environmental scientists in the early
stages of the innovation process to assess the safety risks of potential new products and
11See Allen et al. (1978), pages 36-39.
12The dynamics of the market adjustment may, of course, be substantially more complicated, but
similar in effect. Assuming a workably-competitive industry, product prices will rise by an appropriately
weighted average of tort liability costs. Alternatively, differential product risks may result in price spreads
favoring safer products. Note that the availability of liability insurance may have a mitigating effect, depending
on the ability of insurers to differentiate among product risks.




processes, thereby augmenting the firm's technical expertise in developing profitable
technological solutions.14 The activities associated with enhancing and verifying the safety
of new products and processes may make the innovation process more costly, but they also
increase the likelihood that the outcome will be commercially successful or have an
additional competitive advantage in the longer term.
Thus, correctly applied and properly understood, tort liability provides incentives
that both create and destroy market opportunities, but, in general, it redirects innovation
toward the development of less hazardous products and processes.15
B. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ACUTE CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS
Too often, models of the behavior of the firm have been simplified to the point of
treating the firm itself as a decisionmaking entity (or, as in neoclassical economic theory, of
vesting decisionmaking authority in a single person, the entrepreneur). Such
anthropomorphic models view the firm as a black box, the contents of which are irrelevant
to the firm's decisionmaking calculus. In reality, of course, the dynamics within that black
box--that is, the organization of the firm and the behavior of the individuals in the
organization--are frequently of fundamental importance in understanding and predicting
the firm's actions for policymaking (or other) purposes.
In this section, we turn our attention to the organizational structure of firms
involved in chemical production or use. We focus on the interaction of several key
elements of organizational structure--in particular, organizational objectives, the flow of
14Numerous studies of the chemical industry report the contribution to product and process
development made by the sophisticated analysis performed to assess health and environmental risks. See
Ashford and Heaton (1983), page 133.
15However, we should note that, even under ideal circumstances, it is possible for the presence of tort
liability to discourage the development of an otherwise successful, safe, and desirable innovation. For example,
a firm may decide not to initiate the innovation process for a socially-desirable activity because, hypothetically,
the cost of verifying its (actual, but at that time, uncertain) safety exceeds the product's expected profit.
Similarly, the higher costs of research and development occasioned by tort liability concerns may reduce the
number of innovation initiatives the firm can fund. It should be apparent, however, that unless the firm is held
liable for injuries it did not in fact cause, the likelihood of such perverse" outcomes, and the associated
economic loss, must be minimal. (As we argue in a later chapter, such "false positives are unlikely to occur for
the set of chemical firm activities under consideration.) The reasons are that (1) the research and development
costs attributable to product hazards are usually relatively small since, in the chemical industry, all of the
innovation activities through the applied research stage comprise only 17% of the total costs of new product
development; and (2) the size of the potential market and/or the per-unit expected profit in the absence of tort
liability must be negligible to be offset by safety R & D costs. See Mansfield et al. (1971), page 118.
Furthermore, research and development expenditures as a percentage of sales have been declining (over the
period from 1960 through 1980) in the chemical and allied industries at the same rate, even during periods of
intense regulatory activity. See Ashford and Heaton (1983), pages 115-117.
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information within the organization, and the nature of the firm's technology--and suggest
their relationship to the safety performance of the firm.
1. Organizational Objectives
Organizational theorists define an organization as a social system created for the
purpose of attaining specific objectives through the collective efforts of its members. The
objectives of the organization therefore are the natural starting point for analyzing the
organization's behavior. Organizational objectives can be distinguished along a continuum
from primary through secondary.l 6 An organization's primary objectives include its
internally-stated goals (which may differ from its articulated goals to the outside world) and
the prevention or management of perceived threats to its survival or growth. Examples of
an organization's primary objectives might include profit maximization, sales growth, or
product quality. Secondary objectives are things the organization does because it has to,
not because it wants to, in order to pursue and accomplish primary objectives.17 Examples
of secondary objectives might include the satisfactory provision of staff procurement and
training, information systems (e.g., telephone and computer), internal environment (e.g.,
heating and lighting) and legal compliance.
Typically the organization's primary objectives are associated with its core
production activities or are integral to its core production. An example of the latter is the
sales department of an organization, which is integral to, but not part of, the core
production process. Conversely, peripheral activities tend to be associated with the
organization's secondary objectives and usually involve the management of a particular
element of the organizational environment (such as the infrastructure of the offices in
which members of the organization work). However, even though not part of the
organization's primary objectives, peripheral activities can influence core production, and
failure to provide them can jeopardize the organization as a whole.18
Sudden or gradual changes in the internal or external environment of an
organization may create a crisis situation that threatens the organization's viability.
Examples of such changes could be rapidly rising factor prices, the defection of key staff, or
serious workplace injuries or deaths. If the change threatens secondary objectives, the
16See Cebon (1990), pages 25-27.
17See Cebon (1989), pages 1-2.
1 8 In this regard, peripheral activities should be distinguished from support activities, which have
virtually no impact on core production and whose absence or failure does not represent a threat to the
organization. An example of a support activity would be a company cafeteria. See Mintzberg (1983), page 12.
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organization has available two broad approaches for addressing the problem. First, the
organization can attempt to supply an orthogonal solution, which is defined as an
improvement in performance related to the problem without contributing to other
secondary objectives or modifying the organization's core technology. Alternatively, the
organization can attempt to furnish an aligned solution, defined as an improvement in
performance related to the problem which also directly enhances the way in which the
organization approaches its core activities. An aligned solution can involve either a change
in the organization's core production that remedies the threat to the secondary objective or
a redefinition of the organization's primary objectives to encompass the former secondary
objective.19
An example of an organization's elevation of a secondary objective to primary
objective status is the recent change in the quality culture of many firms. In the past,
quality control within U.S. firms generally consisted of random testing of finished products.
Inferior products, if identified, were scrapped or reworked. In response to consumer
demands and pressure from superior Japanese products, many American firms have shifted
from a reactive system of quality control to a proactive system of quality assurance. Quality
assurance programs typically include testing of incoming raw materials and subsystems,
monitoring of various parameters in process, and final product testing under various
conditions.20 This represents a shift from an orthogonal solution to an aligned solution.
Obvious parallels can be drawn between the development of a quality culture and
the potential for the organization to foster a safety culture as an aligned solution to
perceived chemical hazards. In general, intrinsic safety and primary accident prevention
measures would represent aligned solutions to chemical hazards, while extrinsic safety,
encompassing secondary accident prevention measures and accident mitigation measures,
would tend to be orthogonal solutions.
2. Signals within the Organization
In principle, accident prevention could be a primary objective of the organizations
currently involved in chemical production or use. Certainly no chemical firm would
intentionally want to expose its workers or the community at large to an acute chemical
accident; 21 nor would any chemical firm profess to spare expense or effort in protecting its
t9See Cebon (1990), pages 28-29.
20See Minzner (1990), page 104.
2 1By comparison, in hazardous waste disposal activities, certain firms--such as so-called "midnight
polluters"--might intentionally jeopardize the surrounding community and the environment.
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workers or the public against chemical accidents. In practice, however, accident prevention
and other health, safety, and environmental functions appear to be affiliated with
secondary objectives in most chemical firms.22 The touchstone of whether -accident
prevention is among an organization's primary or secondary objectives is not the
organization's publicly-articulated commitment to chemical safety, but the nature of its
response to potential chemical hazards and the internal signals that it transmits concerning
chemical safety's priority in the organization.
By an organization's internal signals, we mean the organization's incentive system,
its lines of authority and communication among its members, and the information that
flows along those lines. For instance, in the case of accident prevention, it is important to
know who in the organization is responsible for decisions involving chemical safety, who is
punished or rewarded for the organization's safety performance, and what information
about chemical hazards is collected within the organization and how it is used.23
In the case of peripheral activities, whose purpose is to buffer core activities from
the external environment, the organization will tend to create a separate office or
department to perform a specific secondary function. For example, if chemical safety is
only a secondary objective, the organization might be expected to appoint a safety engineer
who reports to, but is not part of, senior management. In this situation, the safety
engineer's responsibilities will typically be limited to secondary accident prevention and
mitigation devices and procedures. Indeed, the safety engineer will often be designated
only after a plant has been fully designed and construction begun or even after construction
has been completed. At this point, the safety engineer has few options but to accept the
chemical hazards that the given technology presents and to recommend add-on
technologies to control those hazards. By comparison, when accident prevention is a
primary objective, chemical safety becomes one of the organization's "products,"24 and
22See, for example, Minzner (1990), page 95.
2 3For example, Brown (1992) found that visionary leadership from senior management is an important
ingredient in stimulating innovative solutions to environmental hazards. The study also noted the significant
role that "gatekeepers" play in the organization, not only in gathering information about innovative solutions,
but also as processors of the information, integrating and filtering knowledge before passing it on to corporate
decisionmakers. Finally, the study concluded that organizations taking a broad and longer-term view of their
activities tend to develop innovative solutions; conversely, an organization's short-term profit orientation is a
barrier to innovative solutions and tends to result instead in adoptive solutions. These factors would seem to
play an equally significant and parallel role in stimulating primary accident prevention. Hopefully, the new
commitment of the chemical industry to process safety management will address organizational deficiencies and
provide safety incentives to those in the organization.
2 4 For instance, one organization, in developing an aligned solution to chemical hazards, bestowed
"customer" status on regulators, environmental groups, and local communities. See Cebon (1989), page 14.
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responsibility and concern about accident prevention pervades the organization from
senior management throughout the workforce. In this case, the safety engineer will be
designated at the outset of plant and process design, and will participate in the making of
design decisions as well as all other core activity decisions affecting chemical safety.
Just as organizational objectives will be reflected in the organization's structure,
organizational structure will dictate the nature of the information flowing through it. For
example, if the safety engineer is appointed after the design stage, information permitting
realistic cost and safety trade-offs between inherently safe production systems and add-on
safety features will normally not be available to, or considered by, the organization at the
time design decisions are made. Similarly, when responsibility for chemical safety and
other environmental activities, such as hazardous waste disposal, reside in separate
departments, cost allocation within the organization will also tend to be compartmentalized
rather than integrated. As a result, decisions regarding chemical hazards or hazardous
waste disposal, which make sense independently, often fail to appreciate the existence of
lower-cost alternatives that remove the hazardous chemical from the production process
entirely. Furthermore, organizations with independent plants and divisions often fail to
aggregate their data company-wide, thereby masking potential problems.2 5
One of the signaling problems peculiar to chemical safety is the difficulty in
determining the need for and success of accident prevention measures. This can be seen by
considering other activities of the organization, such as pollution prevention. An
organization's gradual emissions or wastes can be observed and calculated for any given
time period, and this information can be used to measure the effectiveness of the
organization's pollution prevention efforts. By comparison, acute chemical accidents are
relatively rare events. An organization implementing an effective process safety program
may therefore receive no form of positive feedback whatsoever, for if the safety system is
working, accidents do not occur. Conversely, a hazardous chemical plant may not receive
negative feedback until it is too late. That is one reason why the information contained in
near-miss events is so important. In most cases, the difference between a near-miss and a
severe accident is little more than good fortune. Most hazards reveal themselves before
the worst case accident occurs in the form of a number of near misses, or warnings. 26 As
2For example, a congressman reportedly asked Dow Chemical to provide aggregated data about its
air emissions. Previously, Dow had collected emissions information by division in the form of unit
concentrations, which were relatively modest. However, the aggregate emissions were enormous. When
confronted by its own data in this form, the company revived its waste reduction program. See Cebon (1989),
pages 7-8.
26See Lees (1982), page 225.
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Charles Perrow has cautioned, we should be sensitive to trivial events in non-trivial
systems.27
One indicator of whether chemical safety is a primary or secondary objective of the
organization is the organization's cognitive response to information about potential
chemical hazards. When chemical safety is a secondary objective, the organization will
tend to respond with denial actions, encapsulation actions, or repair actions. Denial
actions include suppressing the chemical hazard information by punishing or firing or, more
likely, intimidating the individual who brings the information to light. For instance, several
researchers have indicated the concern of many chemical engineers that there exists a
recriminatory organizational culture in which those who report minor accidents, near-miss
events, or hazardous conditions feel they will be punished.2 8 Encapsulation actions are
characterized by retaining the informer, but denying the information. Repair actions
acknowledge the information, but deny its significance. By comparison, when chemical
safety is a primary objective, the organization's cognitive response will tend to involve
reform and reorganizational actions which result in changes to the technology or the
organization, respectively.
Another indicator of the status of chemical safety in the organization can be
discerned after an acute chemical accident has occurred. When chemical safety is a
secondary objective of the organization, the organization's formal accident investigations
generally start with the assumption that operator failure was the cause, and if such
attribution can be supplied, that is also the end of the investigation. A more serious inquiry
would threaten the primary objectives of the organization: "Finding that faulty designs
were responsible would entail enormous shutdown and retrofitting costs; finding that
management was responsible would threaten those in charge; but finding that operators
were responsible preserves the system, with some soporific injunctions about better
training. ' 29
3. The Nature of the Technology
The nature of the production technology may have serious implications for the
choice of accident prevention measures. A poignant example is based on Perrow's
classification scheme for technologies introduced in Chapter 4.
2ISee Perrow (1984), page 43.
28Chemical Engineering Progress (March 1990).
29See Perrow (1986), pages 146-147.
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Recall that most chemical processes are inherently complex, tightly-coupled systems.
Chemical production systems are considered complex because they involve interactive
transformation processes with components in close connection, common mode connections,
and frequent feedback loops. They are tightly coupled because system components interact
quickly, often cannot be turned off or isolated from other parts of the process, and offer
little slack or variation in production sequence.
In the case of both complex processes and tightly-coupled processes, inherent safety
is much preferred to add-on safety devices. Because chemical processes are complex, add-
on technologies or procedures often further complicate the system in an undesirable or
unknown way, and provide additional sources of potential component failure. Because
chemical processes are tightly coupled, there is little time or slack in which add-on safety
devices can operate effectively. The nature of the chemical process is often just too
unforgiving.
By and large, we think of the organization as determining the choice of a particular
technology, but to some extent the characteristics of the organization reflect the nature of
the production technology inherent to the industry. This is certainly the case for complex,
tightly-coupled systems. Because of complex interactions, not all possible contingencies
can be planned for in advance. Hence, in the event a problem arises during production,
those closest to the system, the operators, must be able to take independent and
occasionally quite creative action. This suggests the need for a decentralized
organizational structure. However, because chemical processes are tightly-coupled, the
control of operators must be tight because there is no slack time to check out what is going
on in every part of the system. An operator acting independently is therefore a threat to
the whole system. This suggests the need for a centralized organizational structure. Thus,
in the case of complex, tightly-coupled systems, such as chemical processes, the
characteristics of the technology imply the need for contradictory organizational structures
that cannot be simultaneously satisfied. 30 This is one of the reasons chemical system
accidents are such a difficult problem to remedy.31
Apart from organizational implications stemming from the character or nature of
the technology utilized in a specific firm, there are implications--requisite to the
implementation of technological change--for the attitudes and knowledge of managers who
are likely to remain or be retained in a specific firm. If the firm is representative of a
3USee Perrow (1984), page 10.
31It remains to be seen to what extent the process safety management practices, whereby the firm's
central authority oversees training, attitudinal changes, and incentives, affect operator behavior.
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productive segment that has not been particularly innovative in the recent past, or has not
recently changed its technology, the firm is not likely to have managers who are capable of
managing technological change. Managing for productive efficiency is not the same thing
as managing for technological change.
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VI. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT ECONOMIC DETERRENTS
IN PREVENTING ACUTE CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS 1
While we believe that more than economics motivates the firm's behavior, there are
some analysts who describe the problem of accidents in purely economic terms, arguing
that it is the failure of the firm to internalize the costs of its accidents that causes them in a
behavioral sense. Our objective in this chapter is (1) to estimate the magnitude of the
economic costs of chemical hazards and acute chemical accidents borne by chemical
manufacturers and producers using chemicals as inputs, and (2) to determine whether this
economic burden effectively promotes chemical safety. Consistent with the rest of the
report, we do not include in the analysis chronic illnesses from chemical exposure,
accidents associated with the disposal of hazardous chemical residues or wastes, or
accidents associated with consumer use of chemicals or chemical products.
The economic costs we focus on here are those associated with human injury and
death. 2 These costs include workers' compensation payments and tort liability costs. Risk-
compensating wage premiums paid to employees for accepting more hazardous work (a
type of ex ante payment for expected future injuries) are also considered. However,
noticeably absent from the ensuing analysis are regulatory fines for safety violations. We
choose to exclude them for the simple reason that, as a practical matter, regulatory fines
have, to date, been of negligible amounts. For example, the eventual penalties for
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) violations in the chemical
industry averaged less than $75 during the period from 1972-1979, 3 and the average fell
during the Reagan Administration. 4 The median OSHA fine following a death or serious-
injury accident in 1990 was only $890 (less than half the 1972 figure when adjusted for
inflation).5
1Much of the material presented in this chapter has been published in Ashford and Stone (1991), as
part of an analysis of the effects of tort liability on innovation and safety in the chemical industry.
2Note that we do not examine here property damage and the value of lost production capacity, factors
which, in some cases, may be the dominant economic consequences confronting the firm. While significant
potential losses, they are also the most insurable.
3See Ruttenberg and Hudgins (1981), page 11.
4See Business Insurance (January 15, 1991), page 36.
5See Casey and Carollo (1991), page 3. Furthermore, although relatively large fines have been recently
imposed in a few cases--such as the $5.6 million penalties OSHA has proposed for Phillips Petroleum in
connection with its 1989 explosion in Pasadena, Texas--even then, the fines are only a minute fraction (typically
well less than one percent) of the total damage caused by the chemical accident. See, for example, Bureau of
National Affairs (April 25, 1990), pages 2083-2084.
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Our plan is to develop an optimal deterrence benchmark, equal to the total social
costs of acute chemical accidents, and to evaluate the economic costs borne by chemical
firms (chemical manufacturers and chemical-using firms) in relation to that benchmark.
Based on a comparison of the two, we then assess the safety incentives which these
economic costs provide.
A. THE OPTIMAL DETERRENCE BENCHMARK
The way in which tort liability and workers' compensation promote chemical safety
is by internalizing costs: that is, by confronting the firm with the injury costs its activities
(would otherwise) impose on other parties. The "correct" amount of the chemical firm's
cost burden then is simply that level which provides optimal deterrence, by making the firm
bear the entire social costs of the injuries and property damage it causes.
Several features of the optimal-deterrence benchmark merit further explanation.
First, the social costs to be internalized include both pecuniary costs--such as medical
expenses, foregone earnings, and property damage--and non-pecuniary (but real) costs--
such as pain and suffering and loss of life.6
Second, the "cause" of the chemical harm can itself be a highly controversial legal
and philosophical issue. 7 Just for the purposes of establishing a deterrence standard, we
will assume here that causation can be reasonably determined if all the facts to the accident
in question are known. 8 Note, however, that the possibility of multiple causes of the
chemical harm is not precluded. (Indeed, it is probable.) In cases of multiple causation,
we assume that responsibility can be reasonably allocated or apportioned among the
6 Some analysts (such as Viscusi [19881, pages 156-157) have noted that less than full compensation is
desirable if the injury or illness decreases the victim's marginal utility of income. Furthermore, full
compensation for irreplaceable commodities, such as one's life and health, is inefficient (from an insurance
perspective) since monetary compensation is, by definition, an ineffective form of reimbursement for these
losses (as originally demonstrated in Cook and Graham [19771). The reasoning is correct, as far as it goes; but
the analysis refers only to optimal compensation, which is irrelevant to the objective here of optimal deterrence.
On deterrence grounds, as indicated above, the firm responsible must bear the entire social costs. For further
discussion of this point, see Ashford, Moran, and Stone (1989), pages I-4 and I-5.
7 See, for example, Keeton et al. (1984), Wright (1985), and Landes and Posner (1987), as well as the
discussion in Chapter IV, supra.
8 This assumption is in no way intended to minimize the scientific uncertainty inherent in many cases
involving chemical exposure (see, for example, Abraham and Merrill [1986]). Note, furthermore, that this
uncertainty is not restricted to the tort system. For example, the regulatory process is confronted with the same
scientific uncertainty (Latin [1988]), and despite putative procedural advantages and superior scientific expertise
(Elliott [1985]), it is unclear whether administrative agencies are better equipped to deal with it (Elliott [1988],
pages 791-796).
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various parties involved. For purposes of optimal deterrence, the firm should pay only for
that proportion of the damages it has actually caused.
Third, the costs the firm bears due to tort liability are not restricted to court awards
and settlements. 9 They also include the firm's legal expenses to defend the claims; the
costs associated with diversion of scarce management and technical skills to respond to tort
claims; the premiums paid to insurers to indemnify the firm against damage claims; and any
loss of reputation the firm sustains stemming from the tort suits' connotation of fault or
wrongdoing.10
Fourth, the only exception to full cost internalization is punitive damages, in which
case the costs borne by the firm may properly exceed the total costs its actions impose on
the other party to a particular legal claim. However, the immediate objective of punitive
damages is punishment, rather than deterrence, the degree of punishment to be in
proportion to the moral gravity of the firm's conduct.11
Finally, the preceding delineation of the optimal-deterrence benchmark is intended
only to serve as a standard against which to compare the actual accident costs that chemical
firms incur; it does not necessarily represent a recommendation that parallel policies be
implemented. Thus, for example, reliance on full cost internalization to promote optimal
deterrence does not necessarily constitute an endorsement for strict liability in tort
proceedings. l2 Similarly, the fact that optimal deterrence dictates having a firm incur
liability costs only for that portion of the damages it has caused does not necessarily imply
support for introducing a proportional liability standard in the courts.
YIt is not relevant, in terms of establishing the optimal deterrence standard, what portion of the court
award or settlement is received by the plaintiff and what portion by the plaintiffs attorney. All that matters is
the total amount of damages paid by the responsible firm.
10The costs, and associated deterrence value, of loss of reputation can be substantial. For evidence of
its importance in the automobile industry, see Graham (1991). However, in the chemical industry, which is
predominantly a supplier industry to other industries, these reputational concerns may not be as significant as
they are for companies that market consumer products.
11Although the intellectual foundations differ from state to state, punitive damages are usually
intended simultaneously to punish and to deter that tortfeaser and to deter others from doing likewise in the
future. Hence the attendant terminology of "exemplary damages" is used in some states. See Ashford, Moran,
and Stone (1987), pages 28-31.
12In many situations, there is an irresolvable tension between two valid concepts of efficient
deterrence. One is the level of care, which concerns the safety precautions taken within the context of a given
activity and which traditionally has been evaluated by a negligence standard (although a strict liability rule with
contributory negligence would serve equally well). The other is the level of activity, which concerns activity
choices which maximize social welfare (requiring social costs to be internalized) and which is evaluated on the
basis of a strict liability standard. See Shavell (1987).
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The following analysis of accident costs will focus on three elements: (1) the extent
to which the firms that cause the damage incur the accident costs (termed "true positives")
and visa versa (the extent to which firms that do not cause the damage do not incur
accident costs, termed "true negatives"); (2) the extent to which the firms that do not cause
the damage incur accident costs (termed "false positives") and visa versa (the extent to
which firms that cause the damage do not incur accident costs, termed "false negatives");
and (3) the magnitude of accident costs borne by the firm in comparison to the optimal
deterrence benchmark. 13
These elements are obviously a major determinant of chemical safety. Even if
"industry" (as an aggregate) pays for the chemical damages it causes, if individual firms are
not confronted with the costs their chemical activities impose on others, then they will not
be motivated to develop or adopt less hazardous inputs and processes. As a result, in
aggregate, the frequency and severity of chemical accidents, releases, injuries, and property
damage is likely to be socially excessive.
B. CHEMICAL FIRM PAYOUT RELATIVE TO SOCIAL COSTS
In order to determine the amount of deterrence provided by accident costs, we first
identify the major social costs associated with the acute chemical injuries and estimate what
proportion of those costs are incurred by the chemical firm as compensatory damages or in
some other form. This comparison of the chemical firm's payout to the social costs of acute
injuries can be thought of as a two-step process: (1) a comparison in the case of successful
claims against the chemical firm, and (2) an assessment of the likelihood that, in an
appropriate sense, the chemical firm was responsible for, or caused, the injuries for which it
incurs costs--that is, to estimate the likelihood of the claims being true positives.
The analysis is disaggregated according to the three possible types of claimant: an
employee of the chemical manufacturer, a worker employed in another firm that uses the
chemical manufacturer's product as an input, or an innocent bystander. Of necessity,
estimates of the costs and payouts will be gross approximations, and the appraisal of the
amount of deterrence created by liability and its effects on chemical safety will be
qualitative.
13See Ashford, Spadafor, and Caldart (1984), pages 277-279, for more information about the use of
true positives, false positives, true negatives, and false negatives in predictive tests.
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1. Social Costs and Successful Claims
The social costs arising from human injury are dominated by the following: the
victim's foregone earnings from lost worktime, the victim's medical expenses for treatment
and rehabilitation, the victim's physical impairment or loss of function in non-work
experiences and activities, the pain and suffering of the victim and the victim's family, and
the losses associated with the victim's death (foregone earnings, lost lifetime experiences,
and the family's pain and suffering).
The portion of the social costs borne by the chemical firm exceeds the compensation
the victim or the victim's survivors receive directly from the firm. It also includes the
payments made by the chemical firm to economic agents, typically insurers, who assume
some portion of or all of the firm's liability in case of claims against the firm. It is logical to
assume that the price paid by the chemical firm to transfer its risks exceeds the expected
cost of the claims, since the economic agent will charge a fee for providing the service.
However, because the chemical firm derives value from eliminating the uncertainty of
injury costs and voluntarily enters into such insurance arrangements, a reasonable measure
of the social costs of injury borne by the chemical firm is the sum of the claims paid by the
firm and its insurers. (The subsequent analysis contains a loading for insurance claims-
processing costs for lawsuits.)
(a) Employees of the Chemical Firm
When the claimant is an employee of the chemical firm and sustains a job-related
injury, workers' compensation statutes generally bar workers from seeking recovery from
the employer through common law (except in cases of gross negligence or intentional
harm). Workers' compensation programs, funded by the employer's workers' compensation
premiums, provide compensation for injuries on the basis of scheduled rates, on a showing
that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment, regardless of fault.14 In the
case of acute injuries, such a showing is usually effortless and uncontested.
The percentage of the social costs of acute injury recovered from workers'
compensation by the successful claimant is summarized, according to cost category, in the
first column of Table 6-1. State statutes usually limit wage recovery to two-thirds of lost
wages, 15 unadjusted for anticipated wage increases over time, or for retirement
14Note that employees may also receive private disability insurance and life insurance benefits from
their employer, but these can simply be treated as part of the workers' risk premium, to be considered
subsequently.
15These wage benefits are not taxable, which makes their value to the employee approximately
equivalent to net income. This fact, however, does not affect the amount paid out by workers' compensation
(and funded by employers).
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contributions or health insurance, and subject to various constraints on minimum and
maximum benefits and benefits duration. The net effect is to reduce the average
percentage recovered to somewhat below 67 percent. In principle, workers' compensation
covers total medical costs associated with an acute injury, but in practice, the quality and
level of care provided tend to be minimal.16 Workers' compensation provides payment
fordisability, which reflects the socioeconomic consequences of impairment (a strictly
medical concept), but normally only insofar as earning power is affected. 17 In that sense,
disability payments actually should be classified as part of foregone earnings which extend
into the future. However, workers' compensation does not provide benefits for impairment
itself or its non-work consequences; nor does workers' compensation provide recovery for
pain and suffering. l 8
Workers' compensation does award death benefits to the employee's survivors,
ranging from $60,000 to $200,000 in most states,l 9 but these benefit levels are merely a
minute fraction of the corresponding social cost. Estimates of the valuation of loss of life,
based on individuals' willingness to pay for an incremental reduction in risk--which current
economic thinking argues is the appropriate conceptual basis for valuing risks to life--have
consistently exceeded $1,000,000; the majority of such estimates indicate a value of human
life exceeding $3,000,000; and a few estimates exceed $10,000,000.20 Recent research using
more accurate data on job-related fatalities concludes that workers collectively place a
value of from $5,000,000 to $6,500,000 (in 1986 dollars) per "statistical" life saved,21 and
-
1
°See Viscusi (1988), page 172.
17See Barth and Hunt (1980), pages 125-126.
18The magnitude of these uncompensated non-pecuniary health impacts is not insignificant. Viscusi
and Moore (1987) derive willingness-to-pay estimates for pain and suffering and impairment (non-work
disability) that equal 1.25 to 1.5 times the pecuniary losses associated with job injuries.
19See U. S. Chamber of Commerce (1990).
20Viscusi (1986) provides a review of the empirical work in the area and indicates that the estimates
under $1,000,000 (conducted in the 1970's) either depend upon questionable assumptions or are not
representative of the general population. (In addition, even these estimates would exceed $1,000,000 in current
dollars.) For a more critical view of the estimation procedures used in deriving a value per statistical life saved,
and the assumptions on which they are based, see Ashford and Stone (1988, pages 1-29). The problems they
enumerate include (1) the presence of externalities and imperfect information, which violate the assumption of
perfectly functioning markets, and (2) model mis-specification, errors in variables, and sample bias, which
undermine much of the econometric work. Some of these problems clearly result in an underestimate of the
value of loss of life.
21See Moore and Viscusi (1988). A "statistical" life is merely a linear extrapolation of an individual's
willingness to pay for a small reduction in risk. For example, suppose workers demand an extra $.01 per hour
for more hazardous work, with an increased annual risk of a fatality of 1/200,000. On an annual basis
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these estimates do not include all aspects of the social cost of premature death.
Furthermore, federal agencies concerned with health and safety, as a basis for their
regulatory decisions, have generally selected a value per statistical life saved in the millions
of dollars. For instance, the Environmental Protection Agency used a loss of life estimate
of $3,000,000 in its 1987 regulatory impact analysis of protection of stratospheric ozone--
and was then criticized for having selected too low a value.22 By comparison, death
benefits from workers' compensation provide no more than 10 percent, and perhaps less
than 1 percent, of the social cost of death.
In surn chemical firms pay, through workers' compensation premiums, 75 percent or
more of the social cost of minor acute injuries (entailing little pain and suffering), and pay
approximately 50-67 percent of the social cost of acute injuries of average severity (where
there is some pain and suffering but no impairment). Because of limits on awards, workers'
compensation pays some 10-50 percent of the social cost of severe acute injuries (with
appreciable pain and suffering and impairment) and from 1-10 percent of the social costs of
fatal acute injuries.
Workers' compensation, however, is not the only mechanism through which
chemical firms incur costs for their workers' acute injuries. In order to attract workers to
perform work which is more hazardous than the average job, chemical firms must offer
higher wages.23 However, for workers to demand a risk premium to offset otherwise
uncompensated job hazards, (1) they must have knowledge of the firm-specific and
activity-specific risks that confront them; (2) they must be able to process the risk
information in a rational manner; (3) their demands must incorporate the interests of their
family and friends (to avoid externalities); and (4) the relevant job market must be
competitive (otherwise they will be unable to express their demands effectively). Each of
these assumptions is unrealistic to a greater or lesser degree,24 but at least in the case of
(assuming 2,000 hours of work per year), workers will each receive an extra $20 in return for accepting the risk.
If 200,000 workers perform the more hazardous work, they will collectively receive $4,000,000, and on average,
one of these workers will lose his life as a result. Thus, in this example, $4,000,000 is the imputed value of a
statistical life, based on individual workers' risk decisions involving small risks to life.
22See U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (1987), Appendix G. For criticism of the dollar value,
see, for example, Ashford and Stone (1988), pages 29-38.
23See, however, Graham and Shakow (1990), who argue that a dual or segmented labor market exists.
According to them, most high-risk jobs are competed for in the secondary labor market, which is characterized
by low wages, poor working conditions, and no discernible compensation for risk.
24Consider, for now, problems with the perfect information assumption: First of all, even if
employees are familiar with the toxicity and reactive properties of the chemicals they work with, they are
unlikely to know the hazards associated with the plant design or with plant operations that potentially threaten,
but do not include them. Second, it is well documented that individuals have serious risk perception problems.
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acute chemical hazards--in which the consequences of accidents are immediate--the
employees are likely to be cognizant of many of the more serious risks. As a result, it is
reasonable to expect that many, but not all of the "residual" social costs of acute chemical
injuries (that is, those not compensated by workers' compensation) are paid out by the
chemical firm in the form of wage premiums for risk.
There are no other costs of any consequence which the chemical firm incurs as the
result of its employees' acute injuries. The transaction costs of the workers' compensation
system are low in the case of acute chemical injuries because the source of the injury is
usually obvious and rarely contested. Chemical firms therefore do not generally bear legal
expenses or tie up management or technical staff in resolving these injury claims. Finally,
being a no-fault system, workers' compensation does not award punitive damages.
In sum, the chemical firm's total payout for the acute injuries of its employees is less
than the social costs arising from those injuries--how much less depends largely on the
relative efficiency of the job market in internalizing job hazards through wage premiums
for risk.
(b) Innocent Bystanders
An innocent bystander (one who has no pertinent economic or contractual
relationship with the chemical firm whose activities or product caused the damage) can
attempt to obtain recovery for injuries sustained in a chemical accident by bringing tort
action against the chemical firm. If their claims are successful, innocent bystanders receive
the full compensation to which they are entitled from the chemical firm (and its insurers)
for all foregone earnings and medical expenses associated with the acute injury.25 The 100
percent recovery for these social costs is presented, for innocent bystanders, in Column 2 of
Table 6-1. However, the average liability awards in death cases--including both court
(See, for example, Tversky and Kahneman [1974], pages 1124-1131, and Machina [1987], pages i41-147.) In
principle, individuals are just as likely to overreact as underreact to hazard information, but in practice, worker
risk perception appears to be dominated by an "it-can't-happen-to-me" syndrome, which results in known risks
being understated and therefore undervalued. (See Ashford [1976], page 357.)
25Innocent bystanders may also sustain property damage as the result of an acute chemical accident.
We assume claimants receive full recovery for these damages (but, to avoid unnecessary complications, have not
included them in the ensuing analysis).
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awards and out-of-court-settlements--is under $220,000,26 which is less than 10 percent of
the associated social cost, even assuming a value for a statistical life of only $3,000,000.
Presumably, successful tort claimants are fully compensated by the chemical firm for
the social costs of impairment and pain and suffering brought about by the acute injury.
Nevertheless, the fact that average liability awards in death cases are more than an order of
magnitude below their social cost casts doubt on the comprehensiveness of impairment and
pain and suffering awards, which--like the valuation of loss of life--might be considered
somewhat subjective in nature.2 7 Thus, one might reasonably anticipate that juries which
award successful claimants less than 10 percent of the death benefits which economic
research suggests they should will correspondingly award less than full impairment and
pain and suffering damages, and perhaps substantially less. 28 Because of their subjectivity,
we grudgingly retain the 100 percent figures but accompany them in Table 6-1 with a
question mark to reflect our doubts.
Even assuming 100 percent recovery of impairment and pain and suffering costs, the
chemical firm's compensatory payments are less than 40 percent of the social costs arising
from acute injuries. The reason is that fatal injuries comprise such a large share--at least
70 percent, under conservative assumptions--of the total social costs of acute injuries.2 9 If
2OThe average awards in death cases were derived from both court awards and out-of-court
settlements in product liability suits concluded in 1977. The source of the figure (as reported in Viscusi [1988],
page 173) is Insurance Services Office (1977), page 113, adjusted to reflect price increases to 1985 values using
the Consumer Price Index. (Unfortunately, the ISO study has not been updated, and other data sources, such
as Jury Verdict Research, Inc., are biased upwards because they do not include out-of-court settlements.)
27However, as indicated earlier, Viscusi and Moore (1987) have derived willingness-to-pay estimates
for pain and suffering and impairment that exceed the pecuniary losses from injury by 25 to 50 percent.
28One possibility, admittedly untested, is that juries award damages predominantly on the basis of
pecuniary losses where possible. That would explain the considerable under-compensation--relative to social
cost--in death awards: juries are basing damages primarily on the casualty's discounted future earnings. If that
is so, juries are likely to seriously under-compensate impairment losses as well, by treating them as workers'
compensation does, as disability benefits for future loss of earning capacity. In that case, impairment itself and
its non-work consequences would go largely uncompensated. Evidence concerning the magnitude of
compensation payments for disability and impairment, as developed by Hensler, promises to shed some light on
this matter. Telephone conversation on August 14, 1990 with D. Hensler, Rand Corporation.
29 Data from the Insurance Services Office (1977), page 113, indicate that fatal injuries, while
comprising only 3.6 percent of the death award cases, account for 18.8 percent of total liability award payments.
But, as previously shown, those death awards represent less than 10 percent of the corresponding social cost.
Even taking an upper bound of 10 percent, implying the value of a statistical life of $2,200,000, fatal injuries
constitute 70 percent of total social injury costs, of which the chemical firm's compensatory payments comprise
less than 40 percent. For a value of loss of life of $3,000,000, fatal injuries' share of total social injury costs rises
to above 75 percent, and the chemical firm's compensatory payments falls to below 30 percent of total social
costs. For a value of a statistical life of $5,000,000--a recent lower-bound estimate derived from significantly-
improved fatality statistics (Moore and Viscusi [1988])--fatal injuries account for 84 percent of total social injury
costs, and the chemical firm's compensatory payments cover less than 20 percent of total social injury costs.
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impairment and pain and suffering costs are, in fact, incomplete, then the chemical firm's
compensatory payments comprise an even smaller share of the social costs of acute injuries.
Compensatory damages are not the only tort costs borne by the chemical firm.
Successful claimants may be awarded punitive damages from the chemical firm.30 On
average, trial awards for punitive damages are equal to approximately 25 percent of
compensation damages. 31 However, based on very rough estimates, posttrial appeals and
settlements reduce punitive damage awards to from 8 to 19 percent of compensatory
damages. 32 Using the larger figure of 19 percent and recalling that compensatory damages
paid by the chemical firm comprise only 40 percent of acute injury costs, we gauge that
Two possible qualifications in the use of the Insurance Services Office (ISO) data come to mind. First,
the data were derived from product liability cases of all types. It is possible that the composition of tort suits
involving acute injuries from chemical products and those involving innocent bystanders will be significantly
different, although we have no reason to believe that is the case. Of course, to the extent that tort suits for
acute chemical injuries consist of a larger percentage of fatalities, the share of total injury costs covered by the
chemical firm's compensatory payments will decline even further. The second qualification is that liability
awards have increased since 1977. (For example, Jury Verdict Research, Inc. [1991] found that the average jury
award for a wrongful death of an adult male in 1989 was $1,057,612; but that figure is not representative of all
classes of fatality or all liability cases, since settlements are not included. In addition, the figure will generally
contain medical expenses incurred by the victim prior to death. All of these factors will tend to bias the
reported figure upward relative to the true average.) However, even if awards for fatal injuries were to rise to
$1,000,000, assuming the value of a statistical life is $5,000,000, the chemical firm's compensatory payments
would still comprise less than 40 percent of total injury costs. To offset the possibility of this effect, we have
used a very low value of loss of life in the text.
The reader can verify the preceding results by applying these two formulas:
(1) C = PI + mPD and (2) S = (PI + PD)/C
where P is total non-death compensation; PD is total death compensation; m is the ratio of the true social cost
of statistical deaths to death compensation; C is the total social cost of acute injuries (fatalities included); and S
is the share of social injury costs covered by the chemical firm's compensatory payments.
30Recall, however, that punitive damages are, strictly speaking, not intended as an offset to the social
costs of injury, but as a punishment for the firm's outrageous conduct.
31This estimate was reported in U. S. General Accounting Office (1989), page 29, based on its study of
product liability lawsuits. Punitive damages are rarely awarded. A Rand Corporation study concluded,
"Punitive damages continue to be rarely assessed in personal injury cases, and most frequently are assessed
against defendants who were found to have intentionally harmed plaintiffs. In most of these cases the damages
were modest." Peterson, Sarma, and Shanley (1987).
32U. S. General Accounting Office (1989), pages 45-47, indicates that after appeal, the defendant's
damages were reduced to 76 percent of the trial award in cases without punitive damages and to 40 percent of
the trial award in cases with punitive damages. Furthermore, in the latter case, virtually all of the reduction
came from punitive damages. On the basis of this information alone, we can calculate, crudely, that punitive
damages amount to only 12 percent of compensatory damages after appeal. However, the relative size of the
appealed to the not-appealed cases and of the appealed punitive damage cases to those without, information not
fully obtainable from the data, could alter the percentage somewhat in either direction.
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punitive damages paid by the firm are equal to approximately 8 percent of acute injury
costs.
Chemical firms also incur transaction costs to defend against tort claims.33 Legal
fees and expenses have been estimated to equal approximately 30 percent of compensatory
damages,34 which translates to approximately 12 percent of acute injury costs. In addition,
the chemical firm bears the opportunity cost of management and staff time spent in
contesting claims, other non-legal expenses, and claims-processing costs (including
insurance claims-processing costs) for lawsuits. These have been estimated to total to 22
percent of compensatory damages, 35 which is equivalent to approximately 9 percent of the
social cost of acute chemical injuries.
Taking into account compensatory damages, punitive damages, and all transaction
costs associated with defending against tort claims, the total costs borne by the chemical
firm--for claims filed by innocent bystanders--comprise just below 70 percent of the social
cost of acute chemical injuries. Even this estimate may be too high. It depends on a
relatively low value of loss of life and full recovery by the claimant for impairment and pain
and suffering. In addition, it ignores the effects of statutory caps on awards and award
exclusions (e.g., punitive damages), which serve to limit the chemical firm's payout even
further.3 6
3-3Here we include transaction costs for all claims filed against the chemical firm, both successful and
unsuccessful (from the view of the claimant).
34Kakalik and Pace (1986), page 115, calculate that the defendant's ratio of average legal fees and
expenses to average compensation, for organizations in non-automobile tort litigation, is 32 percent in state
courts and 18 percent in federal courts. Since most litigation takes place in state courts, a composite 30 percent
ratio seems appropriate. Data in U. S. General Accounting Office (1989), page 53, suggest a ratio of from 33
percent to 39 percent for product liability cases settled by trial verdicts. Since the large majority of product
liability claims were reported as being resolved in pretrial settlements, which required significantly lower legal
fees and expenses, an adjustment to 30 percent is not unwarranted. Third party claims by innocent bystanders
might have lower legal fees because the question of comparative negligence is not at issue; however, that effect
is largely negated by the fact that purchase of the chemical product comes with an implied warranty, breach of
which gives rise to a cause of action.
35See Kakalik and Pace (1986), page 73, for summary data from non-automobile tort suits.
36the effect of caps and exclusions for particular award categories, however, is surely diminished
somewhat by the jury's ability to shift benefits it feels are justified (but statutorily barred) to another award
category. Thus, for example, the statutory exclusion of punitive damages may, in some cases, simply result in
inflated pain and suffering awards. In addition, it is possible that some juries increase the size of the award to
offset (their expectation of) the legal fees a sympathetic plaintiff must pay.
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(c) Employees of Other Firms
Finally, the claimant may be a worker employed by another firm (a firm other than
the chemical firm) which uses the chemical firm's product in its business activities. In this
case, the percentage of the social costs of acute injuries incurred by the chemical firm
depends on which of three actions the claimant takes.
First, the worker may file a workers' compensation claim. In that event, the costs
borne by the employer are identical to those calculated earlier for chemical firms whose
employees file workers' compensation claims. The only difference is that the employer of
the injured worker, rather than the chemical firm, bears those costs.
Second, the worker may file both a workers' compensation claim through his
employer and a product liability suit against the chemical firm whose product caused the
job-related injury. 37 The situation regarding the chemical firm is no different from the
innocent bystander claims just analyzed. The total burden on the chemical firm and the
employer, however, is generally less than the sum of its parts. Under typical workers'
compensation arrangements, a worker who recovers in full from a third party and also
receives workers' compensation awards must reimburse the employer for associated
payments made by the employer into workers' compensation. 38 Nevertheless, both the
employer and the chemical firm bear part of the social cost associated with the worker's
acute injury. The employer still pays the worker a risk premium to perform more-
hazardous work while the chemical firm incurs product liability costs comprising
approximately 70 percent of the social costs of the acute injury.
Third, the worker may file only a product liability suit against the chemical firm
whose product caused the job-related injury. However, this case leads to the same shared
burden between the chemical firm and the employer as when the worker files both for
workers' compensation and tort damages. The employer still pays ex ante expected injury
damages in the form of wage risk premiums, and the chemical firm incurs liability costs
amounting to approximately 70 percent of the social costs of acute injuries.
We note, for subsequent analysis of deterrence effects, that while the chemical
firm's liability burden is less than the total social costs arising from the acute injury, the
costs incurred by "industry" as a whole theoretically could exceed total injury costs when the
7 Although workers' compensation statutes prohibit workers from filing tort claims against their
employer, they are not barred from bringing a tort action against a "third party," such as the chemical firm.
38In addition, a few states allow third parties successfully sued by workers under product liability to
seek proportionate reimbursement from a negligent employer. The effect of this legal option is clearly to reduce
the chemical firm's burden. However, since this situation is the exception rather than the rule, we do not
include it in the subsequent analysis.
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worker collects from third parties. That outcome, however, is subject to the earlier
qualifications about (1) whether tort liability actually supplies complete compensation for
impairment and pain and suffering and (2) whether wage premiums provide full
reimbursement for residual risk.
2. True and False Positives: True and False Negatives
Up to this point, analysis of the burden of acute chemical injuries borne by the
chemical firm has assumed that the firm's payout was purely for the acute injuries it caused.
We now examine that assumption.
For employees of the chemical firm or employees of other firms seeking recovery
for job-related acute chemical injuries, one can argue that workers' compensation awards
are based on valid claims in virtually all cases. Acute chemical injuries immediately
manifest themselves, and the linkages from the acute injury to the workplace chemical
product or activity to the employer are apparent. Some workers may exaggerate the effects
of an injury, but that possibility is offset by the fact that others choose not to or are
encouraged by their employers not to file a claim at all. For reasons similar to those above,
tort claims seeking recovery for acute chemical injuries filed by innocent bystanders are
generally meritorious, although here the patent connections are from the acute injury to
the injury-causing product or activity to the chemical firm responsible.
Two elements of chemical firm costs arising out of tort liability also need to be
addressed within the context of meritorious claims. The first is punitive damages. On the
surface, it is difficult not to acknowledge that the magnitude of jury awards for punitive
damages is, in many cases, unpredictable and perhaps occasionally inconsistent from case
to case. At the same time, substantial evidence exists that appellate courts, on appeal, have
been generally successful in correcting the errors made in the lower court and in narrowing
the degree of unpredictability of punitive damages. 39 In addition, it is important to bear in
mind that the immediate objective of punitive damages is common justice, including
punishment for socially-reprehensible conduct. Questions of efficient deterrence are, at
best, of secondary importance where punitive damages are concerned. 40
"
9See, for example, U. S. General Accounting Office (1989), page 47. However, the subjective nature
of what constitutes socially-unacceptable conduct and what punishment is appropriate in response makes an
objective bench mark difficult to define, much less apply. Therefore, what may be characterized as an "error"
on appeal might, on occasion, be more accurately described as substituting the appellate court's values and
preferences for the jury's.
40By analogy, one would not excuse a convicted criminal from imprisonment just because he would be
more productive out of jail.
VI-14
1111-·--1 1 -- ---···---·- ·-·------·-·-·--------- I^-------
The second cost element to be addressed is transaction costs. It is possible,
although inaccurate, to argue that having the chemical firm (the defendant) bear its own
legal costs and other tort-related expenses for the cases it wins represents a type of false
positive.41 The flaw in this reasoning is that prior to the verdict by the court, the success or
failure of the plaintiffs claim is not certain or known by the parties to the suit.42
Transaction costs are merely the price one pays to obtain social justice: they are the costs
of using the tort system to obtain a just decision rather than costs to be decided through the
tort process.
C. THE DEGREE OF DETERRENCE
As indicated earlier, the accident costs which chemical firms bear provide a signal to
engage in hazard prevention activities.43 The deterrence effects of accident costs need to
be examined with great care. From an economic perspective, optimal deterrence is
achieved by the internalization of all social costs of chemical production and use. In
general, over-deterrence may arise if costs which exceed or are unrelated to these social
costs are imposed on private actors. However, we argue that the imposition of punitive
damages should not be confused with over-deterrence because those damages serve a
moral and symbolic function, satisfying a need for just punishment of wrongdoers. Good-
faith and knowledgeable chemical firms have little to fear from punitive damages because
it is highly unlikely that they would be imposed on them. On the other hand, the specter of
punitive damages not only encourages good-faith industrial activity; it also prods the firm to
gain the knowledge required to assess the risks of its technology.
There are many factors which influence the firm's response to the expected value of
economic costs associated with chemical harm. These factors include the role of insurance,
41A parallel argument for the successful defendant would be equally wrong. In principle, however, one
might argue somewhat differently, that the high transaction costs deter injury victims from filing valid tort
claims and result in false negatives. In the case of acute chemical injuries, for which establishing causation is
generally not an issue, such arguments would appear to be groundless.
42By analogy, the risk premium workers receive for undertaking a hazardous job is an ex ante
mechanism for reducing uncertainty. If analyzed only after the job is done, however, one might conclude, again
incorrectly, that the injured workers were undercompensated and the uninjured workers overcompensated. The
point is that at the time the risk premium was paid, it was not known which of the workers would be injured.
43This is one of the essential lessons to be derived from the earlier examination of the innovation
process. Acquiring information and engaging in innovative search are costly to the firm. The uncertainty of
liability costs attracts the attention of management and redirects its activities to exploit profitable safety
opportunities which arise from the avoidance of these tort system costs. Liability awards not only bring to the
attention of industry the advantages of minimizing the hazardous effects of technology, they also raise the
importance of safety in technological planning in general.
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the extent to which the firm produces a diversified mix of products, and the desire of the
firm to maintain its reputation as a good corporate citizen.44 Table 6-2 presents a number
of possible scenarios for the firm under which it feels varying degrees of motivation to
engage in hazard-reducing activity, including the search for safer products and processes.
In the case of firms which are fully insured for worker injuries through workers'
compensation, there is little incentive to engage in preventive activities, beyond an interest
in reducing the wage premium for risk that workers demand; the only exceptions are those
rare cases where compensation premiums are both a high percentage of the cost of doing
business and the firm is merit-rated. 45 The same is true for injuries to others for chemical
firms insured through enterprise liability insurance. 46 Through its risk-spreading
properties, insurance shifts the total social costs of chemical damage away from the firm,
causing under-deterrence. In the case of worker injuries or enterprise liability, the
incentives that do exist for insured firms probably are directed to limiting the effects of an
accident once it occurs (e.g., providing fire extinguishers), rather than preventing it in the
first place.4 7 Further, minimum loss prevention advise originates with the insurance
carriers, who generally lack the requisite technical and scientific expertise to suggest
technological changes in chemical products and processes. 48
440ne important factor, not generally relevant for acute chemical injuries (except perhaps in Bhopal-
sized accidents), is the size of the chemical firm's assets in relation to the magnitude of its tort liability burden
and the ease with which the firm can evade that burden by seeking bankruptcy protection.
450nly the very largest firms, representing about 15 percent of employees, are self-insured. (However,
many of the larger chemical firms fall into this category.) The remaining firms are either class-rated, based on
industry-wide safety and health performance, or experience-rated, which is a class rating adjusted by the
individual firm's safety and health record. These firms' payments into workers' compensation are only loosely
related to the costs their employees' injuries and illnesses impose on the system. See Ashford and Caldart
(1990), page 228.
46However, the fact that product liability insurance has become exceedingly expensive in recent years
and, in many cases, become unavailable has forced many firms to self-insure. These consequences of the
insurance "crisis" have generally served to stimulate risk prevention incentives (although they may be
accompanied by some efficiency losses as well). See, for example, Abraham (1986), pages 14-16, and Ashford,
Moran, and Stone (1989), page V-6.
47Chemical firms with workers' compensation and enterprise insurance still are motivated to prevent
safety hazards that threaten to damage or destroy their own property (although that is usually insured as well).
Furthermore, the terms of most insurance policies contain some deterrence features of their own, such as
coinsurance and deductibles, but these clearly are of secondary importance.
48"Insurers have little knowledge of the loss-prevention or loss-protection technologies available to the
insured chemical handlers. Interviews with underwriters reveal little interest in developing their own knowledge
base about either technologies or losses." (Katzman [1988], page 86.) However, the recent development of risk
retention groups, group captives, and other user-financed insurance mechanisms promises to improve risk
management skills and to provide a payoff for the firms that participate. (See Ashford, Moran, and Stone
[1989], pages V-5 and V-6.)
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In the case of chemical firms which manufacture many chemical products or have
multiple plants, the expected value of economic losses due to chemical harm to workers
and bystanders provides a degree of deterrence, at least to the extent that the firms are not
insured and must self-insure. For -the uninsured chemical firm which manufactures few
products at a single plant, it is the reasonably-likely upper bound of a loss, rather than the
expected value of the loss, which drives the firm's preventive activities. This extra incentive
reflects the risk averseness of those firms against business disruption and sudden
catastrophic economic loss. These firms will go an extra measure to prevent chemical
harm, but this should not be confused with over-deterrence. Rather, it is in the former
case, where firms are insured, that there is under-deterrence.
In Figure 6-1, the smooth curve depicts the hypothetical probability of an award as a
function of its size. The value to the firm of avoiding damage is identical with this curve for
small awards. As awards increase in size, the risk-averse firm will increasingly value risk
reduction and will spend increasing amounts to avoid liability, as shown in the dashed
curve.49 The capping of awards (shown as a solid vertical line in Figure 6-2) or risk
spreading through insurance (where premiums are collected, as indicated by the hatched
area in Figure 6-2) decreases the risk averseness of the firm and, hence, expenditures for
developing or adopting safer products and processes.
Attempts to avoid accident claims (with or without the possibility of punitive
damages) may drive either an uninsured or an' insured firm to take special efforts for
prevention. In this case, the firm is responding not merely to its expected economic losses,
but also to the value it places on maintaining a good reputation. Poor corporate images are
avoided by good corporate citizens. Expenditures incurred by firms to develop safer
products or processes may exceed the expected value of losses for not doing so or even the
reasonably-likely upper bound of a loss. This too should not be attributed to over-
deterrence since the firm values the avoidance of liability beyond the immediate or
monetizable economic costs. Similarly, risk-averse firms that decide not to employ unsafe
products or processes may do so because they value the avoidance of liability risk more that
the net profits that might have been enjoyed. If the firms that decide not to employ unsafe
processes do not have the intellectual resources to develop new technology, they may suffer
4 9 One possible functional relationship is:
V = px(d + kld2 + ... +kndn+1),
where V is the value to the firm of avoiding damage costs; p is the probability of damage; and d is the severity of
damage. The firm's risk averseness is reflected in the higher order terms of this expression.
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economically. However, other firms--notably new entrants--may develop new technologies
and profit therefrom.
As we determined in the prior analysis, the chemical firm does not bear even the
expected value of the social costs of acute chemical injuries. Thus, accident costs currently
provide inadequate deterrence for the development or adoption of safer chemical inputs
and processes, such under-deterrence being exacerbated by the availability of insurance
and other risk-spreading mechanisms. Although there is under-deterrence from an
economic perspective, nevertheless what deterrence does occur as a result of prospective
chemical accident costs tends to promote safer technologies for those firms that
value"doing the right thing."50 Ensuring that the economic costs associated with acute
chemical hazards are fully internalized would create even greater incentives. However, at
present, economic incentives are insufficient to spur either primary or secondary
prevention. There are other factors, notably lack of information and managerial attitudes,
that also constitute barriers to chemical accident prevention. These are discussed in the
next chapter.
~0For these firms, factors beyond economic considerations stimulate them to engage in a search for
better products or processes. In the context of tort suits, the possibility of punitive damages or a damage to
reputation may stimulate the search for new products and processes, even though the economic factors




VII. BARRIERS AND INADEQUATE INCENTIVES
FOR THE PREVENTION OF CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS
Our objective in this chapter is to identify the major impediments to primary
accident prevention, relying on the materials presented in the previous five chapters.
Before turning to that task, however, we would like to draw on those same materials to
summarize why primary accident prevention is generally the superior method of achieving
chemical safety--or alternatively, why accident mitigation and secondary prevention, by
themselves, may be inadequate.
First of all, to operate effectively, most secondary prevention and accident
mitigation systems must be properly designed and maintained, demanding time and
resources from the firm. The chemical industry has recognized this through its process
safety management approach.1 Often, particularly during periods of high capacity
utilization or low profitability, such allocations are not made. Failures of safety systems
due to faulty design or maintenance are repeatedly mentioned in accounts of chemical
accidents. 2 Second, operators sometimes turn off or bypass secondary prevention
equipment in order to improve production yield or to avoid maintenance tasks. 3 Third, the
initial chemical release often causes sufficient damage to disable mitigation devices. Such
mitigation failure typically occurs when the chemical accident involves a high-energy
release or an explosion. 4 Fourth, when elements of the production process or the plant are
modified, the safety systems normally should be upgraded or reconfigured to maintain their
effectiveness. In practice, however, when changes are made in production or plant, safety
systems are often ignored. 5 Fifth, the presence of secondary prevention and accident
mitigation systems may create a false sense of security within the firm, encouraging
management to build ever larger plants and to run processes at higher temperatures and
1See, for instance, Center for Process Safety (1989 and 1992).
2See, for example, Bradford (1990); King (1990), pages 429-477; and Kasperson et al. (1988), pages
102-117.
3See, for example, Howard (1983), page A13.
4For example, a relatively small hydrocarbon explosion at a refinery caused the failure of a hydrofluoric
acid storage tank and destroyed the water-spray system specifically designed to keep a hydrofluoric acid release
from migrating off-site. As a result, three thousand nearby residents had to be evacuated from their homes.
See Chemical Week (May 16, 1990), page 9.
5 See, for example, Minzner (1990), page 74.
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pressures, for longer periods of time, using more dangerous chemicals.6 The net result may
be to increase the hazards inherent in the system. Sixth, "normal" accidents appear to be an
unavoidable risk of transformation processes such as chemical production. 7 Accident
mitigation and secondary prevention, by themselves, are unable to eliminate either normal
accidents or their catastrophic potential. (That is why a constant vigilance must be built
into safety management systems.) Finally, accident mitigation and secondary prevention
may actually help trigger some normal accidents by increasing the complexity of the
production system and by increasing the number of components susceptible to failure.
Supporting our assessment of the shortcomings of accident mitigation and secondary
prevention is the fact that of the seven "super-hazardous" segments, in which catastrophic
releases in SIC 28 and SIC 29 were concentrated, safety practices in six were above the
industry average.8 Furthermore, over half of the chemical releases and over half of the
injuries reported in an OSHA survey of chemical producers and chemical users occurred at
facilities that had implemented state-of-the-art process safety management (PSM)
programs. 9 Thus, current safety initiatives are not getting the job done, although greater
vigilance would have some payoffs.
The preceding discussion has summarized why primary accident prevention is the
preferred method of achieving chemical safety. In the remainder of this chapter, we
attempt to identify the major barriers to the adoption of a primary accident prevention
approach. To facilitate the analysis, we have grouped the barriers into the following seven
categories: 10
o Imperfect Information
o Inadequate Economic Incentives
b"Fixes, including safety devices, sometimes create new accidents and quite often allow those in charge
to run the system faster...or with bigger explosives." Perrow (1984), page 102.
7Recall that normal accidents are defined as "the interaction of multiple failures that are not in a direct
operational sequence." (See the discussion in Chapter 4, supra, and Perrow 1984], page 23.)
8See Kearney/Centaur (1990), pages 3-19 to 3-23. However, the Kearney/Centaur study was criticized
in OSHA rulemaking hearings for actually addressing personnel protective equipment practices rather than
process safety management. Process safety management was only inferred from the data.
9See Section II of Appendix A, infra. However, we note that none of the firms in the survey had all
process safety management elements in place.
10In Chapter VIII, infra, we develop a set of policies to remedy these barriers to chemical accident
prevention. The policies are grouped into categories that address the parallel barrier categories. It is suggested
that the reader go back and forth, by category, between corresponding sections of Chapters VII and VIII.
VII-2






There is obviously substantial overlap and interaction among these categories. For
instance, if regulators conduct site inspections too infrequently (a regulatory problem),
firms need not fear the threat of fines for safety violations (an inadequate economic
incentive); consequently, firms might not be induced to provide a structure that rewards
their management and staff on the basis of their safety performance (an organizational
problem).
We also note that committing to accident mitigation and secondary prevention may
itself unwittingly constitute a sort of barrier to primary accident prevention by
(1) misleading those inside and outside the firm into believing that primary accident
prevention is not needed; (2) creating vested interests in the organization to maintain the
status quo; l l (3) partially reducing chemical hazards, ostensibly reducing the additional
benefits of primary prevention; (4) making it more costly and difficult to modify the plant
infrastructure to accommodate primary accident prevention measures; and (5) reducing
the financial resources available for primary prevention.
A. IMPERFECT INFORMATION
As discussed below, inadequate information is a major barrier to efforts to improve
chemical safety. Many chemical-producing and chemical-using firms are simply not aware
of (1) the total costs they already incur for secondary accident prevention and accident
mitigation systems; (2) their actual losses due to chemical accidents or their likely or
potential losses should a chemical accident occur; or (3) the existence of inherently-safe
technological alternatives, and their costs. 12 Of course, some firms may not realize the
extent to which chemical hazards are present and therefore have not sufficiently considered
what to do about them. These informational problems are compounded by an inadequate
11See Cebon (1990), page 31.
12See, for example, Perrow (1986), pages 151-154; Minzner (1990), page 103; Abrams and Ward
(1990), page 146; and Kasperson et al. (1988), page 117.
VII-3
7_ 11 ___________3_____11I _l______L____·___1_1I _ I
chemical accident reporting system and the failure of government to provide sufficient
information about primary accident prevention.
1. Improper Internal Allocation of Accident and Accident Prevention Costs
One informational deficiency confronting many firms is the fact that their internal
accounting practices fail to break out or to disaggregate, for each of their production
processes or product lines, the actual costs they incur both to prevent chemical accidents
and as a result of chemical accidents that do occur.l3 Consequently, these firms--and
especially product line managers in the firm--are unlikely to appreciate the magnitude of
accident-related costs--including the costs of purchasing, installing, and maintaining safety
equipment; worker safety training costs; accident insurance costs; and the firm's chemical
accident losses due to injury, property damage, and business interruption--that could be
reduced or eliminated by primary prevention alternatives. l 4
2. Failure of Firms to Appreciate the Costs of a Possible Serious Accident
Although chemical accidents are relatively rare events--and the probability of their
occurrence elusive--many firms do not realize the typical dimensions of a chemical accident
associated with their production technology when an accident does occur.l5 Thus, these
firms are unable to anticipate either the magnitude of the damages that are likely to result
or the losses they might bear.l 6 As a consequence, these firms will tend to undervalue the
benefits of, and hence to underinvest in, chemical accident prevention.
'3See, for example, Cebon (1989), pages 7-8, as well as the discussion in Subsection B.2 of Chapter V,
supra. Note that we are concerned in this subsection only with the actual costs borne by the firm to prevent
chemical accidents and those costs due to chemical accidents, as opposed to the potential costs of a chemical
accident or the total social costs of the firm's chemical accidents.
14This informational deficiency, as presented, is only part of a larger informational problem. The firm
is often not aware that its decision to use a particular production technology involving hazardous chemicals
imposes on the firm not only avoidable accident and accident prevention costs but also avoidable pollution
control costs and hazardous waste disposal costs, among others. The larger informational problem is
considered later in this chapter.
15Although not an industrial accident at a fixed facility, Exxon's Valdez oil spill is an instructive
example. Exxon apparently had systematically underestimated or had not conceived of an oil spill as large as
the Valdez's, despite the fact that the spill was but one-tenth the size of the cargo and but one-sixth the size of
the Amoco Cadiz spill of a decade earlier off the coast of France. Indeed, Exxon's Valdez oil spill was only the
30th largest spill ever to occur. See Stevens (1989).
16However, the ability of firms to anticipate the costs of a possible serious accident may be addressed,
to some extent, by the requirements under Section 112(r)(7)I of the amended Clean Air Act, that firms conduct
an offsite consequence analysis based on worst case scenarios as part of their Risk Management Plan.
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3. Lack of Information about Inherently-Safe Technological Alternatives
A major barrier to eliminating chemical hazards is the fact that firms are often
unaware of inherently-safe, technological alternatives. This is especially true for small and
medium sized firms.17 Even among those firms actively seeking to improve their safety
performance, many evaluate the areas of vulnerability of their production technology only
after the plant has been designed and constructed, and they restrict hazard assessments to
the technologies that are in place. The results of such hazard assessments, not surprisingly,
are the "adding on" of safety features rather than primary prevention. 18 Government
agencies, at both the federal and state level, have reinforced this result by focusing their
activities--including inspections, technical assistance, and information dissemination--on
accident mitigation and secondary prevention. 19
4. Inadequate Firm Accident Prevention Planning
Another informational barrier has been the fact that some firms are not cognizant
of the chemical hazards posed by their production technology. These firms therefore have
not made plans--much less implemented such plans--to reduce the risks of a chemical
accident.
Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act in 1986 (the
Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, or "EPCRA") includes provisions
for facilities to provide a wealth of information about the hazardous chemicals they use and
to develop emergency response plans, but as legislation to require firms to develop
accident prevention plans, EPCRA is sadly deficient. One commentator has noted:
EPCRA is hollow at the core. Missing from the extensive array of
communication duties is any authority for anyone, agency or industry, to do a
rigorous, site-specific safety analysis. M
Furthermore, EPCRA contains no mechanism to ensure that the dangers implied in a
facility's reports of hazardous chemicals have been minimized or eliminated. Finally, as
1 /See, for example, Karmali (1990), page 81.
18 See, for instance, Kletz (1985) and Minzner (1990), pages 100-103.
19 See, for example, the discussion in Minzner (1990), pages 11-12, and in Abrams and Ward (1990),
pages 137-139.
20Baram (1988), pages 37-38. But compare Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act discussed below.
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indicated above, EPCRA's focus is on emergency response rather than accident prevention,
particularly primary accident prevention.2 1
However, Section 112(r) of the amended Clean Air Act promises to bring about
substantial improvements in firm accident prevention planning.22 Under this section, EPA
must promulgate regulations that require the owners and operators of facilities--at which a
regulated chemical is present in amounts above a threshold quantity--to prepare and
implement a Risk Management Plan consisting of a hazard assessment, an accident
prevention program, and an accident response program. These Risk Management Plans
must be submitted to the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board and the
implementing government agency (at the federal, state, or local level) responsible for
planning and responding to accidental releases. The plan is to be made available to the
public.23 In addition, under the OSHA Process Safety Management Rule, the employers of
covered facilities are required to compile process safety information; conduct a process
hazard analysis; develop written operating, maintenance, and emergency action
procedures; and conduct pre-startup reviews and compliance safety audits.24
5. An Inadequate Chemical Accident Reporting and Analysis System
A chemical accident reporting system serves two basic functions that are related in
practice, but entirely different in concept. 25 One function, the one typically thought of, is
to provide a source of information to be used to develop effective strategies to prevent
accidents in the future (such strategies for use by decisionmakers at the firm level, trade
associations, safety councils, professional organizations, government regulators, or
insurance companies). The second function is, through the accident investigation and
reporting process, to help shift the organization's (or management's) knowledge of and
2ZLEPCRA contains other defects as well that are relevant here. For example, chemicals must be
reported, according to EPCRA requirements, only on the basis of their toxicity. However, chemicals have other
properties--such as flammability, explosiveness, or corrosiveness--that also make them potentially hazardous.
See Abrams and Ward (1990), page 160.
22See 42 USC 7412(r). Note that unlike EPCRA, whose purpose might best be characterized as
accident preparedness, the purpose of Section 112(r) of the amended Clean Air Act is accident prevention.
23However, firms will be able to protect trade secret information (that they are able to justify as such)
from release to the public.
24See 29 CFR 1910.119.
25We are ignoring here the emergency response role of accident reporting, whereby the government
and the affected community are notified of a chemical accident in progress to facilitate accident mitigation.
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attitudes towards chemical safety (that is, to make safety a primary objective of the
organization).
The chemical accident reporting system has been widely criticized, and properly
so.26 It has covered only a fraction of the chemical incidents that do occur, significantly
underreporting less-severe accidents and omitting "near misses" entirely. It has provided
incomplete information about the accidents which were reported, often omitting an
analysis of management failure as well as basic technological detail (the type and scale of
the production process involved; whether the chemical released was an input, an
intermediate, or a final product; etc.); the circumstances surrounding the accident (location
of the release, production context, the consequences, etc.); or an accident scenario
describing the pertinent events leading up to and following the chemical reaction or
release. In addition, the several reporting systems currently in place have also been
inefficient in the sense they are partially duplicative and yet largely incompatible (that is,
they cannot be effectively combined for most purposes). These aforementioned problems
with the chemical accident reporting system are compounded by the fact that the
government up to now has played only a limited role in accident investigation and
analysis.27
The importance of these flaws in the chemical accident reporting and analysis
system in satisfying an informational function depends crucially on whether we are
considering (1) primary accident prevention or (2) secondary accident prevention or
mitigation. In terms of secondary prevention and mitigation, the flaws in the reporting
system are of immense importance. Minor chemical incidents or near misses may be
precursors of a catastrophic release to follow.28 Neither the chemical firm involved nor
2We are referring here to the chemical accident reporting system prior to the changes that will occur
in response to the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. These anticipated changes are subsequently discussed in
the text.
27In fact, one can argue that in no industry with catastrophic potential--including nuclear plants, mines,
dams, space missions, military activities, aviation, and marine, railroad, and vehicular transportation--has the
government been less involved in accident investigation and analysis than it is in the chemical industry. (See
Perrow [1984], page 103.) We note, however, that chemical industry and professional associations have
responded by assuming a greater accident investigation and analysis role, as evidenced, for example, by the
American Institute of Chemical Engineers' (AIChE's) Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) and by the
Chemical Manufacturers Association's (CMA's) Responsible Care Program, with which all CMA members
must comply to maintain membership. (For discussion of these and other non-governmental programs, see
Haggin [June 18, 1990] and Chemical Manufacturers Association [1991].) Here, too, the chemical industry pays
lip service to input substitution, particularly in the context of pollution prevention, but the options of process
redesign and product reformulation are barely mentioned.
28See, for instance, Lees (1982), page 225.
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those involved generally in making chemical processes safer can afford to ignore--either by
failing to collect or by failing to analyze and respond to--any information about an
impending or realized chemical hazard. In terms of primary prevention, however,
information from the chemical accident reporting system is much less important. The
reason is that firms that successfully achieve inherent safety by implementing primary
prevention measures have few accidents or near misses to deal with, and no catastrophic
ones. By and large, we believe there is sufficient information and expertise about primary
accident prevention today to make dramatic inroads in eliminating chemical hazards.29
True, in some cases, improved accident reporting might allow analysts to uncover some
subset of chemical hazards which is amenable to primary prevention that might not have
been previously recognized. For example, in Appendix D we suggest how chemical
accident data might be used to identify promising, but heretofore unrecognized, primary
prevention opportunities. But that would be the exception, rather than the rule, in our
opinion. Further advances in primary accident prevention are most likely to come as a
result of technological options analyses (TOA) conducted by process engineers and
chemists rather than from insights gleaned from accident data. Therefore, what is needed,
in terms of the best use of primary accident prevention resources, is not so much improved
accident reporting, but rather mechanisms to induce adoption of the many primary
prevention techniques that we already know about and technological development of more
inherently-safe chemical processes.
We emphasize that the previous discussion is not intended to minimize the defects
in the chemical accident reporting system. The point we wish to make is that, from a public
policy perspective, the benefits of improved accident reporting are mostly to be found in
secondary prevention and mitigation. not in primary accident prevention.30 In addition, in
terms of the second function of the chemical accident reporting system--fostering
attitudinal changes concerning chemical safety--requiring the firm to make a detailed
report and analysis of all chemical incidents on-site will serve to make the firm more aware
of its own chemical hazards and thereby to make primary safety more attractive to the firm.
Finally, if it is necessary to convince the public and private institutions involved in
chemical accident prevention to move from mitigation to secondary prevention and from
29See, as illustration, the successful examples described in Chapter II, supra.
30The internal reporting of a chemical accident within the firm experiencing the accident could, of
course, stimulate a reexamination of the firm's production practices and technology. Safety management
systems focused on secondary prevention and mitigation need to have as good a reporting system in place as
possible.
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secondary to primary prevention, improvements in the nature and quantity of chemical
accident data might be needed as a consciousness-raising interim strategy.
We note that many of the defects, identified above, in the chemical accident
reporting and analysis system are currently being addressed in response to Section 112(r) of
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. 31 Owners and operators of facilities who will be
required to prepare and implement a Risk Management Plan will have to address near
misses and develop a five-year accident history as part of the hazard assessment
requirements of the Risk Management Plan. Section 112(r) also establishes the Chemical
Safety and Hazard Investigation Board to investigate accidental chemical releases, to make
recommendations for legislative or administrative action to be taken by Congress, EPA,
OSHA, or other agencies, and to conduct research with respect to risk assessment and risk
reduction technologies. In addition, the OSHA Process Safety Rule requires the employers
of covered facilities to conduct a process hazard analysis that addresses any previous
incidents that could have resulted in catastrophic consequences in the workplace, the
consequences of a failure of engineering and administrative controls, the effect of facility
siting on the hazards, and the effect of human factors on the hazard. 32
B. INADEQUATE ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
Our examination of technological change, in Chapter V, suggested that firms are not
the simplistic, profit-maximizing entities of neoclassical economic theory. Instead, firms
are complex organizations that develop and adopt innovative technologies for a variety of
reasons, only some of which are economic in nature. However, economic incentives
interact strongly and positively with other factors, both internal and external to the
organization, to encourage technological change.33 Below, we consider whether current
economic incentives--in the form of workers' compensation, the tort system, regulatory
fines, and insurance--are sufficient to promote primary accident prevention.3 4
31See 42 USC 7412(r).
32See 29 CFR 1910.119(e)(3).
331n the context of organizational theory, the provision of economic incentives may overcome cognitive
barriers to the acceptance of new information. That is, it may induce a critical rethinking and redefinition of
the problem, a dissolution of organizational boundaries or barriers to search for a solution, and the actual
finding of a solution--a process which Bartunek has termed cognitive reframing. See Bartunek (1-988) and
Cebon (1990), pages 204-205.
34As noted earlier, property loss and business interruption (loss in production capacity) may also have
large economic consequences. They have either been considered very unlikely or they have been sufficiently
insured by the firm so that they do not seem to act as powerful economic incentives for prevention.
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1. Workers' Compensation
Workers' compensation represents an historical "no-fault" compromise between
industry and labor whereby workers whose injuries "arise out of and in the course of
employment" receive partial, but certain compensation in return for relinquishing the right
to obtain full, but uncertain compensation from tort awards based on a demonstration that
employer negligence caused the injury.35 Thus, providing complete compensation for
work-related injuries is not an objective of the workers' compensation system.
Nevertheless, as we have shown in Chapter VI, even under generous assumptions, workers'
compensation payments may be as little as 10 percent of the social cost of severe injuries,
and death benefits from workers' compensation provide no more than 10 percent, and
perhaps less than 1 percent, of the social valuation of loss of life. In our view, these awards
abuse the intended compromise of "partial" compensation and provide an inadequate
economic signal to the firm to protect its workers from life-threatening chemical hazards.
2. The Tort System
The past decade has witnessed a well-publicized effort, both nationally and in the
individual states, to effect so-called "tort reform," based on assertions that liability costs are
excessively high and unpredictable and that, as a consequence, both innovation and safety
are deterred.36 In many states, the tort reform movement has succeeded in capping
damage awards or in eliminating entire classes of tort awards, most notably for punitive
damages.
Based on a detailed analysis in Chapter VI of the economic costs of chemical
accidents which are borne by industry, we concluded that liability costs for chemical
accidents are not excessively high. On the contrary, we found that the total costs incurred
by chemical-producing and chemical-using firms to defend against tort claims arising from
acute injuries from chemical accidents--taking into account all compensatory damages,
punitive damages, and transaction costs--comprise less than 70 percent of the social cost of
those injuries. We also concluded that tort awards are not random and unpredictable. On
the contrary, we found no evidence to suggest that firms are bearing liability costs for
chemical harms they did not cause or that punitive damages, or any other damages, are
being arbitrarily awarded.
;35See, for example, Ashford and Caldart (1991), pages 453-455.
36See, for example, Huber (1989).
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Based on these findings, we conclude that the tort system provides insufficient
economic incentives to industry to invest in chemical safety. Furthermore, what economic
incentives the tort system does supply are attenuated by the availability of liability
insurance.
3. Regulatory Fines
As indicated in Chapter VI, during the past two decades regulatory fines for
chemical safety violations have been only rarely and haphazardly imposed, and when
imposed, the fines have been of negligible--actually insulting--magnitude, given the
seriousness of the potential consequences of such violations. Furthermore, since safety
standards typically address only accident mitigation and secondary prevention, regulatory
fines for safety violations have provided virtually no economic stimulus to industry to
implement primarv accident prevention measures.
4. Insurance
Insurance has traditionally been thought of as a risk-spreading mechanism, but it
can operate as a risk-management mechanism as well.37 Insurance coverage--including
property insurance, workers' compensation insurance, (third-party) personal injury
insurance, and business interruption insurance--to protect firms against chemical accident
losses can serve a risk-management function in two ways. First, the premium set by an
insurance underwriter theoretically reflects a firm's loss potential; thus, the firm receives an
economic inducement, in the form of lower insurance premiums, by reducing its chemical
hazards and thereby its loss potential. Second, the insurance carrier can attempt to reduce
its financial exposure by engaging in so-called loss-control activities; that is, the insurer can
require the firm to undertake specified chemical accident prevention measures as a
condition of insurance coverage.
As indicated in Chapter VI, insurance coverage for chemical accident losses has, to
this point, performed rather poorly as a risk-management mechanism. The reason is that
insurance carriers have relied on information contained in the major accidental release
databases and the history of their insured firms regarding mitigation and secondary
prevention activities and are not knowledgeable about the availability of inherently-safer
alternatives. Therefore, the insurer's underwriting and loss control activities have been
35See, for example, Abraham (1986) and Ashford, Moran, and Stone (1989).
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limited primarily to recommending secondary prevention and chemical accident mitigation
rather than to primary accident prevention.3 8
C. ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS
Our examination of organizational theory in Chapter V revealed several
organizational barriers to chemical accident prevention. As discussed below, these include
the fact that, in some cases: (1) safety is not a primary objective of the organization;
(2) the organization provides inadequate internal incentives to encourage safety; (3) the
structure of the organization is not conducive to primary accident prevention; and (4) the
organization lacks an effective labor-management dialogue on safety.
1. Safety Not a Primary Objective of the Organization
All firms would prefer to have a safer production environment rather than a more
hazardous one, if given the simple option in isolation. However, many firms have primary
objectives, such as profitability or sales growth, that take priority over safety. When one of
these firms allocates resources to achieve its various objectives, safety interests may, as a
practical matter, sometimes be sacrificed or compromised to achieve other objectives
which the firm believes are more important. This is particularly likely to occur when the
firm's primary objectives are threatened. As a result, the firm may create chemical hazards
far in excess of what it would tolerate were chemical safety a primary objective of the firm.
2. Inadequate Internal Incentives to Encourage Safety
Those within the organization respond to the reward structure created by the
organization. In some firms, performance is evaluated only on the basis of non-safety
factors; in others, workers may be demoted or fired for reporting chemical hazards. In such
situations, the firm's incentive structure constitutes a barrier to chemical accident
prevention.
3. Organizational Structure Not Conducive to Primary Prevention
In many firms, the organization is structured such that its technical experts are not
in a position to promote primary accident prevention. For example, the safety engineer in
some firms is located in a separate department that does not participate in the planning
and construction of new plant.3 9 In such circumstances, many or all of the primary
MSee Katzman (1988).
391t bears repeating that even if the safety engineer were closely associated with production, he may
not be equipped to suggest primary prevention strategies.
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prevention opportunities will have been eliminated before the safety engineer is able to
contribute his or her expertise.
4. Lack of an Effective Labor-Management Dialogue on Safety
Workers today are frequently unable to participate in their company's safety
decisions. Where workers are formally allowed to participate--typically as part of a
company management-labor health and safety committee--their involvement is usually
restricted to secondary prevention and mitigation measures and does not include
consideration of inherently-safe technological options.
That is unfortunate since system operators have traditionally been more aware than
management of the frequency, severity, and nature of chemical incidents.40 Similarly,
workers are often more aware of the ineffectiveness of personal protective equipment and
other mitigation devices. Were the company's technological decisionmaking to be
informed by such worker insights, primary prevention would be significantly encouraged.
Other mechanisms currently used to enhance chemical safety are inadequate
substitutes for worker participation in technological choice. For example, worker hazard
communication pursuant to the OSHAct4 1 is a rather ineffective means of promoting
primary prevention since the mechanism is activated only after a hazardous technology is in
place. In addition, other parties capable of influencing the firm's safety decisions--such as
local emergency planning committees (LEPCs) and insurers--have, to date, been unaware
of, or poorly equipped to evaluate, inherently-safe technological options.4 2
D. MANAGEMENT FACTORS 43
A lack of managerial awareness and expertise about inherently-safe technologies, at
all levels of management within the firm, represents a barrier to primary accident
40See Minzner (1990), page 146.
41See the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard at 29 CFR 1910.1200a.
42Regarding LEPC's, see Rest (1990) and Baram, Dillon, and Ruffle (May 1990), page 82; regarding
insurers, see Katzman (1988), page 86. Note, however, that there has been an increasing community-based
concern about both accidents and pollution. Local efforts vary, but community involvement has the potential to
become an important element in encouraging change.
43See also Chapter V, supra.
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prevention.44 Many production managers have received no training in safety issues, and
even safety managers often are unfamiliar with primary prevention opportunities. Of equal
concern is the fact that plant managers and other upper management, who have important
decisionmaking and supervisory responsibilities within the firm, are frequently unaware of
primary prevention opportunities or of their importance. To the extent to which this is so,
their unfamiliarity with and lack of commitment to primary prevention is reflected
throughout the organization in those whom they hire and consult to take responsibility for
safety.
E. LABOR FACTORS
Inadequate knowledge on the part of operators and professional staff, such as safety
engineers, and their failure to think about chemical safety in terms of primary accident
prevention are major barriers. These employees are often unfamiliar with inherently-safe
technological options or lack the technical expertise to modify their existing chemical
processes to incorporate primary prevention measures.
Following an accident, it is often alleged that workers are either not safety-conscious
or not aware of the importance of complying with safety procedures. However,
management training of employees has often been inadequate and has been focused on
mitigation or secondary prevention. Moreover, the pressures placed on workers to produce
often encourage them to take shortcuts or bypass safety procedures. In the case of the
petrochemical industry, much has been made of the role of inadequately-trained contract
labor in causing accidents. 45 Primary prevention approaches lessen the reliance on worker
training for accident mitigation and secondary prevention, and increase the use of
technological alternatives to accomplish accident prevention.
F. TECHNOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS
Two barriers to primary accident prevention are technological in nature. First, it is
often impossible or prohibitively expensive to replace an existing chemical process with an
inherently-safe production technology. Hence, primary accident prevention options are
often limited once a hazardous production technology has been constructed. Second, for
many commodities whose production involves hazardous chemicals, inherently-safe
44 0f course, management factors are important for successful implementation of secondary prevention
as well. Process safety management has emphasized these factors. However, we focus here on primary
prevention.
45See John Gray Institute (1991).
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technological alternatives have not yet been developed, although safer substitutes and
processes may be known.
G. REGULATORY PROBLEMS
Finally, we consider features of the regulatory system that impede chemical safety.
In large measure, of course, many of the barriers to chemical accident prevention
previously identified in this chapter also represent failures of the regulatory system.
However, the following regulatory problems merit separate discussion: (1) intra-agency
coordination; (2) interagency cooperation; and (3) regulatory flexibility.
1. Intra-Agency Coordination
EPA and OSHA are concerned not just with reducing the risk of injury caused by
chemical accidents but also with reducing chronic health hazards caused by frequent
human exposure to toxic substances. However, the individual agencies are organized such
that responsibility for chemical accident prevention and responsibility for controlling
gradual emissions (via environmental medium) are typically vested in separate divisions of
the agency. For example, in EPA the accident prevention activities are handled by a
different office (OSWER) than control of direct emissions to air and water. In OSHA, the
Office of Health Standards is separate from the activities dealing with safety.
Consequently, attempts by one division to reduce chemical hazards could, occasionally,
simply result in transferring the hazard to another medium and perhaps in increasing the
total societal risk. To take a simple example, the use of fire retardants and asbestos to
prevent chemical accidents may increase chronic health hazards. To cite another example,
when semiconductor firms substitute inorganic solid arsenic for organic arsine gas in their
computer chip manufacturing processes in order to eliminate the acute chemical hazard
associated with arsine gas, they actually create a chronic health risk (associated with solid
arsenic residues).46
Ordinarily, however, a specific chemical hazard jointly increases the risks of
chemical accident and pollution. In this usual case, policies to prevent chemical accidents
will simultaneously reduce pollution risks as well, and vice versa. Unfortunately, efforts to
impose the costs of chronic health hazards on those firms whose toxic substances create the
hazards have not been very successful. For example, the total liability costs borne by
chemical producers and chemical-using firms for chronic diseases from chemical exposure
represent no more than 5 percent, and often less than 0.1 percent, of the corresponding
46See Baram, Dillon, and Ruffle (1990), pages 23 and 27.
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social cost.47 Problems in establishing liability include difficulties in identifying the firm
responsible for a chemical release, difficulties in linking a chemical release to human
exposure, and difficulties in demonstrating an association between exposure and
subsequent disease; these difficulties are exacerbated by the often lengthy latency period
between exposure and manifestation of disease. In the usual case, as indicated above, this
failure to internalize the costs of chemical pollution constitutes a barrier to chemical
accident prevention as well.
2. Interagency Cooperation
An historical barrier to chemical accident prevention has existed because of
jurisdictional differences (i.e., different mandates) between EPA and OSHA. In a few
instances industry has responded to the initiatives of a particular agency by reducing the
chemical hazards confronting that agency's constituency, but which increased the chemical
hazards confronting another constituency. For example, inducing a firm to eliminate its
storage of hazardous chemicals by using just-in-time delivery of the hazardous chemical
could, in some cases, merely shift the risk of a chemical accident from the workers and
citizens in the vicinity of the firm to the population at large (at risk from a transportation
accident). More generally, EPA initiatives may, in some cases, increase worker hazards,
and OSHA initiatives may, in some cases, increase environmental hazards. 48
Many of these interagency problems have been addressed, or are currently being
addressed, by the recent Memorandum of Understanding49 (signed November 23, 1990)
between EPA and OSHA, pursuant to the Clean Air Act mandate for interagency
cooperation to protect public health and the environment. 50 As part of the Memorandum
of Understanding, EPA and OSHA must establish a joint workplan that targets specific
industries with high accident rates and defines the agencies' priorities with respect to those
industries. In their 1992 workplan, EPA and OSHA targets include the petrochemical
industry, in order to reduce the number and severity of catastrophic chemical releases and
explosions.51 Activities covered under the Memorandum of Understanding include
exchanging data and information, cross training of agency personnel, providing technical
4/See Ashford and Stone (1991), pages 401-419.
48See Ashford, Matthiesen, and Stone (1992), pages VII-1 and VII-2.
49See Hanson (September 9, 1991), page 22.
50See 42 USC 7412(r)(6)(E).
51See Environmental Reporter (November 30, 1990), pages 1483-1484.
VII-16
CI _I__________I__II__I__________
and professional assistance, referring alleged violations and employee complaints,
conducting joint inspections, and providing updates on compliance and law enforcement
efforts. Thus, at the time of an inspection, for example, employees should now be able to
inform the inspection official about both EPA and OSHA violations with the knowledge
that the appropriate agency will respond to the complaints, regardless of the affiliation of
the inspector.
3. Regulatory Flexibility
In the past, EPA and OSHA chemical accident prevention activities have vacillated
between lax, underfunded initiatives and the imposition of rigid, specification-oriented
regulations. This latter approach has been criticized in that it "wastes resources, results in
plans that gather dust on shelves, disillusions the public, and focuses industry efforts on
compliance rather than improvement." 52 The Office of Technology Assessment noted:
In terms of economic efficiency, environmental protection in the United
States appears more costly than in other industrialized nations. The reason
seems to be not merely greater government regulation but less flexible
environmental regulations in the United States that block effective and more
economical and technologically-advanced solutions. 53
When EPA and OSHA have attempted to be "flexible," the result has been criticized as
leading to no regulation or ineffective regulation.54 However, recent regulations developed
by both OSHA and EPA are performance-based and are both flexible and effective.
:ZAbrams and Ward (1990), page 183.
53U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (1987) (emphasis added.)
54See Abrams and Ward (1990), page 186.
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VIII. THE PREVENTION OF CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS:
MECHANISMS TO ADDRESS BARRIERS AND INADEQUATE INCENTIVES
In this chapter, we develop a set of policies to address the impediments to chemical
accident prevention identified in Chapter VII. Although often discussed individually, the
policies are designed to work together as elements of a coordinated strategy to achieve a
superior level of chemical safety. For ease of presentation, the policies are grouped into
categories that address the parallel categories in Chapter VII.
A. INFORMATION POLICIES TO PROMOTE CHEMICAL SAFETY
The policies introduced in this section are intended to help remedy the
informational deficiencies that have hampered efforts to promote chemical safety.
1. Encourage Full Cost Accounting of Accident and Accident Prevention Costs
In order to address the problem of firms being unaware of the actual chemical
accident and accident prevention costs imposed on them by their current production
technology on a product line or process-specific basis, EPA and OSHA should develop,
disseminate, and encourage the use by industry of full cost accounting (FCA) guidelines. 1
FCA should in practice disaggregate, for each production process or product line, the
actual costs of chemical accidents and the actual costs of accident prevention borne by the
firm. By implementing Full Cost Accounting guidelines, firms will be able to make a more
informed analysis of the long-term costs and savings of accident prevention technology and
activities.
2. Help Firms to Estimate Their Costs of a Possible Serious Chemical Accident
Many firms fail to appreciate the costs they might incur in the advent of a serious
chemical accident. In order to remedy this informational deficiency, we believe that
insurance carriers, trade associations, and professional associations should be encouraged
to develop and to provide to firms in the chemical-producing and chemical-using industries
exemplary or hypothetical estimates of firm accident costs--using a full cost accounting
methodology--associated with that firm's production technology and scale. EPA and
1Full cost accounting procedures serve to reallocate accident and accident prevention costs from
overhead accounts to the production processes or product lines that are properly responsible for their creation.
The full cost accounting methodology is intended to parallel a valid cost assessment methodology for comparing
alternative technological choices, although the former case involves actual costs while the latter involves




OSHA should also contribute to this effort of providing case studies of actual/hypothetical
accidents as a part of their accident prevention strategies. (Firms required to conduct an
offsite consequence analysis, under Section 112(r)(7) of the Clean Air Act, would be aided
by these examples and case studies.)
3. Develop Information about Inherently-Safe Technological Alternatives
In order to help address the current lack of information about inherently-safe
technological alternatives, we recommend (a) that firms manufacturing or using hazardous
chemicals be required to conduct a Technology Options Analysis, and (b) that both Federal
and state agencies play a greater role in developing and disseminating information about
primary accident prevention.
(a) Require Firms to Conduct a Technology Options Analysis
Although the Clean Air Act provisions and anticipated regulations and the OSHA
Process Safety Management Rule require facilities to assess and reduce the hazards that
are associated with their production processes, these do not require facilities to evaluate
alternative production technologies.2 Consequently, firms are not encouraged to identify
or consider new technologies that may be inherently safer than the ones they currently
employ. Moreover, these accident prevention requirements emphasize secondary accident
prevention strategies, which utilize engineering and administrative controls on an existing
production technology, rather than primary accident prevention strategies, which utilize
input substitution and process redesign to modify a production technology.
In contrast to a traditional Hazard Assessment--which, in practice, is generally
limited to an evaluation of the risks associated with the firm's established production
technology and how to reduce them--we propose to add the use of Technology Options
Analysis (TOA), which would expand the evaluation to include alternative production
technologies and would facilitate the development of primary accident prevention
strategies. 3
2See 42 USC 7412(r) and 29 CFR 1910.119.
3Technology Options Analysis has as its antecedents Technology Assessment (TA) and Constructive
Technology Assessment (CTA), which are respectively concerned with government's evaluation of technological
systems and government's role in influencing technological developments. (See Schot [1989].) Technology
Options Analysis extends the concepts of TA and CTA from government activities to the activities of the firm.
(See Minzner [1990], page 102.) A precursor of Technology Options Analysis can be found in the New Jersey
Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act, which requires that firm hazard assessments be accompanied by a state-of-
the-art analysis of safety alternatives.
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All firms manufacturing or using hazardous chemicals should be required to conduct
an annual Technology Options Analysis.4 The scope of the TOA will depend on the
technical options that are realistically open to the firm in terms of scale, performance, and
cost. In general, for an existing plant, the options, by necessity, will mostly involve
secondary accident prevention and mitigation technologies. In such cases, the TOA would
be similar to the Hazard Assessment that may soon be required as part of the Risk
Management Plan under regulations pursuant to the Clean Air Act, and it would also be
similar to the Process Hazard Analysis that is required by the OSHA Process Safety
Management Rule. For some processes used in existing plants, primary prevention options
might also be considered, especially those involving materials substitution or minor process
changes. While these changes might be considered "minor" from the perspective of
disrupting production, they could yield significant safety benefits.
For new plant construction or for major modifications to an existing plant, the
options will involve primary and secondary prevention (as well as mitigation). Where both
continued use of an existing plant and major modifications are possible, technological
options will range from primary prevention to mitigation. Such TOAs should be conducted
well before the Pre-Startup Safety Review 5 (preferably before any process or mechanical
design is commenced) and should be incorporated into the procedures to manage change
that are required under the OSHA Process Safety Management Rule. As required by
Section 112(r)(7) of the Clean Air Act, and as a part of the Risk Management Plan, the
TOAs should be filed with the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board and the
appropriate regulatory office (federal, state or local entities), which should verify their
adequacy and ensure their confidential handling. However, most information in the Plan
may also required to be made available to the public, with the exception being information
about methods or processes that are considered to be trade secrets.6
The TOAs could serve a variety of functions. First and foremost, TOAs are a
valuable source of information to the firm--which might not otherwise be cognizant of its
technological options--and thus can help the firm to make sound technological choices. In
addition, regulators, both in EPA and OSHA, may use the TOAs to develop primary
4Here, and elsewhere in this chapter, the chemical producers and chemical users to be covered should
be consistent with those industrial segments required to comply with the OSHA Process Management Safety
Rule and with Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act.
5SSee 29 CFR 1910.119(i).




accident prevention strategies and policies. Although regulatory requirements may be
performance-based, regulators could designate certain technologies, or the use of certain
chemicals in certain applications, as a clearly inferior (or clearly superior) technological
choice. (Note that we are not suggesting that the agencies specify the technology to be
used.) The TOAs would not of themselves require firms to select superior technological
options or to reject inferior ones. However, the process of conducting the TOA and
reporting the results of the TOA would ensure not only that the firm recognizes the
hazards to which it is exposing its workers and the surrounding community (as required by
the hazard assessments in EPA's Risk Management Plan and OSHA's PSM Rule) but also
that it recognizes superior technological options that are available.
(b) Increase Govemment's Role in Developing and Disseminating Information
Government should play a much more active role in developing and disseminating
information about accident prevention, especially primary accident prevention. In addition
to the initiatives in this area taken in response to Section 112(r) of the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments, 7 we recommend that the Federal government, under the direction of EPA
and/or OSHA, create a clearinghouse of information about inherently-safe technologies
and inferior technologies, including cost and performance data.8 Information submitted by
a firm9 in its Technology Options Analysis might contribute to the federal government's
information base, as could inputs from academia and research institutions or laboratories.
Relatedly, information provided by the clearinghouse might be utilized by firms in
conducting their TOAs.
At the state level, we recommend that government develop technical assistance
initiatives, including demonstration projects of primary prevention measures. Such
technical assistance programs can significantly reduce the technological risks which
frequently inhibit firms--particularly small- and medium-sized firms with limited
technological capabilities--from adopting inherently-safe technologies.l 0 Because industry
often fears or distrusts the actions of government, the state agencies should utilize trained
/See 42 USC 7412(r).
8Possibly, EPA's newly-created Pollution Prevention Information Clearinghouse could be expanded to
include information about primary accident prevention.
90bviously, inherently safe technologies confer a competitive advantage to the innovative firm.
Mechanisms need to be explored that resolve that proprietary interest with the societal goal of
disseminating/diffusing newer technologies in order to reduce accidents.
10See, for example, Karmali (1990), pages 155-156.
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private consultants, acting under contract to the state, to provide the technical assistance
whenever possible.ll
4. Require Firms to File an Accident Prevention Plan
To ensure that chemical producers and chemical users are aware of the hazards
associated with their current or proposed production technology and are taking steps to
eliminate those hazards, we recommend that the Hazard Analysis required as part of the
Risk Management Plan under Section 112(r) of the 1990 Clean Air Act and as part of the
OSHA Process Safety Management Rule12 be modified in three ways. First, as suggested
above, the Hazard Analysis should include a Technology Options Analysis. Second, ideally
the Hazard Analysis (with a Technology Options Analysis) should be conducted
continuously, but as a legally-enforceable requirement consideration should be given that it
be formally submitted annually rather than once every five years. In our view, an annual
analysis is needed in order to ensure compliance with previous safety recommendations
and to review the adequacy of the firm's Hazard Analysis in light of its recent safety
performance.l 3 Third, the facilities that are part of the Hazard Analysis should be
encouraged to use full cost accounting methods in their calculation of current accident and
accident prevention costs. It is anticipated that the process of preparing the modified
Hazard Analysis will reveal to the firm (1) where investments in chemical safety are
needed and (2) that primary accident prevention may be the most economical means of
achieving chemical safety.
We note that these recommendations could also be incorporated into international
efforts to promote chemical safety. For example, the "Seveso Directive" (and its various
revisions and updates) requires all member countries of the European Community to
ensure that all of its manufacturers have identified existing accident hazards and adopted
the appropriate safety measures.l4 Similarly, developers of industrial plants must comply
with World Bank accident prevention guidelines in order to qualify for World Bank
llf necessary, the state may have to provide the private consultants with training in primary accident
prevention. Such training, however, will help create a technical consulting market in primary accident
prevention to replace or augment the existing market in secondary prevention and mitigation. See Ashford,
Cozakos, Stone, and Wessel (1988), page V-20.
1 2See 29 CFR 1910.119(3).
1 3 Note that OSHA has no statutory requirements for submission of the firm's Process Hazard
Analysis. Only EPA under Section 112(r) of the amended Clean Air Act has submission requirements for the
firm's Risk Management Plan.
1 4See Council Directive of June 24, 1982 (82/501/EEC), 25 OJ. Eur. Comm. (No. L 2301 I (1982).
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funding; these guidelines essentially require the developer to submit a detailed accident
prevention plan to the World Bank.15 These provisions should be strengthened by more
specifically requiring a Technology Options Analysis.
5. Improve the Chemical Accident Reporting and Analysis System
It is clear from the profile of chemical accidents, presented in Chapter III, that a
great deal of information about chemical accidents has been collected and is publicly
accessible. Furthermore, steps have been taken in recent years to improve chemical
accident data collection. Examples include the development and expanded sample size of
EPA's Accidental Release Information Program (ARIP) database16 and the creation by the
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) of the Emergency Event
Surveillance System, a program for reporting acute chemical releases in much greater
depth than before. 17
However, as indicated in Chapter VII, it is equally clear that the historical chemical
accident reporting and analysis system was seriously flawed and constituted a barrier to
efforts--particularly in the areas of accident mitigation and secondary prevention--to
promote chemical safety. To remedy these flaws, improvements in the chemical accident
reporting and analysis system would have to be made in the following three areas: (1) the
range of chemical incidents covered; (2) the level of detail of reported information
relevant to the chemical incident; and (3) coordination among regulatory agencies and
other parties concerned with chemical accident data collection and analysis. Virtually all of
these improvements are currently being made in response to Section 112(r) of the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments. 18
As regards the first area, it can be argued that firms should be required as a matter
of law to investigate, to maintain records of, and to report all chemical incidents involving
their facilities, including near misses, and they should confront civil and/or criminal
1DSee World Bank (1985).
16See Appendix B, infra.
17 See Occupational Safety & Health Reporter (January 31, 1990), page 1446. A rule requiring exployers
to report fatalities to OSHA within eight hours (rather than 48 hours) is targeted for publication in April
(1993). The requirement is expected to improve OSHA's ability to ensure that the accident scenes are "fresh"
for investigation. See Occupational Safety & Health Reporter (February 3, 1993), page 1580.
18See 42 USC 7412(r).
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penalties for failure to report. Such requirements and penalties are laid out in Sections
112-114 of the Clean Air Act.19
In the second area (the level of detail), we recommend that the quality of the
information collected about chemical accidents be much improved. Accident reports
should contain extensive technological detail, including the type and scale of production
and the role of the chemical released in the production process; an accident chronology
describing the salient events leading up to and following the chemical release and reaction;
and other circumstances surrounding the accident, such as the location of the release, the
production context, and the accident consequences. In addition, the "root cause(s)" of the
accident and the management system failure in need of correction should be discussed. In
reporting the consequences of a chemical release, firms should be required to include
injuries and deaths of all workers on site, including both their own employees and contract
workers.2 0
In many severe chemical accidents, fire or explosion will destroy crucial information
needed to understand what happened. Nevertheless, skillful investigation of the site of
severe or frequent chemical incidents will often uncover evidence of their underlying
causes. Therefore, increased regulatory resources should be devoted to this area.
Similarly, frequent or severe chemical incidents should serve as a trigger for regulatory
safety inspections. These recommended improvements in accident information and
investigation promise to be accomplished by the creation of the Chemical Safety and
Hazard Investigation Board, as required under Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act.
Finally, in the third area, EPA and OSHA need to improve the coordination of their
accident reporting, investigation, and analysis activities--or ideally have firms report all
chemical incidents to a common national database. The recent Memorandum of
Understanding between the two agencies (signed November 23, 1990) is a step in the right
direction. 21 At the same time, these agencies should also attempt to share chemical
accident data with industry, trade associations, unions, and insurers and to cooperate with
these organizations in analyzing the data for purposes of accident prevention.
19In large measure, of course, even prior to the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, the law already
required firm recordkeeping and disclosure of worker exposures to toxic substances under Sections 8(c)(1),
8(c)(3), and 6 of the OSHAct and of accidental releases of hazardous chemicals under the 1986 Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), which created the Toxics Release Inventory Program.
20See John Gray Institute (July 1991), pages 196-197.
21See Hanson (September 9, 1991), page 22.
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B. ECONOMIC INCENTIVES TO IMPROVE CHEMICAL SAFETY
In this section, we identify policies that would increase the economic benefits of
chemical accident prevention--and particularly primary accident prevention. The economic
incentives under consideration are workers' compensation, the tort system, regulatory fines,
and insurance.
1. Workers' Compensation
In order to help remedy the considerable worker undercompensation in the case of
fatalities or severe injuries arising from chemical accidents, death benefits from workers'
compensation would have to be raised by a factor ranging from 2 to 10, and maximum
workers' compensation benefits for severe injuries receive an increase ranging from 50 to
500 percent.2 2 We note that because serious, acute injuries from chemical accidents are
relatively easy to verify and to link to the workplace, the increase in workers' compensation
benefits would not lead to fraudulent or exaggerated claims.
Even if these changes were implemented, the total workers' compensation awards
for chemical injuries would still be small relative to industry's property damage and
business interruption losses from chemical accidents.23 Nevertheless, these increases in
workers' compensation payments would provide a more accurate economic signal to the
firm of the benefits of chemical accident prevention. For example, firms may increase
efforts to avoid toxic chemical accidents (with no fire or explosion), which typically have
little property damage but potentially large casualties.24
2. The Tort System
The tort system would have to be strengthened in order to remedy the inadequate
deterrence the system currently provides in the case of chemical hazards. States need to
reconsider artificial limits placed on tort awards. Separate awards for punitive damages
and pain and suffering should be permitted and be unrestricted in magnitude. In addition,
Z2Because of skyrocketing workers' compensation costs, this suggestion may have to be accompanied
by a reduction in workers' compensation payments for minor injuries.
23Consider, for example, the Phillips Petroleum Company explosion in Pasadena, Texas in 1989 in
which 23 workers were killed. Even if death benefits from workers' compensation were increased to $2 million
per worker, the total for the 23 workers would be only $46 million. By comparison, the property losses were
approximately $300 million and business interruption losses exceeded $1 billion. (See Fire & Marine Insurance
News Digest [December 2, 1989], page 109.)
24In spite of the compelling reasons for increasing workers' compensation benefits for fatalities and
severe injuries, we are cognizant of the political resistance to implementing these changes. This makes, then, an
even stronger case for aggressive regulation and informational strategies.
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to be consistent with the meaning of the term, punitive damages should not be insurable as
a matter of public policy.25 A subsidiary benefit of this policy, from the perspective of
accident deterrence, is that the additional uncertainty--created by the possibility of having
to pay punitive damages, which cannot be shifted via insurance coverage--could act as a
powerful stimulus for firms to eliminate chemical hazards. 26
Additional deterrence may be indirectly provided by the tort system as a result of
other policy recommendations. For example, a company's Technology Options Analysis
might be used as evidence in private suits against the company.27 A written declaration by
the company that it knowingly chose an inferior technology would, depending on the
particular jurisdiction, either provide a rebuttable presumption of negligence per se or
constitute weighty evidence of negligence. If combined with violations of pertinent safety
regulations, the choice of an inferior production technology might even be introduced as
evidence of gross negligence. 28 A finding of negligence or gross negligence will tend to
increase the ability of injured parties to recover damages from the firm and may expose the
firm to punitive damages as well.
3. Regulatory Fines
Regulatory fines, to date, have been a seriously-neglected economic stimulus to
promote chemical safety. Major changes in the implementation of this policy instrument
are needed.
2 5In addition, the tax code should prohibit the deductibility of punitive damages in calculating
corporate taxes. Such a policy would provide a further economic disincentive for firms that recklessly disregard
the safety of their workers, the public, and the environment. See Westin and Gaines (1989), page 762.
26 0f course, too much uncertainty can have a paralyzing rather than a stimulative effect on the firm.
For instance, truly unstable and unpredictable liability obviously undercuts the firm's ability to make optimal
investments in safety. (See for example, Siliciano [1987].) However, some uncertainty about having to pay for
the damages it causes will stimulate the firm to undertake preventive action. By analogy, some randomness in
come tax auditing has been shown to reduce taxpayer underreporting. (See, for example, Scotchmer and
Slemrod [1989].)
27The possibility that a firm's Technology Options Analysis--or other reports prepared by the firm
concerning its chemical hazards or chemical incidents--might be used as evidence in a lawsuit against the firm
could be problematic. Firms fearing public disclosure of their reports might perform only superficial
investigations and provide as little information as possible. Of course, such a response would undermine the
purpose of the reports. On the other hand, state regulatory offices can avert this outcome by fulfilling their
charge of verifying the adequacy of TOAs and other safety reports.
28Similarly, a firm's failure to implement its own Risk Management Plan might be introduced as
evidence of negligence or gross negligence.
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First of all, meaningful regulatory fines should be levied on firms for violations of
reporting requirements--including failure to report a chemical incident or near miss or
failing to file an adequate Risk Management Plan. Second, the scale of penalties for safety
violations should be increased dramatically. 29 Chemical firms with annual revenues in the
billions of dollars are not going to notice isolated fines for safety violations in the hundreds
of dollars; even fines in the millions of dollars levied on firms of this size may be
inadequate if the safety violations result in fatalities. Third, the magnitude of the fine
imposed for a given safety violation should be conditioned on a variety of factors, including
the following: the nature and degree of the safety violation under consideration, the extent
to which the safety violation contributed to a chemical accident or to the severity of its
consequences, the consequences of the chemical accident, whether the firm had knowingly
chosen an inferior production technology when inherently-safer, practical alternatives were
available, whether the firm had failed to implement its own Risk Management Plan, and
the prior safety record of the firm. Thus, maximum penalties would be imposed on
extreme safety violations leading to fatal accidents when the firm was using an inferior
production technology, had not implemented its Risk Management Plan, and had a history
of grossly-negligent behavior in the area of chemical safety. Conversely, minor safety
violations not involving a chemical accident might be excused from any fine if the firm's
prior safety record is good, if the firm is using an inherently-safe production technology,
and if the firm remedies the safety problem in a timely fashion.
Chemical accidents involving casualties or environmental damage should also be
subject to significant regulatory fines, even in the absence of safety violations, if (1) the firm
failed to implement the safety improvements recommended in its Risk Management Plan,
and the failure to implement contributed to the chemical accident or to the severity of its
consequences, or (2) the firm knowingly--as confirmed by its Technology Options Analysis--
chose an inferior technology when inherently-safer alternatives were available. Here,
again, the magnitude of the regulatory fine should be conditioned on the consequences of
the chemical accident, the potential hazard reduction achievable had the firm selected a
superior production technology or implemented its Risk Management Plan, the firm's prior
safety record, etc. We note that Section 113 of the amended Clean Air Act, in principle,
29However, as subsequently explained, increasing the scale of penalties for safety violations is not
intended to suggest that huge fines be imposed on any and all safety violations or, for that matter, that each and
every safety violation automatically be fined at all. For an example of a regulatory system with significantly
greater fines than that in the U.S., see the system implemented in British Columbia, Canada, as described in
Hunt, Barth, and Leahy (1991).
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addresses the need to impose penalties for safety violations. 30 However, to be effective,
these sanctions must be stringently imposed as violations occur.
For regulatory fines to be effective, firms must be able to anticipate the possible and
likely regulatory consequences of maintaining or eliminating chemical hazards. We
therefore recommend that the Federal agencies make public their guidelines for levying
fines, including an explanation of those factors which influence the magnitude of the fine
imposed. The Federal and state agencies should then apply these guidelines consistently
and fairly. Thus applied, the system of regulatory penalties recommended above should
provide significant economic inducements for firms to improve chemical safety, especially
by implementing primary accident prevention strategies.
Finally, we note that, unlike other economic incentives such as workers'
compensation and liability for damages through the tort system, regulatory fines are under
the direct control of the regulatory agencies. In fact, the scale of penalties for safety
violations might be shifted upward to compensate for continued inadequacies in other
economic incentives outside direct agency control (that is, if these other economic
incentives are not implemented).
4. Insurance
In general, insurance has not yet proven to be an effective mechanism in preventing
chemical accidents. The major problem has been the insurance carriers' lack of
sophistication in evaluating the relative hazardousness of alternative chemical process
technologies. Remedies for this problem are most likely to be found in the information-
enhancing policies described previously. For instance, the government clearinghouse of
information about inherently-safe technologies and inferior technologies, firm-specific Risk
Management Plans (including a Technology Options Analysis), and an improved chemical
accident reporting and analysis system should all contribute to more refined risk
assessment capabilities, more effective loss control activities, and more rational
underwriting on the part of insurers.
As the insurance industry improves its skills in classifying chemical risks (reflecting
primary, secondary, and accident mitigation measures taken by a particular firm) and
setting premiums for those risks, the Federal government might consider imposing financial
3°In particular, a violation of any of the requirements or prohibitions of Title I (encompassing air
toxics and Section 112(r)) include the following remedies: administrative penalty order and field citation;
administrative compliance order; civil judicial action; or criminal action.
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responsibility requirements on producers and users of hazardous chemicals.3 1 Financial
responsibility requirements would ensure that firms are able to pay for the damages their
chemical accidents are judged to have caused.32 The premiums that firms pay for
insurance coverage--to comply with financial responsibility requirements--would provide an
immediate and continuing economic inducement for firms to reduce chemical hazards.33
C. ORGANIZATIONAL INCENTIVES TO PROMOTE CHEMICAL SAFETY
Many of the organizational barriers to chemical safety identified in Chapter VII are
indirectly addressed by the preceding informational and economic policies. In this section,
we identify policies which are specifically designed to help remove organizational barriers
to chemical safety. These organizational policies are intended to (1) make safety a
primary objective of the organization; (2) strengthen internal incentives to encourage
safety; (3) modify the organizational structure to encourage primary prevention; and
(4) establish an effective labor-management dialogue on safety.
1. Make Safety a Primary Objective of the Organization
To promote chemical accident prevention, firms need to elevate chemical safety
from a secondary objective to a primary objective of the organization. 34 In order to
accomplish this attitudinal shift, regulators, insurers, trade associations, professional and
management associations, and suppliers of chemical inputs and technologies should refocus
their educational initiatives for management and employees at all levels of the
31Such financial responsibility requirements might parallel the requirements imposed on those
facilities that treat, store, or dispose of hazardous substances under CERCLA Section 108(b). Those provisions
require firms to be able to pay for the consequences of chemical releases. Chemical handlers can demonstrate
financial responsibility in a variety of ways: financial tests, corporate guarantees, insurance, letters of credit,
surety bonds, or trust funds. However, the first two financial responsibility mechanisms leave the firm's
potential chemical risks unsecured. Consequently, we recommend that every financial responsibility mechanism
be required to provide collateral, such as a surety bond, to offset the chemical risk. See Ashford, Moran, and
Stone (1989), page V-5.
32Financial responsibility requirements may be a particularly effective policy instrument for smaller
and medium-sized firms that are capable of having a catastrophic chemical accident but do not have the assets
to pay for the resulting damages. See Ashford, Moran, and Stone (1989), page 111-18.
33Note, however, that if insurers are unable to distinguish among firms with different degrees of risk,
then imposing financial responsibility requirements may not provide an adequate incentive for the development
of inherently-safer technologies. See Minzner (1990), pages 168-169.
34While EPA, OSHA, the Chemical Manufacturers Association and the American Institute of
Chemical Engineers are aiming at this through Process Safety Management and Responsible Care, clearly more
is required.
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organization. The educational focus of these initiatives may vary depending on the nature
of the provider and the intended target within the organization.
2. Strengthen Internal Incentives to Encourage Safety
The reward structure in some firms deters those within the organization from
attending to safety considerations. To promote chemical accident prevention, firms should
be encouraged to evaluate management and technical employees on the basis of their
safety performance. Such management and employee evaluations should be based not only
on the firm's record of chemical accidents, which are relatively rare events even in
hazardous plants, but also on management and employee contributions to the identification
and elimination of chemical hazards and on their conducting operations in a way which
promotes the safety culture of the firm.
It is especially important that corporate ownership strengthen incentives for top-
level managers to promote chemical safety. In many American corporations today, senior
management believes it must demonstrate its effectiveness immediately or risk being
replaced. Since, for many stockholders, the most visible evidence of management
performance is corporate profit, management objectives are frequently dominated by
attempts to maximize short-run corporate profits. The problem with this incentive
structure is that desirable corporate investments will be rejected whenever the investment
returns are not immediate (since only the costs of the investment will appear in the short
run).3 5 Investments in accident prevention, and particularly primary accident prevention,
may be of this type since most of the costs are borne immediately but the benefits accrue
over the life of the plant.
3. Modify Organizational Structure to Foster Primary Prevention
The firm's organizational structure may inhibit primary accident prevention. To
remedy this problem, firms should be encouraged to include their technical experts on
chemical safety in plant and process design as well as in operations. Firms should also
make whatever other modifications of their organizational structure are needed to
facilitate the flow of information concerning primary prevention and other hazard
prevention opportunities.
35See Ashford and Caldart (1991), page 230.
VIII-13
i--- -- --7 -- - - I -II --llllll·IC1-.l --.-----^-·-------------·----- ------ --C-- - -
4. Establish an Effective Labor-Management Dialogue on Safety
Broadening worker involvement in the firm's technological decisionmaking could
significantly enhance efforts to promote inherently-safer chemical processes:
Federal labor policy should encourage a change in attitude between labor
and management. Both parties commonly share an assumption, which is
reflected in [National Labor Relations] Board and court decisions, that
technological development involves certain adverse effects, and that those
affected must simply cope. However, the adversarial stance of management
and labor is inappropriate for the optimal development and implementation
of technology. There is a great need to establish a cooperative attitude
between the parties in order to develop integrative solutions to the complex
problems posed by adyancing technology that will address the needs of
management and labor. oo
Two mechanisms to allow labor and management to participate jointly in corporate
decisionmaking involving chemical safety are management-labor safety committees and
technology bargaining.
(a) Require Management-Labor Safety Committees
Thousands of collective bargaining agreements throughout the United States
currently provide for joint safety and health committees. A Bureau of National Affairs
survey found that approximately 62% of manufacturing firms, and almost 75% of firms in
the chemical and petroleum industries, had joint management-labor health and safety
committees.3 7 Originally, many of these committees were little more than "paper tigers,"
lacking credibility, authority, and training. Recently, however, growing concern about
occupational and environmental health and safety--by the public, regulators, insurers,
management, and labor--has resulted in an expansion of the role of such committees.
Nevertheless, a recent study prepared for the Department of Labor cautions:
If these committees are to perform effectively their mandates, the scope of
their powers, and their limitations need to be clearly established. Function is
established through clear enunciation of committee rights and
responsibilities; it is established through actual practice; it is also established
through structure. A joint committee with unequal representation by
management and labor, or with infrequent meetings, or with members that
have no line authority outside the committee, or that does not provide pay
P6Ashford and Ayers (1987), page 858.
37See the discussion in Minzner (1990), page 133.
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for members who do committee work during working hours is less likely to
have the capability of making contributions which will ave a major effect on
correcting safety and health hazards in the workplace.3 8
Properly devised, management-labor safety committees, or a series of such
committees in a large corporation, can be an effective means of overcoming some of the
organizational barriers that inhibit the development or adoption of inherently safer
technologies. To promote primary safety in chemical processes, we recommend that
chemical-producing and chemical-using firms be required to have management-labor safety
and health committees that satisfy the following conditions: 39
o Safety committees should be well-represented by top management and well-
placed union and worker representatives, with substantial training and expertise
in the areas of safety and production technology.
o Management representatives should have the visible support of senior corporate
management.
o Committee members should have full access to pertinent company records and
data, not just those concerning health and safety, but for purposes of primary
accident prevention, those concerning corporate planning, finance, and
technological options as well.
o Committees should meet regularly, on paid working time, and keep formal
minutes to be shared with the company's management and workforce.
o Committees should conduct regular inspections of the facilities and participate in
accident investigations and safety monitoring programs.
o Committees should be allowed to comment on the company's Technology
Options Analysis and Risk Management Plan. The company should be required
to "act or explain" in response to the committee's comments.
o Committees should have control over their budget and participate in health and
safety training and in the hiring and firing of health and safety personnel.
o Committees should have the authority to prevent the use of any imminently
hazardous equipment or process, where an important measure of relative
hazardousness is the availability of safer alternatives with similar performance
and cost characteristics.
38Ruttenberg (1988), page 4.
39 These conditions correspond closely to those recommended in Ruttenberg (1988).
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We note that many of these conditions are commonly present in many European
management-labor safety and health committees. 40 We further note that, although OSHA
does not require a particular mechanism for employee participation under its Process
Safety Management Rule,41 it did sugges that employees establish joint management-labor
safety and health committees. 42
(b) Permit Technology Bargaining
Another mechanism to allow workers to influence corporate decisions involving
chemical safety is technology bargaining. The wording of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) guarantees workers the right to bargain on "terms and conditions of employment."
The legislative history of the NLRA indicates that Congress initially contemplated
collective bargaining as a dynamic process capable of responding to new problems. 43
However, while the dangers of complexity, scale, and hazardous substances--which are
embedded in chemical processes--clearly affect the conditions of employment, recent
Supreme Court rulings have not supported the employer's duty to technology bargain.
Using the terminology developed by Ashford and Ayers, the Supreme Court has not
sustained the employer's duty to "decision" bargain, which requires management to bargain
with labor during the decisionmaking process (involving technological and other choices);
instead, it merely reinforced the employer's duty to "effect" bargain, which requires that
once management makes a decision, it must bargain with labor over the effects of the
decision.44 The problem is that effect bargaining will not induce firms to substitute
4°See Ruttenberg (1980). In addition, the proposed Comprehensive Occupational Safety and Health
Reform Act(COSHRA) would require firms with 11 or more employees to have joint management-labor safety
and health committees (see HR 3160 and S 1622 Section 601(2)).
41The Process Safety Management Rule does require employers "to develop a written plan of action
regarding the implementation of the employee participation that is required." The irony of this requirement is
that the Process Safety Management Rule does not explicitly require employee participation in the development
of an employee participation policy. See 29 CFR 1910.119(c).
42See Appendix C: Compliance Guidelines and Recommendations for Process Safety Management
(Non-Mandatory), 29 CFR 1910.119. Because OSHA did not specify the level of required employee
participation, the effectiveness of the resultant employee participation programs, as well as the extent of
employee empowerment, may vary significantly from firm to firm. To prevent such variation, at a minimum,
OSHA should clarify the language of the Process Safety Management Rule and issue a policy statement with
respect to the expected level of employee participation. Such a policy is particularly important in defining the
participation rights of workers in non-unionized workplaces.
43See Ashford and Ayers (1987), page 855.
44See Ashford and Ayers (1987).
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inherently-safe technologies for mitigation measures; allowing labor to decision bargain
over technological choices will. Federal labor policy (or the National Labor Relations
Board and the courts by accepting a broader interpretation of the NLRA) needs to
recognize the benefits of encouraging the right of workers to bargain over those decisions
which significantly affect the hazardousness of the work environment.
D. POLICIES TO EXPAND MANAGEMENTS PRIMARY PREVENTION ROLE
Upper management needs to be sensitized to the importance of primary accident
prevention and to require that those working under them have the requisite skills and
attitudes to achieve primary prevention. Several policies can help accomplish this
objective. First, MBA programs, especially those specializing in the management of
technology or in training managers for technologically-based firms, should contain
materials on process safety--including primary accident prevention--as part of the
curriculum. Second, continuing educational initiatives concerning primary prevention
should be undertaken by professional associations such as the American Institute of
Chemical Engineers (AIChE), by professional management associations such as the
American Management Association, by trade associations such as the Chemical
Manufacturers Association,4 5 and by a joint EPA-OSHA effort. (Ideally, these two
initiatives would be undertaken in combination with efforts to alter the firm's attitudes
toward occupational disease and pollution prevention dealing with gradual emissions.)
Third, formal responsibilities should be placed on top management to acquaint it with
primary prevention opportunities. These would include requiring the President of the
corporation and each member of the corporation's Board of Directors to sign a statement
that he or she has read the corporation's Risk Management Plan; requiring that a
statement of the corporation's safety and environmental performance be entered into the
Annual Report and read at the Board of Directors' meetings; and requiring that the
appropriate corporate officer and line managers certify as to the inherent safety of any
proposed new facility or that inherently-safe technologies with reasonably comparable cost
and performance characteristics are not available. Finally, criminal sanctions on top-level
corporate officers and managers should be available if they knowingly select or authorize
an inferior technology (verifiable as a result of the preceding policy recommendation) and
subsequently the corporation engages in blatant safety violations that lead to chemical
accidents involving serious injuries or fatalities.
4
'CMA's CAER Program ought to be reexamined for its inadequate emphasis on primary prevention.
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E. POLICIES TO EXPAND LABOR'S ROLE IN PROMOTING CHEMICAL SAFETY
A combination of policies can help increase employee knowledge about primary
accident prevention. First, the academic training that engineers receive should be
improved by incorporating process safety, process design, and process redesign into the
educational curriculum. 46 Second, the Federal agencies should provide grants, styled after
those in OSHA's New Directions program,47 to train operators and professional staff to
recognize primary prevention opportunities. These grants should be offered to industry,
unions, trade associations, and professional associations to improve the competence of
these institutions in accident prevention. Third, existing training grants should be
expanded to include primary accident prevention. Fourth, union conferences on health and
safety should contain sessions on primary accident prevention. Finally, demonstration
projects of primary prevention measures, recommended earlier to promote information
dissemination, should also be encouraged for educational purposes.
F. POLICIES TO DEVELOP INHERENTLY-SAFE TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS
To help encourage the construction of inherently-safe plants, the Federal
government should consider providing Safer Technology Investment Tax Credits. In
addition, to help overcome the technical difficulty of achieving primary accident prevention
in currently-operating plants, the tax code should be revised to eliminate or to diminish the
tax depreciation taken by purchasers or repurchasers of old plants, especially those plants
with a poor safety record. Combined with the other economic incentives discussed earlier,
such a tax policy will discourage the continued operation (through resale) of obsolete,
unsafe plants and will encourage their replacement by new plants utilizing inherently-safer
technologies.
To help remedy the lack of inherently-safe technologies for production of many
commodities, the Federal government should provide grants to universities and to other
technical institutions to conduct research in this area, and EPA and OSHA or NIOSH
should undertake initiatives in their research facilities to develop inherently-safe
technological solutions. In addition, the Federal agencies should encourage government-
46For example, it has been reported that none of the 145 undergraduate chemical-engineering
programs in the United States currently require separate safety courses as part of its curriculum. See Jones
(1988), page 221.
470SHA's New Directions program was instituted in 1978 to provide grants to employee, employer,
educational, and non-profit organizations for the purpose of education and training (as authorized under
Section 21(c) of the OSHAct). For an analysis of the purpose and effectiveness of the program, see Whiting
(1989).
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industry and industry-industry joint ventures to develop inherently-safe technologies. A
relatively new mechanism that EPA could use to promote the development of inherently-
safe technologies is the Federal Technology Transfer Act (FT A) of 1986. The FTTA
promotes cooperation between government agencies, in this case EPA and OSHA/NIOSH,
and industrial firms that wish to commercialize new technologies. 48 This cooperation
involves sharing industry's costs of developing new technologies, with reimbursement in the
form of royalties to EPA and OSHA/NIOSH for technologies which these agencies have
helped to develop. Clearly, if vigorously encouraged, this mechanism can yield substantial
benefits to all parties involved. The incentives should be structured in such a way that
cooptimization of accident prevention, pollution prevention, reduction of occupational
disease, and productivity improvements is encouraged by technological change/redesign.
G. REGULATORY APPROACHES FOR IMPROVING CHEMICAL SAFETY
Finally, in this section, we identify policies to address the barriers to chemical
accident prevention created by the regulatory system itself. In a broad sense, we hope that
EPA and OSHA use the recommendations of this report to clarify the requirements and
opportunities for primary accident prevention in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments and
in the OSHA Process Safety Management Rule, respectively.
1. Improve Intra-Agency Coordination
EPA and OSHA individually can improve its regulatory performance by
coordinating all of its accident prevention and pollution prevention initiatives both at the
state and Federal level. This would allow each agency to identify and eliminate hazard-
shifting responses by industry and to cooptimize its accident prevention and pollution
prevention objectives. As part of the cooptimization, pollution prevention and source
reduction incentives to industry should be dramatically strengthened.
In the context of chemical production and use, the EPA Office of Solid Waste and
Emergency Response currently concerns itself with chemical process safety, while the
Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxic Substances is concerned with preventing
unreasonable risks related to the toxicity of new and old chemicals. The Toxics Release
Inventory (TRI) under SARA Title III is informational in character and alerts the
regulatory agencies and the public concerning industrial releases. The coordination of
4'The purpose of the Federal Technology Transfer Act is to improve American competitiveness by
increasing the rate of adoption of new technologies. As of January 1990, EPA had entered into a total of six
cooperative agreements with firms desiring to develop innovative technologies. See Karmali (1990), page 149.
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prevention activities focused on process and product safety and toxicity is what is needed.
OSHA standards for safety and health also need to be integrated.
2. Increase Interagency Cooperation
Earlier in this chapter, we recommended that EPA and OSHA build on their 1990
Memorandum of Understanding to improve the coordination of their chemical accident
reporting, investigation, and analysis activities. More generally, cooperation should be
encouraged between EPA and OSHA in all of their regulatory activities involving chemical
accident prevention and particularly in the design of policies to promote primary
prevention. We note that, in addition to the 1990 Clean Air Act,49 which requires EPA to
coordinate its accident prevention regulations with OSHA, the recent OSHA Process
Safety Management Rule directs EPA and OSHA to avoid unnecessary duplication and to
harmonize their regulatory efforts. 50
3. Increase Regulatory Flexibility While Retaining Stringent Safety Objectives
The approach EPA and OSHA need to take to promote chemical safety can, we
believe, best be summarized by the concept of regulatory "flexibility," broadly interpreted.
By regulatory flexibility, we mean to encompass three distinct aspects of regulatory
involvement.
First, the regulatory approach should be flexible in the sense that individual firms
can select whichever methods they believe are most effective in preventing chemical
accidents. By taking such a performance-oriented approach, 51 regulatory agencies can
ensure that chemical safety objectives are attained without imposing antiquated technology
or burdening the firm with unnecessary costs of regulatory compliance. 52 Note, however,
that regulatory flexibility applies only to how chemical safety objectives are achieved, but
not to the chemical safety objectives themselves. These objectives must not be
compromised. Thus stringent, though flexible, regulatory approaches are needed.
49See 42 USC 7412(r)(7)(D).
50See 29 CFR 1910.119, section 304.
51Much has been written about performance versus specification standards. We mean here to suggest
a hybrid system whereby imaginative and innovative firms are accorded a flexible response, while smaller or
technologically unsophisticated firms are given articulated options to adopt technologies known to provide
safety improvements.
52See Abrams and Ward (1990), page 172.
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Second, the regulatory approach should be flexible in the sense that it deploys a
broad array of policy instruments--involving information, education, and various economic
incentives and disincentives applied to industry, management, labor, and the community.
When effectively applied, the chemical safety policies reinforce each other with synergistic
effects. For instance, informational requirements can give substance to regulatory form by
providing valuable evidence in regulatory proceedings to determine whether a firm's use of
a particular technology has violated the "general duty" clause under the OSHAct53 or under
the Clean Air Act54 . Furthermore, by providing a variety of mechanisms that allow all
interested parties to participate in a common effort to prevent chemical accidents,
regulatory agencies can ensure that the attainment of chemical safety objectives are not
vulnerable to the failure of a particular policy initiative. For example, if individual states,
because of limited resourced or political leanings, are not able to monitor or enforce their
chemical safety programs effectively, other policy mechanisms must still be in force to
ensure that chemical safety objectives are achieved.
Third, the regulatory approach should be flexible in the sense that EPA and OSHA
develop finely tuned, particularized policies based on fine distinctions in circumstances,
such as hazardous chemicals in a specific production process, the scale of production, the
availability of safer technological alternatives, the prior safety performance of the
company, etc. Thus, regulatory policies typically need to be relatively complex to reflect
important differences in circumstances surrounding different chemical hazards, and
regulatory agencies will need to use their discretion in the application of these policies.
However, by complex, we do not mean confusing or unnecessarily complicated, and by
discretionary, we do not mean arbitrary.
We note that in order to make the fine distinctions that true regulatory flexibility
demands, the agencies need to increase the technological literacy (i.e., their knowledge of
alternative production technologies, not just secondary prevention and mitigation options)
53See 29 USC 654 (Section (5)(a)(1) of the OSHAct). The employer has a general duty "to furnish
each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are
causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees."
54See 42 USC 7412 (r)(1). 'The owners and operators of stationary sources producing, processing,
handling or storing [hazardous substances] have a general duty ... to identify hazards which may result from
such releases using appropriate hazard assessment techniques, to design and maintain a safe facility taking such
steps as are necessary to prevent releases, and to minimize the consequences of accidental releases which do
occur."
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of their staff. In addition, Federal and state inspectors should receive technical training in
chemical process safety, particularly in the area of primary accident prevention. 55
In addition, we note that chemical accident prevention must be a continuous
process, not just a one-time event. As existing plants modify their processes or as new
approaches become available, prevention plans should be updated. At the same time, it is
clear that primary accident prevention offers the greatest opportunity to promote chemical
safety and that primary prevention can be most effectively and economically ensured at the
plant design stage when the chemical process technology is selected. 56 As one expert on
chemical safety has reported:
For every dollar it costs to fix a problem in the early stage of design, it will
cost $10 at the flowsheet stage, $100 at the detailed design stage, $1,000 after
the plant is built, and over $10,000 to clean up the mess if the problem is left
until an accident has occurred. 57
Similarly, the best opportunity for regulatory agencies to vouchsafe chemical process safety
is at the time of plant design and certification. Therefore, this is where regulatory activity
is likely to achieve its greatest benefit.
Finally, we are cognizant of the fact that the policy initiatives discussed in this
chapter require a cultural reorientation on the part of U.S. firms and may present non-
trivial economic burdens in some cases. However, since the international community,
working through organizations such as the OECD and UNEP, is also seriously examining
these questions (and the United States is providing leadership there), all industrialized and
industrializing nations might be persuaded to follow suit, so that no long-term competitive
disadvantage would inure to those countries and industries reconstituting their safety
initiatives.
-5Industry has expressed concern about the level of expertise of OSHA inspectors (in the context of
the proposed OSHA chemical process safety standard 29 CFR Part 1910, proposed in July 1990]). Many
petrochemical and other chemical firms have agreed to provide training personnel to augment OSHA's training
program to ensure a high level of expertise in inspections. See Occupational Safety & Health Reporter (January
8, 1992), page 1140.
56See, for example, Hohenemser, Kates, and Slovic (1983), which reached this conclusion based on
studies of 93 technological hazards.
57Kletz (1989), page 24.
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APPENDIX A: THE FATALITY/CATASTROPHE
ACCIDENT DESCRIPTION DATABASE
The Fatality/Catastrophe (FAT/CAT) Accident Description Database consists of a
computerized compilation of non-construction fatality/catastrophe inspection reports and
is a part of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA's) Integrated
Management Information System (IMIS). The screening criteria that determine whether
an accidental release will be included in the FAT/CAT database, therefore, are the same
criteria that result in a FAT/CAT inspection. Those inspections are carried out at facilities
"where there was one or more fatality or where five or more workers were hospitalized due
to injuries or illnesses that are work-related."1 This selection criterion biases the database
towards severe, high-casualty accidental workplace releases to the exclusion of low-impact
workplace releases and "nonfatal incidents in which there are large evacuations or property
damage, but few injuries." 2 Two OSHA contractors, Charles River Associates (CRA) and
Kearney/Centaur, utilized the information from the FAT/CAT Accident Description
Database to "determine the number of fatalities and injuries/illnesses associated with
accidents that would be potentially prevented by the development and use of PSM (process
safety management) programs."3
Only 29 of the 53 state areas in the United States are required to report the results
of their FAT/CAT inspections, since the remaining 24 states are under their own OSHA
State Plan. In order to assemble a comprehensive profile of the risk posed by hazardous
material accidents, the scope of the FAT/CAT database needed to be expanded. CRA
tried to fill this information gap by combining the statistics from five other sources with
FAT/CATs. Two of the sources, the Bureau of Labor Statistics Supplementary Data
Systems File (BLS SDS) and the National Fire Protection Association Fire Statistics
(NFPA U.S. Structural Fires Database), were either not compatible with the others or
incomplete and were only used to extrapolate estimates of workers' compensation expenses
and property damage, respectively. The three other sources were the OSHA First Report
of Serious Accident File (First Report), the National Response Center Database (NRC),
and a survey of selected regional newspapers. Since the CRA report focused only on the
chemical industry (SIC codes 28 and 29), five major regional newspapers4 were selected
1U.S. Department of Labor (1990), page V-2.
2Charles River Associates (1989), page 36.
3U.S. Department of Labor (1990), page V-3.
4The major regional newspapers surveyed included:
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from areas that are known to have a high concentration of chemical plants and petroleum
refineries, namely the East, Gulf, and West Coasts. Records from each of the latter three
sources were compared, and duplicate reports were identified and consolidated.
Conflicting reports were resolved by accepting either the most recent record or the most
frequently cited figures. The conclusions of CRA after performing cross-checking on the
data were as follows:
Review of the data retrieved from these sources confirms that, while some
overlap does exist, this compilation is not likely to be comprehensive. Much
of the data in some of them (e.g., BLS/SDS total incidents and NFPA
materials and property use classifications) cannot be interpreted in a way to
relate them directly to the presence of hazardous materials, or they are
incomplete. Of a total of 498 definable incidents obtained from these
sources, 439 proved to be unique and 59 were cited in more than one. The
rather low degree of overlap suggests that still more would have been found
if more sources had been searched (emphasis theirs).5
Kearney/Centaur expanded the scope of the CRA study to all industrial sectors that
use significant quantities of hazardous materials in analyzing the impact of a proposed
process safety management (PSM) standard. The FAT/CAT accident description database
was again taken as a starting point to estimate the risk posed by accidental releases. The
compiled statistics from the OSHA IMIS computer records of FAT/CAT inspections were
adjusted by using ratios of both fatalities and injuries/illnesses for each source contributing
to the data consolidation performed by CRA for incidents occurring in SIC 28 and 29
during the period 1983-87.6 These ratios were combined and multiplied to obtain the
* The Chicago Tribune
* The Houston Post
* The Los Angeles Tunes
* The New York Times and
* The Times Picayune (New Orleans)
SCharles River Associates (1989), page 42.
6Kearney/Centaur also attempted to use the OSHA IMIS data to estimate the number of non-
catastrophic injuries and evacuations that occur in the chemical-using industries. By the term "non-
catastrophic" we mean an accident involving fewer than five injuries and no deaths; these would not be included
in the FAT/CAT records. OSHA's roughly 34,500 planned inspection records were searched for accidents
involving hazardous substances over a four-year period from 1984 to 1987 (using the same format as was used in
searching FAT/CAT reports) and 13 were found. The consequences associated with these incidents included
14 injuries/illnesses (13 of which required hospitalization), which would scale up to 46 non-catastrophic
incidents and 50 injuries/illnesses if applied to all the plants subject to the proposed OSHA process safety
management (PSM) standards. However, further analysis by Kearney/Centaur revealed that those numbers





FAT/CAT totals for all hazardous chemical-using sectors to give an overall risk profile
from their operations. The assumption underlying this extension of the CRA analysis is
that their ratios "are judged to be reasonable for adjusting the FAT/CAT fatality and
injury/illness data across all the relevant industrial sectors.
I. SEVERE ACCIDENTAL RELEASES: AGGREGATE NATIONAL RESULTS
A. From the Charles River Associates Report
Table A.1 provides a summary of the number of chemical release incidents by year
and the databases involved, and Table A.2 gives the consolidated results. The figures for
number of evacuees is a minimum, because thirteen sources mentioned only that a number
of homes (up to 40) or area (up to 1 square mile) was evacuated without giving a head
count. No attempt was made by CRA to account for the people evacuated in those
incidents. Property damage figures (of $416 million) are provided only for sixteen high-
damage events, while smaller, but still-significant damages are unaccounted for in the
records. This means that the total amount of property damage reported is an
underestimate while the average property damage per event overestimates the true average
property damage. Most incidents did not involve a fatality; however "multiple fatalities
occurred in almost 10 percent of the incidents, and 3 of them accounted for 51 deaths."8
The post-1984 jump in accidents recorded in Table A.1 could conceivably be due to
increased accident reporting in the wake of the disaster at Bhopal in late 1984. However,
this period, during which the chemical industry was recovering from its "decade of misery,'9
was characterized by severe cost-cutting measures, some of which could potentially serve to
jeopardize the safety of chemical facilities. Therefore, these measures may also be a factor
in the increase in accidents.
CRA broke down its results for SIC 28 and 29 by the size 10 of the establishment in
which the incidents occurred. These results are given in Table A.3. CRA contends that
there is a relative underrepresentation of small establishments in the accident statistics.
carrying out planned inspections. Given the limited amount of data recovered (13 incidents) and the extent of
underreporting of accident histories, no profile of non-catastrophic incidents could be assembled using OSHA
IMIS data. (See Kearney/Centaur [1990], pages 5-7 to 5-11.)
7 Kearney/Centaur (1990), pages 5-6 and 5-7.
8 Charles River Associates (1989), page 43.
9KIine (1989), page 80.
10 The criterion for size was an economic one not based on a fixed definition of the number of
employees in the establishment. See Charles River Associates (1989), page 27.
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Table A.1 Chronological Survey of Incidents Reported in SIC 28 and 29
I_ I I I JilI If II III ................H-"HF ....F ..... ..... IIIII
Files Surveyed In Which Incidents Are Reported
Number of First Regional
Year Incidents FAT/CAT Report NRC Papers
1982 38 X X
1983 67 X X X
1984 68 X X X
1985 100 X X X
1986 99 X X X X
1987 87 X X X X
19881 31 X X
1Through mid-August.
SOURCE: Charles River Associates 1989, p. 44.
Table A.2 Results from the CRA giving the risk profile associated with hazardous materials in SIC 28 and
29, 1982 to mid-1988
Total Number of Incidents
Incidents Involving Fatalities
Incidents Involving Multiple Fatalities
Number of Fatalities
Incidents Involving Injuries




Number of Persons Evacuated
Amount of Property Damage Reported
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"While a large fraction of the total incidents occurred in establishments of
unknown size, it is clear that small establishments are underrepresented with
respect to their occurrence in their population as a whole. They constitute
about 60 percent of the total population of establishments, but are involved
in only about 6 percent of the identified incidents. Even if all unknown
establishments were small, they would still be underrepresented." 11
CRA suggests reasons for the underrepresentation, ranging from the relative
underreporting of smaller plants incidents to the hypothesis that smaller plants are safer,
on average, than their larger counterparts. This latter possibility could be due to the
smaller amounts of hazardous substances generally on hand in smaller facilities, making
any releases less catastrophic.
Two features of the data in Table A.3 should be noted. First, fatalities seem to
occur in a roughly uniform distribution within establishment size, whereas medium-sized
facilities are proportionately overrepresented by injuries and evacuations. Second, the
large amounts of property damage incurred by large facilities is probably due to the larger
amounts of capital invested in plant and equipment at those establishments.
After using the BLS SDS files to extrapolate the medical expenses and the workers'
compensation costs and the NFPA files to aid in assessing the property damages involved,
CRA estimated "the minimum levels of risk associated with hazardous materials in SIC 28
and 29,"12 as summarized in Table A.4. The estimates of fatalities, injuries, and evacuees
were obtained by averaging the totals for the period from 1985 to 1987, in order to account
for the probable increased reporting of accidents in the wake of Bhopal. The concluding
paragraph of CRA's analysis of hazardous material incidents in the US chemical industry is
given below:
Overall, the safety of the chemical process and petroleum refining industries
is excellent: only about one plant in 200 can be expected to have a single
incident per year, and the fatality rate is about one per 55 million hours
worked. However, while the majority of the incidents do not involve multiple
fatalities, large numbers of injuries, or evacuations or major property loss,
major incidents are often of a catastrophic nature. Table 3-8 [reproduced as
Table A.5] gives a profile of the most serious incidents. The largest number
occurred in the petroleum refining sector and most involved fires or
"LCharles River Associates (1989), pages 53-54.
12Charles River Associates (1989), page 59.
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1Totals do not include blocks/homes/square miles evacuated.
SOURCE: Charles River Associates 1989, p. 53.
Table A.4 Summary of Estimated Annual Minimum Levels of Risk Associated with Hazardous Materials in
SIC 28 and 291





Medical Expenses plus Compensation 2
Property Damage3
1 Numbers and dollars per year.2In 1983 dollars







SOURCE: Charles River Associates 1989, p. 60.
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Table A.S Profile of the most serious incidents involving hazardous materials
Number of Incidents Designated as Most Serious













Number of toxic gas or vapor releases










1 Incidents involving multiple fatalities or more than 10 injuries or more than 1,000 evacuees or more
than $1 million damages. Data obtained from FAT/CAT, First Report, NRC, and major newspapers
for 1982 to mid-1988.
SOURCE: Charles River Associates 1989, p. 55.
Table A.6 Risk Profile for Accidents Involving Hazardous Substances from all Industries Subject to the
OSHA Proposed Rules On Process Safety Management
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explosions, which were also the most frequent causes in the other sectors.
Releases of toxic gases or vapors are implicated in more than one-fourth of
the incidents. Human error and equipment failure each account for about
one-fourth of the causes of these incidents, but most causes were unknown at
the time the data became available. We must also emphasize here that the
criteria chosen for designating these incidents as "most serious" are arbitrary:
the purpose of developing this classification scheme was solely to gain
insights into the nature of this subset of incidents. While they make up about
25 percent of the total reported, about 60 percent of the fatalities, 80 percent
of the injuries, and almost all the damages occurred in them.13
B. From the Kearney/Centaur Report
Aggregated national statistics from the Kearney/Centaur search of the FAT/CAT
inspection records-for all industries subject to proposed OSHA process safety
management (PSM) rules--are given in Table A.6. This table provides a summary of the
FAT/CAT results by year and also an estimate of the total and annual consequences of
accidents involving hazardous substances in the United States (using the adjustment
methodology previously described for the CRA data).
Comparing the Kearney/Centaur estimates to those developed by CRA (presented
in Table A.4) reveals a discrepancy in the ratio of fatalities to injuries expected per year.
The CRA estimate of injuries annually (985), made only for accidents in plants from SIC
codes 28 and 29, is larger than the Kearney/Centaur estimate (901) for accidents across all
SIC codes. However, the estimated annual number of fatalities (265) from the
Kearney/Centaur report is five times larger than the estimate (53) from the CRA report,
which means that the ratio of fatalities to injuries from the Kearney/Centaur report is
roughly five times greater than the CRA's fatality/injury ratio. CRA's ratio of 18.58
injuries for every fatality is more in line with the conventional rule-of-thumb that
anticipates 10 workplace injuries for every workplace fatality14 than the Kearney/Centaur
ratio of 3.4 injuries per fatality.
Results from another database covering accidental releases, the Acute Hazardous
Events (AHE) Database, are summarized in Table A.7. They suggest that, for primary
producers, the actual ratio of deaths to injuries from hazardous material releases are in
fairly close agreement with the CRA estimate, even though the AHE results include
LiCharles River Associates (1989), page 54.
14This heuristic is based on the Heinrich triangle, which summarizes the results of studies of workplace
safety and anticipates that every hundred incidents should produce 10 injuries and 1 death. See Haggerty
(1989), page 39, which refers to the Heinrich triangle in the context of chemical plant safety.
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Table A.7 Results on the ratio of injuries to fatalities from the AHE Database compared to results from
CRA and Kearney/Centaur





















Results from Kearney/Centaur (1990)
All Sectors 1,327







1 Primary producers include the chemical and petroleum refining industries (SIC 28 and 29).
2 Secondary producers include all manufacturing industries exclusive of primary producers (SIC 20-27
and SIC 30-39).
3The figures in this row represent annual estimates based on the results from the row above it.
Table A.8 Summary of Aggregated National Results Associated
Substances.
From Charles River Associates



















with Accidents Involving Hazardous
From Kearney/Centaur
Report on Plant Safety







Lost Production $30 million2
Worker/Workplace Impacts
Labor Turnover




NOTE: All results are annual estimates of the risk posed by hazardous material accidents.
1 Assumes the same inpatient/outpatient breakdown as reported in the risk profile on p. 45.
2 Calculated by multiplying the annual number of incidents by the lost production per accident for a
relative plant estimated in the Kearney/Centaur report and discussed above.
3 Calculated from the Kearney/Centaur results by summing all productivity gains from implementing
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primarily "near miss" or nonfatality/noninjury incidents while the CRA results contain
comparatively few "near miss" records. Since the AHE results for secondary producers
indicate that the injury/fatality ratios are smaller than they are for primary producers, we
conclude that the low ratios obtained from the Kearney/Centaur results are largely derived
from the underreporting of nonfatality events and not from an increased incidence of
fatalities relative to injuries among non-chemical industry users of hazardous materials.
Kearney/Centaur used the results from the CRA report to estimate the average
property damage per major accident. They assumed that the vast majority of incidents
involved property damage that was unreported, and estimated that the average loss
incurred in these unreported incidents was $17,000, equal to the average of the five
smallest incidents of property damage that were reported.l 5 If all incidents were assumed
to have unreported property damage, the average property damage per major incident
would be $904,000. However, if only those incidents that reported a fire or explosion are
assumed to have property damage that is unreported,l6 the average property damage
would be $866,000. It is expected that a few leaks/spills may cause $77,000 in property
damages but most would not, in which case the latter estimate of $866,000 would be more
accurate and is the figure that we will use.
The value of lost production per accident was estimated by Kearney/Centaur
assuming that each accident caused the affected plant to be shut down for an average of
two weeks, which is equivalent to roughly four percent of annual production.
Kearney/Centaur then assumed that the production losses could be estimated by using the
amount of value added to raw materials by a manufacturing facility.17 They developed this
The amount of property damage reported in the five lowest estimates was $100,000, $100,000,
$100,000, $60,000, and $25,000. The average of these five estimates is S77,000. The remaining eleven reported
estimates were each in excess of $1 million.
16 Each incident was classified as involving a fire/explosion or a spill/leak. Spills/leaks that were later
ignited were classified as fires/explosions. All 16 of the incidents where property damage was reported involved
fires or explosions. Of the 482 events for which no property damage was reported, 239 (or 49.6%) involved an
explosion and/or a fire. The total property damage reported in the CRA report was S412.9 million. Adding to
this total the damages from the 239 "unreported" fires/explosions, and assuming that the spills/leaks caused
nominal damage, gives a sum of $4313 million for the 498 events identified in the CRA analysis. If we assume
that all of the unreported incidents cause an average of $77,000 in property damage, the total damage would be
$450 million.
17Kearney/Centaur asserted that value added "is approximately equal to the difference between the
value of shipments and the cost of raw materials." (Kearney/Centaur [1990], page 6-25.) The authors assumed
that this variable, including the cost of labor and overhead, represents the parts of the production process that
would be incurred even when the process is inoperative, whereas the cost of raw materials would not be
incurred. Note that value added does not account for the value lost by possible destruction of inventory and/or
products in process and, as such, "the value added estimate represents a minimum amount of loss."
(Kearney/Centaur [1990], page 6-26.)
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estimate by taking as a representative facility a hypothetical plant in SIC 28 having average
sales and an average ratio of value of shipments to value added. Multiplying the average
value of shipments (obtained from the 1982 Census of Manufacturers and recalculated in
1988 dollars) by the average ratio of shipments to value added gives an average value
added for a representative plant of $7.54 million. In order to use this figure in their
calculation of lost production, Kearney/Centaur further assumed that the likelihood of a
major incident is independent of plant size. Four percent of the representative plant's
value added is $301,000, which is the Kearney/Centaur estimate of the average amount of
production lost per hazardous material accident.
The number of chemical incidents annually was derived by Kearney/Centaur in the
same way that the annual injuries and fatalities were estimated from the FAT/CAT
results. 18 The average of 182 incidents that were attributed to hazardous materials for the
five year period from 1983 through 1987 from the FAT/CAT database was adjusted based
on the results of the CRA incorporation of other data sources as described previously.
Based on this adjustment, the total number of accidents was estimated to be 389 annually,
which contrasts with the CRA's estimate of 100 incidents every year from facilities in SIC
28 and 29.
The total amount of property damage associated with major accidents involving
hazardous substances using estimates provided by Kearney/Centaur is $336.9 million per
year. The value of production lost due to those accidents was calculated to be $117.1
million per year. By comparison, CRA estimates the yearly property damages from
hazardous material accidents in SIC 28 and 29 to be $63 million (in Table A.4).
Kearney/Centaur's estimate of worker turnover assumes that one third of all
manufacturing turnover is due to job-related hazards and that the minimum cost of this is
"equivalent to the worker's wage for the period of time required to fully replace a lost
worker." 19 The time required was estimated to be at least two weeks, which when
multiplied by the average wage rate for a manufacturing employee (including benefits),
$12.90 per hour, gives an estimated replacement cost of $1,032 per turnover. The turnover
rate for the manufacturing sector was estimated to be 26.4 percent annually.20 The
18 Kearney/Centaur (1990) estimated that 56% of the accidents in chemical-using facilities would have
been avoided annually if a national process safety management (PSM) program had been in place. However,
since we are interested in the number of hazardous substance accidents, we will divide the Kearney/Centaur
estimates of potential accidents avoided by .56 to arrive at the total number of forecasted accidents.
19Kearney/Centaur (1990), page 6-28.
20Kearney/Centaur (1990), page 6-29.
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population of workers whose job involves operation of equipment and possible direct
exposure to chemical-related job hazards is 1,643,567, of which only a quarter were
estimated to "perceive themselves as being affected by hazards in such a way as to influence
staying on the job."21 We get an estimate of the worker turnover due to chemical-related
job hazards by multiplying the affected worker population by the turnover rate times the
fraction due to job-related hazards. Multiplying this by the cost per turnover gives us a
rough estimate of the impact of hazardous material accidents on worker turnover, which is
performed below:
Amount of worker turnover = (affected population) x (turnover rate) x (0.33)
Affected population = (1,643,567) x (0.25) = 410,892
Turnover rate = 0.264/year
Amount of worker turnover = (410,892) x (0.264) x (0.33) = 35,797/year
Annual cost of worker turnover = (Annual amount) x (cost per turnover)
Cost per turnover = $1,032
Annual cost of worker turnover = (35,797) x ($1,032) = $36.9 million
Table A.8 gives a summary of all the national statistics derived from the OSHA
FAT/CAT Accident Description Database. These figures indicate that catastrophic
accidents exact a huge toll on the lives of the workers and the community surrounding
hazardous chemical-using facilities. The Kearney/Centaur estimates reveal that over a
recent four year period (1984-1987), over 250 Americans were killed and almost 1,000 were
injured in those accidents. The economic burdens are also high, since almost $900 million
in plant damages, lost production, increased worker turnover, and decreased productivity
were estimated by Kearney/Centaur to have occurred during that time period as well.
These calculations were based on minimum costs and used conservative assumptions. The
conservatism of these estimates is illustrated by the fact that the damages stemming from
the October 1989 Phillips 66 plant explosion in Pasadena, Texas alone exceeded $1 billion.
II. SUPPLEMENT TO THE FAT/CAT ACCIDENT DATABASE
Charles River Associates and Kearney/Centaur examined the practices currently
being used in different industry sectors within the context of rules proposed by OSHA in
1990 on process safety management (PSM). Therefore, our examination of industry safety
2 1 Kearney/Centaur (1990), page 6-30.
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practices will begin by reviewing OSHA's proposed PSM standards. Kearney/Centaur's
data will then be inspected, followed by an investigation of CRA's results for the chemical
and petroleum industries.
A. OSHA's Proposed Standards Regarding Process Safety Management (PSM)
In 1990, OSHA published rules containing "requirements intended to eliminate the
incidence or mitigate the consequences of highly hazardous chemical releases, fires, and
explosions." 22 The focus of the rules was to require the adoption of a management system
that includes twelve basic areas (denoted by the letters d through o) which will be briefly
described below.
(d) Process safety information. Divided into three subparts, paragraph (d) requires
employers to develop and maintain certain important process information, providing a
"foundation for identifying and understanding the hazards involved in the process. '2 3 'This
safety information must be communicated to employees involved in the processes, and shall
include information pertaining to hazards of the highly hazardous chemicals used in the
process [subpart (1)], information pertaining to the technology of the process [subpart (2)],
and information pertaining to the equipment in the process [subpart (3)]" (square brackets
ours).24
(e) Process hazard analysis. According to OSHA, this is the "cornerstone of any
effective program for managing hazards because it is a thorough, orderly, systematic
approach for identifying, evaluating, and controlling processes involving highly hazardous
chemicals." 25 Both the time period involved for performing the analysis and the type of
analysis to be required are left to the employer's discretion. Subsequent sections lay out
some minimum requirements including the scope required, the makeup required by the
analysis team, follow-up, record-keeping, and implementation procedures surrounding the
process analysis.
(f) Operating procedures. This section requires the employer to "develop and
implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely
conducting activities involved in each process consistent with the process safety
2L-Occupational Health and Safety Reporter (July 18, 1990), page 251. The purpose in reviewing these
proposed OSHA rules is merely to provide a context for the subsequent survey results, which are based on the
proposed OSHA rules. The actual OSHA final rules on process safety for hazardous chemicals can be found in
Occupational Health and Safety Reporter (Fcbruary 24, 1992), pages 1285-1332.
23 Occupational Health and Safety Reporter (July 18, 1990), page 252.
240ccupational Health and Safety Reporter (July 18, 1990), page 262.
250ccupational Health and Safety Reporter (July 18, 1990), page 253.
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information,'"2 to disseminate this information to the employees, and to update these
procedures as the practices, processes, and technology change. These written procedures
are to address each operating phase, process operating limits, and safety and health
considerations surrounding the process.
(g) Training. This three part section establishes a process by which workers are
made aware of the processes and the operating procedures involved "with emphasis on the
specific safety and health hazards, procedures, and safe practices applicable to their job
tasks."27 Paragraph (g)(1) addresses initial training, paragraph (g)(2) deals with the
establishment of at least annual refresher and supplemental training, and paragraph (g)(3)
requires employee training to be certified--establishing a "tracking mechanism for the type
of training employees receive and when the employees received the training."28
(h) Contractors. This paragraph mandates information transfer from the employer
to contractors on applicable safety rules, on the "known potential fire, explosion or toxic
release hazards related to their work and the process,"29 and on applicable sections of the
emergency action plan. It also requires the employer to ensure adequate training of
contract employees and that contract employers "shall assure that each of their employees,
follow all applicable work practices and safety rules of the facility."30
(i) Pre-startup safety review. OSHA included this paragraph to require employers
operating "new facilities and...modified facilities for which the modification necessitates a
change in the process safety information" 3 1 to implement many of the provisions of the
proposed PSM before commencing operation. More specifically:
Construction is in accordance with design specifications; that safety,
operating, maintenance, and emergency procedures are in place and
adequate; process hazard analysis recommendations have been addressed
and actions required for startup have been completed; and training of
operating personnel has been completed.32
'-Occupational Health and Safety Reporter (July 18, 1990), page 263.
2 7 Occupational Health and Safety Reporter (July 18, 1990), page 263.
28 Occupational Health and Safety Reporter (July 18, 1990), page 254.
2 9 Occupational Health and Safety Reporter (July 18, 1990), page 254.
3 0 Occupational Health and Safety Reporter (July 18, 1990), page 264.
3 10ccupational Health and Safety Reporter (July 18, 1990), page 264.
3 2 0ccupational Health and Safety Reporter (July 18, 1990), page 254.
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(j) Mechanical integrity. This section deals with the maintenance of process
equipment, and its provisions are considered by OSHA "to be a major and necessary
element in a process hazard management program because of its importance in ensuring
equipment integrity; eliminating potential ignition sources; and, for determining that
equipment is designed, installed, and operating correctly." 33 Paragraphs are included
specifying the minimum items of process equipment that the provision applies to,
establishing written maintenance procedures, mandating maintenance employee training
practices, and detailing inspection and testing requirements that follow accepted standards
and codes and that are certified to have been conducted at acceptable frequencies.
Additional paragraphs require correction of equipment deficiencies before further use and
extends the above-mentioned mechanical integrity provisions to fabricated equipment.
(k) Hot work permits. In this paragraph, OSHA mandates that permits must be
issued and kept on file for hot work operations performed on or near the employer's
processes and facilities. Exceptions are made for hot work done in authorized welding
shops and done in the presence of the employer or someone authorized by the employer to
issue hot work permits. 'The purpose of the permit is to assure that the employer is aware
of the hot work being performed, and that appropriate safety precautions have been taken
prior to beginning the work.'3 4
(1) Management of change. This paragraph regulates modifications of "process
chemicals, technology, and equipment; and changes to facilities"35 by requiring the
establishment and implementation of written procedures that cover the reasons and time
period necessary for the change to be made and that enumerate the impacts of the changes
on operating procedures. Provisions are made for the employees impacted by the changes
to be informed of and trained in the changes as early as possible and for the process safety
information (covered in paragraph (d)) and the operating procedures (covered in
paragraph (f)) to be updated to incorporate the impending changes as soon as possible.
(m) Incident investigations. "OSHA believes that an important part of any process
safety management program is the thorough investigation of major, or potentially major,
incidents."36 These paragraphs mandate such investigations within 48 hours of an incident
by a qualified team, followed by a written report that would be reviewed by all facility
5-Occupational Health and Safety Reporter (July 18, 1990), page 254.
340ccupational Health and Safety Reporter (July 18, 1990), page 255.
3 5 0ccupational Health and Safety Reporter (July 18, 1990), page 255.
3 6 0ccupational Health and Safety Reporter (July 18, 1990), page 255.
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personnel and filed for a five year period. OSHA also requires the employer to "establish a
system to promptly address the report findings and recommendations and shall implement
the report recommendations in a timely manner."37
(n) Emergency planning and response. This section requires that employees know
and be trained in a written emergency action plan. The action plan's minimum scope is
defined as including "the establishment of an employee alarm system; the development of
evacuation procedures; the development of procedures to account for all employees after
emergency has been completed; and, the training of employees in those actions they are to
take during an emergency.' 38
(o) Compliance safety audit. Finally, OSHA requires that every three years an audit
be performed by a qualified team to see how well employers have implemented the
provisions of these proposed rules. Additionally, the two latest written reports of audits
and supplementary material describing the employer's response and citing the correction of
deficiencies are to be retained.
B. Industrial Safety Practices as Described in the Kearney/Centaur Report
The Kearney/Centaur report consolidates the results of two surveys conducted by
OSHA in support of recent proposed rules39 and the results of a survey conducted by
Chemical Engineering magazine on chemical plant safety. 40 Current industry compliance
with each of the above-mentioned proposed rules was analyzed by combining the results
from the two OSHA surveys and "filling in the gaps"41 with the results from the Chemical
Engineering survey. Some of the provisions of the proposed rule can be directly linked to
the survey data (existence of hazard communication programs was determined from the
PEL survey and the performance of hazard assessments were topics covered by the PPE
survey), while most were estimated from the convergence of data from all the surveys since
3 'Occupational Health and Safety Reporter (July 18, 1990), page 264.
380ccupational Health and Safety Reporter (July 18, 1990), page 256.
39 The first survey, done to support the Permissible Exposure Limits (PEL) rulemaking, was conducted
in 1988. In it approximately 5,600 establishments were queried about what types of chemicals were used, the
processes in which they were employed, and some of the engineering controls and safety practices in use to
reduce or control employee exposure to toxic substances. The second survey supported the Personal Protective
Equipment (PPE) rulemaking, involved over 5,000 establishments, and included questions about PPE use,
processes, and engineering controls and safety practices currently in use in the industry.
40See Mascone, Gordon, and Vagl (1988), pages 74-86.
4 1Kearney/Centaur (1990), page 3-4.
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no questions were asked that directly indicated the percentage of firms complying with the
provision. Neither of the OSHA surveys provided sufficient establishment responses to
estimate compliance at the level of four-digit SIC codes. 'Therefore the percentages for
the two- and three-digit industry segments represent averages for all of the four-digit
segments included therein." 42
The Kearney/Centaur compliance results were presented for large and small plants
from 31 two- and three-digit SIC codes for fifteen separate provisions of OSHA's PSM
rule.43 As one might guess, the sheer volume of disaggregated statistics (930 separate
compliance percentages) made it difficult to discern trends and patterns from the reported
data. Therefore, in order to facilitate some understanding of the safety practices in various
types of facilities, the data were aggregated (1) by primary and secondary producers, (2) by
large and small facilities,44 and (3) by SIC code.
1. Safety Practices: Primary and Secondary Producers
The thirty-one reported two- and three-digit SIC codes were collapsed into three
categories: primary producers, secondary producers, and others.45 The large/small two-
and three-digit SIC code compliance percentages were combined by multiplying each
percentage by the number of large and small establishments in each SIC code, as reported
in the profile of affected industries.46 The results of this calculation, representing the
number of complying facilities in that SIC grouping, were summed across SIC codes and
then divided by the total number of affected primary producers, secondary producers, and
other facilities to obtain the overall compliance percentages. The results of these
calculations are reported in Table A.9. Readily apparent from the compliance results are
that, in general, the provisions of part (d) are currently widely practiced while the
provisions of paragraph (1) are not practiced.
4 2 Kearney/Centaur (1990), page 3-3.
4 3See Kearney/Centaur (1990), pages 3-19 to 3-23.
44Small facilities were defined by Kearney/Centaur as those with fewer than twenty employees. (See
Kearney/Centaur [19901, page 4-9.)
4 5See Table 3.1 in Chapter III for the different industry segments in each category.
46Kearney/Centaur (1990), pages 2-82 to 2-85.
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Table A.9 Current compliance percentages of primary and secondary producers with aspects of the
proposed provisions of the OSHA PSM standards.
- I ' ; ; III I . . .. II l I I I i | | l
Aggregated Compliance Results1
Primary Producers
PSM Proposed Rule Provision Small Lar
(d)(1): Material Hazard 57.9 3 85.4 2
(d)(2): Technical Basis 68.4 2 92.0 1
(d)(3): Equip. Design Basis 68.6 1 83.7 3
(e): Process Hazard Analysis 42.6 9 70.6 6
(f): Operating Procedures 45.7 8 67.5 8
(g)(1): Initial Training 54.8 5 67.5 8
(g)(2): Refresher Training 50.6 6 62.3 10
(g)(3): Training Certification 40.9 11 50.4 14
(h): Contractors 40.5 12 59.8 12
(i): Pre-Startup Safety Review 42.6 9 70.6 6
(j): Mechanical Integrity 55.7 4 75.8 6
(k): Hot Work Permit 48.5 7 79.6 4
(1): Management of Change 128 15 19.5 15
(m): Incident Investigation 37.2 14 61.6 11
(n): Emergency Action Plan 40.5 12 59.8 12
Secondary Producers
SmAU Larg
35.7 7 82.6 2
60.2 2 78.5 3
79.7 1 87.8 1
30.0 9 45.0 12
282 11 65.2 7
44.2 5 65.5 6
40.9 6 60.5 8
33.0 8 49.0 11
25.0 13 57.8 9
30.0 9 45.0 12
45.7 4 68.3 5
47.4 3 71.8 4
17.9 15 15.8 15
26.2 12 39.2 14
25.0 13 57.8 9
OVERALL TOTALS
OVERALL AVERAGES
Avg. S.D. Avg. S.D.
47.2 13.7 67.1 17.3
5C09
Avg. S.D. Avg. S.D.
37.9 16.0 59.3 18.6
47.54
1For small and large establishments, the scores are given first followed by the ranking of
each size and producer type.
each score for
SOURCE: Kearney/Centaur 1990, pp. 3-19 to 3-23.
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2. Safety Practices: Large and Small Firms
Safety practices of primary producers and secondary producers vary enormously
according to the size of the facilities. Small primary producer plants are superior to their
secondary producer counterparts when it comes to "procedurally-based" PSM provisions,
while large primary producer plants exhibited superior compliance with regard to
"analytically-based" PSM provisions. Procedurally-based provisions include material
hazards (section (d)(1)), operating procedures (section (f)), contractors (section (h)), and
emergency action plans (section (n)). These provisions typically involve having a pre-set
methodology to respond to the issue at hand.47 Analytically-based provisions include
process hazard analysis (section (e)), pre-startup safety reviews (section (i)), and the
investigation of incidents (section (m)). All of these provisions require auditing of plant
facilities with a focus on making the processes involved safer. The provisions were placed
in these two groups based on normalizing the compliance results of primary producers by
three-digit SIC codes.48
Increases in the level of overall compliance from small secondary producers (overall
level of 38%) to small primary producers (overall level of 47%) to large secondary
producers (overall level of 59%) to large primary producers (overall level of 67%), suggests
an evolutionary process of growth in PSM systems. The first step in the cycle of growth
involves the establishment of set, written-down procedures in the areas of plant operations,
instructing contractors, hazardous material information transfer, and emergency response.
Small secondary producers typically have not implemented these provisions, whereas all
other facilities, to a much greater extent, have done so. The second step involves greater
implementation of those procedural provisions, for while the "half' compliance of small
primary producers is superior to the "non-compliance" of small secondary producers, it
greatly lags the "two-thirds" compliance typical of large plants. The third step in the PSM
evolutionary cycle seems to be the widespread practice of safety analyses at various points
in the processing of hazardous substances. Only the large primary producers have achieved
"4All of the procedurally-based rules do this. Section (d)(1) establishes a procedure for the transferal
of hazardous material information via material safety data sheets (MSDS). Section (f) mandates the writing
down of procedures that enable workers to cope with situations ranging from normal operation to equipment
breakdowns to emergency shutdowns. Section (h) requires a set procedure to facilitate the transfer of safety
and process information to contractors. Section (n) establishes a written plan that specifies how workers are to
respond to in-plant emergencies.
48In the normalization, each SIC three-digit industry sector's compliance was divided by the industry's
average compliance. The relative compliance ratios of all of the provisions mentioned above fell into exactly
one of two groups, which were subsequently named procedural aspects and analytical aspects. The congruence
of relative compliance ratios is an artifact of the similar types of methodology used by OSHA in assigning
compliance percentages from the OSHA PEL and PPE survey results.
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"two-thirds" compliance in these provisions, while the other facilities are at "half'
compliance or less.
3. Safety Practices: By Primary Producer SIC Codes
The Kearney/Centaur compliance results for OSHA's proposed PSM rules can be
aggregated by two- or three-digit SIC code. Such an analysis was carried out for primary
producers according to their three-digit SIC codes, the results of which are given in Tables
A.10 and A.11. Table A.10 provides relative measures of compliance with PSM rules
disaggregated by 3-digit SIC primary producers, where the PSM rules are grouped into the
following categories: procedurally-based provisions, analytically-based provisions, training
provisions, equipment design provisions, technically-based provisions, mechanical integrity
provisions, how work permit provisions, and management of change provisions. In Table
A.11, the small and large establishment compliance percentages were combined to obtain
an overall compliance per three-digit SIC sector by multiplying each compliance
percentage by the number of affected small and large plants and then dividing by the total
number of affected plants (both large and small).
It is clear from Table A.11 that the large plants have compliance rates that are
consistently 20 percentage points higher than the compliance rates for small plants.49 Since
larger plants are typically 20 percentage points more in compliance than small plants, a
sector with a large proportion of small plants would be penalized relative to sectors having
almost all large plants. This would explain why SIC sector 289, containing a high
proportion of small facilities, could have the safest small plants and among the safest large
plants, yet finish fifth overall.
Most of the "super-hazardous" four-digit segments had above average safety
practices (such as sectors 2812, 2819, 2869, 2873, 2879, and 2899), while sector 2911,
petroleum refining, had one of the highest accident rates and one of the lowest PSM
compliances rates. 50
C. Primary Producer Safety Practices as Described in the CRA Report
Despite searching the technical literature and contacting trade associations,
professional societies, engineering companies, and hazardous material processors, Charles
River Associates was unable to find a comprehensive survey of industrial practices
49 The only exception is SIC 287, Agricultural Chemicals and Pesticides, whose large plants are only 9
percentage points more in compliance than its small facilities.
50See Chapter III, Section B, supra.
A-20
Table A10 Relative measures of the current compliance with elements of the OSHA PSM rules for three-
digit industry segments among primary producers
m-~ m mm m m mmmimm m  m  m r l
SIC PcdrL
Code Industrv Descrition Asvcts
281 Indust. Inorg Chem. 1.035
282 Plastics & Syn. Org. 1.028
283 Pharmaceuticals 0.927
284 Cosmetics, Detergents 0.746
285 Paints & Allied Prod. 1.146
286 Indust. Org. Chem. 0.961
287 Agricultural Chem. 1.182
289 Misc. Chem. Prod. 1.134
291 Petrol. Refining 0.965
295 Asphalt Products 0.849





























































































Table A11 Aggregated compliance of primary producer facilities by three-digit SIC codes with all the
provisions of the OSHA proposed PSM standards
Agggated Overall Compliance by Facility Size
SIC Code and Sector Name Small Rank Large Rank OverallRank
281 Industrial Inorganic Chemicals 48.92 4 67.07 4 57.48 6
282 Plastics & Synthetic Organics 44.45 7 67.57 3 60.81 1
283 Drugs & Biological Products 44.73 5 66.45 6 55.78 7
284 Soaps, Cleansers, Cosmetics 42.27 8 66.35 7 51.07 9
285 Paints and Allied Products 5037 3 69.76 2 59.24 2
286 Industrial Organic Chemicals 44.58 6 66.95 5 5836 4
287 Agricultural Chemicals 55.81 1 64.83 8 59.22 3
289 Misc. Chemical Products 50.98 2 70.17 1 57.70 5
291 Petroleum Refining 4031 10 60.18 10 52.55 8
295 Paving & Roofing Materials 40.98 9 6185 9 46.10 11
299 Misc. Coal & Oil Products 36.73 11 55.15 11 48.00. 10
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concerning process safety management. The best source available appeared to be
the survey of plant safety conducted by Chemical Engineering.51 The responses to the
survey are summarized below.
1. Impact of Plant Safety Inspection Frequency
Table A.12 is reproduced from the Chemical Engineering survey results and weakly
suggests that "as inspection frequency is reduced, the percentage of plants that have
experienced a major accident in the last five years goes up."52 "Damage and injuries within
the plant appear to be more severe as inspection frequency is reduced from monthly to
annually."53
2. Impact of Industry Classification
An attempt was made to classify the responses into several different industrial
groups, but the data only allowed grouping into three categories: chemicals and
petrochemicals; food, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, etc.; and petroleum refining and coal
products. 54 The results of the survey, presented in Table A. 13, indicate that the petroleum
refining and coal products sector is especially hazardous, which is consistent with the CRA
accident statistics. However, even the "clean" facilities (subcategory of food, drugs, etc.)
have their problems, as attested to by the high injury rates there:
"Our [food industry] processes are not as inherently dangerous as many in the
CPI. This, in itself, breeds a certain laxity, usually until an injury to a worker
highlights a specific unsafe condition or practice. Otherwise, the risk usually
seems low enough, and too many shortcuts are still taken."'5 5
31Mascone, Gordon, and Vagl (1988), pages 74-86.
52Mascone, Gordon, and Vagl (1988), page 81.
53Mascone, Gordon, and Vagl (1988), page 79.
54Mascone, Gordon, and Vagl (1988), page 78, explained their rationale for these categories:
"'Chemicals and petrochemicals,' because it is the largest CPI sector; 'food, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, etc.,'
because we wondered whether the efforts to meet cleanliness standards in these industries carried over to safety
practices as well; and 'petroleum refining and coal products,' because facilities there handle flammable and
hazardous materials at high temperatures and pressures. We had hoped to examine other CPI segments as well
(e.g., 'explosives and ammunition'), but did not receive enough responses from these areas to draw any
meaningful conclusions."
55Statement of James Santagata, manager of process engineering, Thomas J. Lipton, Inc, as cited in
Mascone, Gordon, and Vagl (1988), page 78.
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Table A12 Relationship between accidents and plant safety inspections from Chemical Engineering survey
results
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Table A.13 Plant accident results from the Chemical Engineerin survey classified by industrial segment
All Food, drugs, Petroleum refining
respoondents cosmetics. etc. and coal posducts
Major accident within last five years 44% 38% 64%
Injuries to plant personnel 49 70 57
Major plant damage 42 37 77
Property damage outside plant 9 20 9
Injuries to nonplant persons 13 10 21
Deaths of plant personnel 19 17 42
Deaths of nonplant persons 3 -- 11
Could it happen again? 70 66 86
---· --------------- -- ------ ---------------------
3. Impact of Plant Size
In 1987 OSHA inspected forty chemical plants as part of their chemical special
emphasis program (ChemSEP) and concluded that "smaller plants had more hazards than
larger facilities, even when the smaller plants were owned by large firms with ample
resources."56 No such trends were identified from the Chemical Engineering survey results.
4. Impact of Training of Personnel
"Plant safety appears tied to training frequency."57 The survey indicates that
respondents employed in plants not having a major accident in the last five years were
"more likely to have received safety training, and to have had more-frequent refresher
training"58 than respondents employed in facilities that had such an accident.
Survey results were also reported regarding the frequency of refresher training and
the content of safety training. Three of the topics covered least often would enhance the
ability of employees to prevent accidents: explosion prevention, hazard/risk identification
and analysis, and the recognition of potentially hazardous situations. Comments from
respondents on training focused on the need to improve the quality of training by making it
more relevant to the workers and by extending the scope of personnel trained to those who
are infrequently or periodically on the plant floor. The need for further training of
subcontracted labor was specifically mentioned.
5. Impact of Various In-Plant Characteristics
Table A.14 reports the perceptions of the respondents to the Chemical Engineering
survey concerning the safety of various aspects of their plants. Amid comments on the lack
of operating process information and poor housekeeping procedures, the following was
reported:
Maintenance and repair programs...received the most "Inadequate" ratings
and this category was ranked least safe by nearly every subgroup (i.e. by job
function, industry segment, and company and plant size). In addition, many
readers criticized this aspect of plant operations in their written comments. 59
5Cited in Mascone, Gordon, and Vagl (1988), page 78.
57Mascone, Gordon, and Vagl (1988), page 80.
58Mascone, Gordon, and Vagl (1988), page 80.
59Mascone, Gordon, and Vagl (1988), page 82.
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A contributing factor in shaping the poor perception of the effectiveness of process-safety
devices is a laxity in inspecting and maintaining those devices.60
6. What Is Being Done
On the positive side, the Chemical Engineering survey reports that a variety of safety-
enhancing actions are being implemented by industry. These survey results are
summarized in Table A.15. The tendency of the chemical processing industry (CPI) to
respond by initiating mitigation or secondary prevention approaches is illustrated by the
lower percentages of plants that were implementing primary prevention strategies.
On the negative side, the massive layoffs and cost reductions spurred by the CPI
slump in the late 1970's and the early 1980's have jeopardized and are jeopardizing plant
safety, as indicated by the following comments:
There is a tremendous lack of experience among the current group of
operating and maintenance engineers. Younger engineers simply don't have
the knowledge of what to do in certain situations.6 1
Our plant has suffered severe personnel cutbacks. One of the "non-
productive" activities cut as a result was safety...gone are opportunities,
resources and time to plan safety, inspect, thoroughly review projects and
processes, and train.62
The CRA report's closing comments concerning process safety management
practices are repeated at length below:
The current practice of formal process hazard management techniques and
procedures varies greatly. Small establishments are unlikely to have formal
practices in place, and many do not have formal safety programs. Large
establishments are likely to have either some elements of or a comprehensive
PHM program. Medium-sized establishments have a variety of practices,
and are likely to have some elements of a formal hazard management
program and formal safety program.
°0See Mascone, Gordon, and Vagl (1988), page 82.
61Mascone, Gordon, and Vagl (1988), page 83.
62Mascone, Gordon, and Vagl (1988), page 84.
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Table A14 Perceived safety of various aspects of CPI plants from results of the Chemical Engineering survey
IIII I I I I I 111 I II II IIIIII1 [ II Il k[ i'~ ' ~""~-'I"[ '1P11" ~ I1 I IH lII
Overall
Mean*
Transportation of chemicals into or out of plant 3.13
Process equipment 3.05
Storage and handling of raw materials, intermediates,
products, etc. 3.03
Process-safety equipment 3.03
Handling and disposal of wastes 2.92
Process instrumentation, monitoring and control 2.85
Operating and maintenance procedures 2.77
Housekeeping practices 2.74


























*Excellent = 4, Adequate = 3, Marginal = 2, Inadequate = 1
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Conducting periodic plant-safety audits 86
Installing more personal safety equipment 85
Reducing Inventory of hazardous materials stored onsite 77
Upgrading process hardware 75
Installing more process safety hdware 74
Implementing community emergency-response plan 74
Providing better control systems and backups 72
Implementing new plant-safety programs or procedures 71
Providing improved or more frequent safety training 70
Increasing management's role in safety programs 70
Prowiding automatic containment or treatment of spils 69
Conducting hazard analyses for process and material modifications 68
Modifying process to operate at less-hazardous conditions 66
Modifyin process to eliminate or reduce use of hazardous materials 64
KEY Primary prevention approaches are in bold type, mitigation approaches are in italics, and
secondary prevention approaches and unclassifiable approaches are in normal type.
III IIIIIIIIII III I I III I II Irl IIIII 
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Some of the size-related differences in practices may reflect differences in
the perception of risks: the generally larger quantities of hazardous
materials present in larger facilities warrant more systematic reviews of
design and operational practices. Some of the differences may reflect a
lower degree of awareness or technical competence on the part of the
management of small facilities. In any case, the frequency of incidents in
smaller establishments is lower than their percentage in the population of all
establishments, even though they do not generally practice formal
procedures.
A significant portion of all injuries and fatalities occur in establishments that
have limited or even formal programs in place, indicating that there is an
underlying accident rate that cannot be reduced using current practices.
(emphasis added)63
The essential point is that process safety management practices, by themselves, are unable
to eliminate chemical accidents. Primary accident prevention measures are needed as well.
III. CHEMICAL HAZARDOUSNESS AND CHEMICAL INDUSTRY SEGMENTS
One of the possible applications of the FAT/CAT database and supplement is to
identify the accident hazards faced by each 4-digit SIC segment in the chemical and
petroleum industries, based on the chemicals involved. As discussed below, in order to do
this, we assigned the chemicals used by each industrial segment normalized rankings
reflecting their hazardousness and the amount of hazardous material used relative to the
other industrial segments.
The amount of annual production and three measures of hazardousness are
provided for each of the chemicals listed in Table A.16. The hazardous material rankings
for each SIC code were normalized by multiplying each chemical's rank by the amount of it
used by the industrial sector under consideration. These were totaled for each ranking and
divided by the amount of the hazardous materials used for both the overall industry and for
each sector. The result is an average SHI, an average NFPA flammability ranking, and an
average NFPA reactivity ranking for the overall industry and for each sector. 64 Finally,
these averages were divided by the overall average for each ranking in order to obtain a
normalized measure of relative sector hazardousness, which is presented in Table A.17.
It is important to emphasize the roughness of the aforementioned estimates. First
of all, the listing of hazardous chemicals in Table A.16 is not exhaustive. Including more
b3Charles River Associates (1989), page 91.
64See Chapter III, Section C, supra.
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Table A.16 List of materials used as indicators of process-related workplace hazards
I I I I I I I I I III I I I I I
Annual US. Production



























































































































*Value is an estimate. No reliable data were found.
**Chemicals for which no data appears were ignored in our analysis.
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Table A.17 Summary of results on the hazardousness of chemicals used in SIC 28 and 29 classified by four-
digit SIC codes
miII I I I r- I I
SIC
Code Industryl Description
2812 Alkalies & Chlorine
2813 Industrial Gases
2816 Inorganic Pigments
2819 Industrial Inorganic Pigments
2821 Plastics & Resins
2822 Synthetic Rubber
2823 Cellulosic Manmade Fibers
2824 Organic Fibers, Noncellulosics
2831 Biological Products
2833 Medicinals & Botanicals
2834 Pharmaceutical Preparations
2841 Soap & Other Detergents
2842 Polishes & Sanitation Goods
2843 Surface Active Agents
2844 Perfumes, Toilet Preparations
2851 Paints & Allied Products
2861 Gum & Wood Chemicals
2865 Cyclic Crudes & Intermediates
2869 Industrial Organic Chemicals
2873 Nitrogenous Fertilizers
2874 Phosphatic Fertilizers
2875 Fertilizers, Mixing Only
2879 PesticidesAgricultural Chemicals




2899 Chemical Preparations, NEC
2911 Petroleum Refining
2951 Asphalt Paving Mixtures, Blocks
2952 Asphalt Felts & Coatings
2992 Lubricating Oils & Greases
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chemicals could significantly change the relative hazardousness rankings. In addition, the
procedure theoretically involves multiplying the sector chemical hazard rankings by the
amount of the chemical used in each sector. However, that information was not readily
accessible for all of the substances listed. An analysis of chemical usage was performed on
certain key, high-volume chemicals: naphtha, sulfuric acid, n-butane, ammonia, chlorine,
nitric acid, and hydrochloric acid. Every chemical with an annual production less than that
of hydrochloric acid was assumed to be used by every sector indicating use in an amount
equal to its annual production.
Information about the amount of chemicals used and released by industry sector was
reported only by two-digit and three-digit SIC codes.65 These cumulative figures were
disaggregated by multiplying the two- and three-digit SIC totals by the fraction of affected
production workers in each of the relevant four-digit SIC sectors. For example, the amount
of chemicals released by SIC 2911 was estimated by multiplying the total amount for SIC
29, 6.077 x 108, by the fraction of SIC 29 production workers laboring in SIC 2911 (133,777
out of 177,058, or 75.6%). The results of these calculations are reported in the third
column of Table A.18, with the fourth column indicating the relative amount of hazardous
substance release per establishment (divided by the overall average hazardous material
release per facility for all plants in SIC 28 and 29). This normalized hazardous material
release is assumed to be directly related to the amount of hazardous chemical use per four-
digit SIC code.
°SU.S. Environmental Protection Agency (June 1989).
A-30
Table A.18 Summary of results on chemical releases by four-digit SIC codes for SIC 28 and 29.
SIC
Code Industry Description
2812 Alkalies and Chlorine
2813 Industrial Gases
2816 Inorganic Pigments
2819 Industrial Inorganic Pigments
2821 Plastic Materials and Resins
2822 Synthetic Rubber
2823 Cellulosic Manmade Fibers
2824 Organic Fibers, Noncellulosic
2831 Biological Products
2833 Medicinals and Botanicals
2834 Pharmaceutical Preparations
2841 Soap and Other Detergents
2842 Polishes and Sanitation Goods
2843 Surface Active Agents
2844 Toilet Preparations
2851 Paints and Allied Products





























Paving Mixures and Blocks
Asphalt Felts and Coatings
Lubricating Oils and Greases









































1 SOURCE: Charles River Associates 1989, p. 26. The totals are taken from the column giving the
number of production workers estimated to be exposed to hazardous chemicals.
2SOURCE: US EPA 1989, p. 284.
3SOURCE: Relase amounts from previous column are divided by the number of establishments
estimated to be under the proposed PSM standards by Kearney/Centaur (1990, pp. 2-82 through 2-85)
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APPENDIX B: THE ACCIDENTAL RELEASE
INFORMATION PROGRAM (ARIP) DATABASE
The Accidental Release Information Program (ARIP) database, currently being
compiled by the Environmental Protection Agency, is designed to give a representative
sampling of chemical releases in the United States. The purpose of the ARIP database is
to identify the causes of, and means of preventing, chemical accidents.l
The records in the ARIP database were gathered from questionnaires completed by
facilities that fell into any one of four categories:
1. A release reported to the National Response Center (NRC) that was in
excess of the minimum required to be reported by law for the chemical
involved by a given multiplying factor.
2. A release reported to the National Response Center that resulted in a death
or injury.
3 Releases reported to the National Response Center that was part of a
frequent trend of releases.
4. Releases reported to the National Response Center that involved substances
designated by Title III legislation as extremely hazardous.
Since the triggering events all involve the National Response Center, chemical releases not
subject to CERCLA and Title III reporting requirements are excluded from the ARIP
database. In addition, the triggering events skew the database towards "larger, more
severe, and more frequent releases.' "2
Our original analysis was conducted prior to receipt of the full ARIP database.
Below we provide the full, 1990/91 updated ARIP database, without analysis, for the
interested reader. The distribution of the amounts released and the process status at the
time of the releases are presented in Figures B.1 and B.2, respectively. The decision to
focus on high-volume facilities arose from the dominance of high-volume commodity
chemicals on the most frequently released substances list (see Figure B.3) and from the
large number of releases from storage locations (see Figure B.4).
'U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (July 1989), page 13.
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Release causation, as derived from the ARIP database and presented in Figure B.5,
indicates the dominance of equipment failure and operator error, since these categories
were mentioned 76% of the time as the primary cause of the chemical release. However,
this finding hinges on the meaningfulness of operator error and equipment failure as the
preventable causes of the hazardous chemical releases.
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APPENDIX C: THE ACUTE HAZARDOUS EVENTS (AHE) DATABASE
The Acute Hazardous Events (AHE) database is the most comprehensive source of
national accidental release statistics available today. The AHE database contains records
for approximately 11,000 chemical release events from all industrial sectors involved in the
manufacture, processing, storage, distribution, use, and disposal of chemicals from U. S.
sources for the years 1980 through 1986.
The purpose of the database is to "provide a historical perspective on the types of
accidental events that release potentially hazardous substances in the United States, the
substances involved, the causative factors leading to their release, and the end effect of
these releases."1l The focus of the data collection is to "develop a complete census of the
more severe accidental releases" (emphasis ours). 2 Chemical accident results derived from
the AHE database are expected to be correct, but are probably worst-case estimates of
accidental release impacts due to the database's emphasis on the most severe "Bhopal-type"
incidents and its underreporting of less severe events.
The EPA contractors that developed the AHE database, Industrial Economics, Inc.,
et al., attempted to assess the accuracy and inclusiveness of the AHE database by collecting
additional data on acutely hazardous events resulting in deaths, injuries, or evacuations that
occurred during the year 1986 in four states. The 185 new events that were uncovered by
this intense data collection effort were typically of moderate impact (most were at or below
the median level of severity for events in the AHE database), leading the EPA contractors
to conclude the following: "Thus, although more intensive data collection is likely to
uncover additional events which resulted in a serious outcome, the majority of the most
serious events were reported in sources contributing to the Acute Hazardous Events
Database."3
I. SUMMARY OF THE AHE DATABASE RESULTS
The major findings gleaned from the AHE database are briefly summarized below.
Included are disaggregated results for primary and secondary producers according to the
chemicals involved, the causative factors present, and characteristics surrounding the
releases.
'Industrial Economics et al. (1989), page 9.
2Industrial Economics et al. (1989), page 1-13.
3Industrial Economics et al. (1989), page 1-14.
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A. The Consequences of Accidental Releases
Event severity results for primary and secondary producers presented in the AHE
report indicate the frequency of releases that featured a death or an injury and the
associated number of deaths and injuries. One percent of the primary producer releases in
the AHE resulted in deaths, and six percent resulted in injuries. The frequencies for
secondary producers were similar, with 1.1 percent resulting in deaths and 8.2 percent of
the releases resulting in injuries. The consequences of these death/injury events for the
overall database and for primary and secondary producers are included in Table C. 1, along
with results for evacuations and property damage. The number of "known events" refers to
the total number of events in the AHE database in which the source indicated an amount
for the consequence in question. This number is always smaller than the total number of
that type of event in the AHE database, since some event records indicate only that an
adverse consequence occurred without giving an estimate of its magnitude.
Of the most severe death events (associated with two or more fatalities), 87 percent
were held to be due to the occurrence of a fire or explosion, while 65 percent of the most
severe injury events (associated with 40 or more injuries) were attributable to the toxicity of
the released chemicals. Statistical analysis indicates a relationship between chemical
toxicity and event severity (whether or not deaths and injuries would occur), but there was
no relationship between toxicity and the number of deaths and injuries. Severe evacuation
events, involving more than 2,000 evacuees, were predominantly (70 percent) triggered by
the occurrence of a fire or explosion.
B. Releases Classified by Chemical
Releases in the AHE database can be classified by chemical released for the
number of all events, death/injury events, and evacuation events involving that chemical.
This information is provided in Table C.2 for the fifteen most frequently released
chemicals in all events and in all death/injury events. Chemical releases for primary and
secondary producers are presented in Table C.3. As one can see, there are many
similarities in the types of chemicals released by primary and secondary producers.
Chemicals associated with a large number of accidental releases are not necessarily closely
correlated with a high incidence of injuries and deaths, which could be due to the relative
lack of hazardousness of the chemicals involved. However, this is not the case for two of
the chemicals in this category, methyl chloride and ethylene oxide, since both are classified
as extremely hazardous. 4
4Both scored above 8,000 on the substance hazard index (SHI). See Tables A-16, supra.
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Table C.1 Summary of Death, Injury, Evacuation, and Property Damage Reports from the AHE






























WHEN INJURY SE,;E TY IS KNOWN
Number Number
IT e of Source of Events Hosuitalized
Primary Producers 129 502
Secondary Producers 67 343
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Table C2 AHE Database Results for Substances Released Most Frequently Released from all sources































































































1CASUALTIES = DEATHS + INJURIES
2 Quantities released are given in pounds.











































5 Hydrochloric acid 5
5 Toluene diisocyanate 5
7 Polystyrene 4
8 Ethylene oxide 3
8 Explosives 3
8 Hydrogen 3
8 Sodium hydroxide 3
8 Carbon monoxide 3
8 Naphtha 3
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C. Releases Classified by Accident Circumstances
Potentially significant circumstances surrounding an accidental chemical release
include the reported cause of the release, the location of the release, and the process status
at the time of the release. The AHE database was disaggregated by relevant categories for
each of these accident circumstances. For instance, the accidental release location
categories are process equipment, storage, disposal, valves and piping, heating and cooling,
vehicle not in transit, unknown, and other.
The reported causation for all events and death/injury events for both primary and
secondary producers in the AHE database is summarized in Table C.4. Note that
secondary producers seem to have more problems with fires and explosions than primary
producers and that fires and explosions were associated with death/injury events out of
proportion to their involvement in all releases.
The AHE database indicates the location where accidental releases occurred,
classified by primary and secondary producers and for all events and death/injury events.
These results are reproduced in Table C.5.
Table C.6 provides the results from the AHE database classified by the event
context associated with accidental chemical releases, for primary and secondary producers.
Primary and secondary producers show similar release patterns, the major difference being
the low proportion of death/injury releases from primary producers during periods of
normal, steady-state processing. Also, maintenance releases are represented to a greater
degree in death/injury events for primary producers.
II. ADJUSTMENTS TO THE AHE DATABASE
The roughly 11,000 events recorded in the AHE database were calculated from two
separate computer groupings of the data. The first grouping, called MAIN, includes all
records from all sources except for the major source, the National Response Center
records. All events from those records that featured a death or an injury were included in
the MAIN data grouping, while for the rest of the National Response Center data, every
tenth record was coded into the AHE database grouping entitled SAMPLE. The Main
section includes over 5,000 event records while the SAMPLE grouping contains roughly
400 event records. To achieve the final results previously reported for all events, the
results from the SAMPLE data grouping were calculated, multiplied by 10, and added to
the results from the MAIN data grouping. Final results for death/injury events were simply
C-5
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Table C.4 Results from the AHE on the Cause of Accidental
Producers.




















































































Table C- Results from the AHE on the Location of Accidental Chemical Releases from Primary and
Secondary Producers.
ALL EVENTS PRIMARY PRODUCERS SECONDARY PRODUCERS
# OF % OF # OF % OF
LOCATION EVENTS EE TOTAL
Process Vessel 1,150 302 286 20.0
Storage Vessel 751 19.8 493 34.5
Valves/Pipes 1,114 293 331 23.1
Disposal 284 7.5 97 6.8
Heating/Cooling 96 2.5 9 0.6
Vehicle not in Transit 70 1.8 55 3.8
Other 41 1.1 34 2.4
Unknown 297 ''3 126 8.8
DEATH/INJURY EVENTS
PRIMARY PRODUCES SECONDARY PRODUCERS
# OF % OF # OF % OF
LOCATION EVENTS TOTAL EVENTS TOTAL
Process Vessel 65 27.8 35 28.5
Storage Vessel 59 25.2 36 293
Valves/Pipes 52 22.2 15 12.2
Disposal 4 1.7 4 33
Heating/Cooling 4 1.7 4 3.3
Vehicle not in Transit 10 43 4 33
Other 5 2.1 2 1.6
Unknown 35 15.0 23 18.7
- , a _I- --  r
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Table C.6 Results from the AHE report on the event context associated
primary and secondary producers.









































































Table C.7 Characteristics of chemicals selected for further study from records in the MAIN grouping of the
AHE data base.
I IIIIIIIII I II I ~ II- I IIII I
CHEMICAL NAME




















































*S.H.I. value was estimated using acute toxicity concentration estimated as ten times the threshold limit
value (TLV) and the vapor pressure at a temperature between 20 and 25 degrees Celsius.
**S.HI. value was assumed to be zero for a solid substance at 25 degrees Celsius.
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the results of the MAIN data section, because SAMPLE contains only "non-death/injury
events."
The MAIN data grouping of the AHE database was obtained on computer disks and
used in the calculations below. The results from these calculations therefore represent a
subset of the AHE database that contains all of the more severe events but fewer of the
"near miss" events that did not result in any deaths or injuries. This overrepresentation of
severe events should be kept in mind as the results are presented.
A. Selection of Chemicals for Analysis
In order to group chemical processing technologies together, we first categorized
releases in the MAIN data set according to the chemicals released. Since the technologies
involved in chemical manufacturing are different from those industrial processes for which
chemicals are an input but not a final product, the releases are further divided into releases
from primary producers and releases from secondary producers.
In order to facilitate analysis of the MAIN data, chemical substances were placed in
one of the following three categories:
1. Flammable chemicals, which are defined as those having flammability
rankings from the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) of either 3
or 4.
2. Reactive chemicals, which are those having reactivity rankings of 3 or 4 from
the NFPA.
3. Non-flammable, non-reactive toxic chemicals that have toxicity rankings of 3
or 4 from the NFPA, while having NFPA flammability and reactivity rankings
of 0 or 1.
Definitions for the various numerical rankings in the NFPA hazard classification systems
for toxicity, flammability, and reactivity are provided in Table 3.12.
Chemicals were then selected from each of the three categories on the basis of two
criteria. The first criterion for selection is the chemical's involvement in a large number of
releases in the AHE database. The second criterion is including chemicals with a range of
Substance Hazard Indices (SHIs). The results of the chemical selection process are
presented in Table C.7.
C-8
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B. Chemical and Accident Characteristics and the Severity of Accidental Releases
The fact that a process technology is plagued by an overabundance of accidental
chemical releases is not necessarily grounds to press for changes. If the accidental releases
are contained and cause no property damages or adverse health impacts, then a large
number of releases can easily be accepted. That is why AHE's practice of reporting
releases only on the basis of the number of releases and the amount released is misleading.
The impact of those releases also needs to be evaluated. As illustration, we present Table
C.8, which contains data on event severity for the top chemicals most frequently released
by primary producers. Methyl chloride and ethylene oxide releases resulted in no health or
property damage impacts on primary producers, despite the hazardousness of both
chemicals (see Table C.7). Sulfuric acid, despite its low SHI, seems to be relatively
dangerous. However, an analysis of the summary statistics of the AHE database indicates
that most of the releases attributed to sulfuric acid came from the SAMPLE grouping,
which contains solely non-death, non-injury releases.
C-9
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Table C.8 Event Severity results for the most frequently released chemicals from primary producers from
the AHE.
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APPENDIX D: USING CHEMICAL ACCIDENT STATISTICS TO HELP
IDENTIFY PRIMARY PREVENTION OPPORTUNITIES
In this Appendix, we develop a classification scheme to demonstrate how chemical
accident data can be used--by both chemical firms and policymakers-to help identify
promising primary prevention opportunities. So as to allow the use of currently-available
chemical accident statistics, the classification scheme presented here is somewhat
preliminary and crude in nature. The availability of more technologically-detailed accident
data in the future would permit the classification scheme to be refined substantially.
Accident statistics from the Acute Hazardous Events (AHE) database1 were
combined with recent annual U.S. production estimates for thirty-eight chemicals to
calculate "lumped" event ratios.2 These figures are provided in Table D.1 along with AHE
information about the number of releases resulting in a fatality, an injury, or an evacuation.
In Figures D.1 through D.6, lumped event ratios are plotted versus the percentage of "near-
miss" releases. The "near-miss" percentage for fatality events for a specific chemical is
derived by (1) subtracting the number of releases of that chemical that were associated
with a fatality from the total number of releases of that chemical recorded in the AHE
database, and (2) dividing the remainder (the number of nonfatal releases) by the number
of releases of the chemical to calculate the chemical's "near-miss" percentage for fatality
events. The same procedure can be followed to calculate "near-miss" percentages for both
injuries and evacuations.
In Figures D.1 and D.2 (Figure D.2 is a close-up of the upper lefthand portion of
Figure D.1) the "near miss" category is the percentage of events that did not result in any
injuries, while for Figures D3 and D.4 (Figure D.4 is a closeup of the upper lefthand
portion of Figure D3) the "near miss" category is the percentage of releases that did not
cause an evacuation. In Figures D.5 and D.6 (Figure D.6 is a closeup of the upper lefthand
portion of Figure D.) the "near miss" category is the percentage of releases that did not
cause a fatality. In general, most chemicals are seen to lie in the closeup area and have
event ratios ranging from 0 to 100 total AHE releases per billion pounds of annual
production and near-miss percentages above 70 percent.
1See Appendix C, supra.
2Lumped event ratios were introduced in Section D of Chapter I, supra.
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Table D.1 Annual US. Production Figures and Number of AHE Events for Selected Chemicals
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Figure D.1 Plot of Event Ratios versus the Injury Event near-miss percentages for several Chemicals
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Figure D2 Closeup of upper lefthand corner of Figure D.1
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What is the relevance of the near miss and event ratios? A graph of the near-miss
percentages versus the event ratios for the various chemical processing technologies 3 can
be divided into the following four quadrants:
Quadrant I consists of those chemical processing technologies that have both low
event ratios and low percentages of near-miss events.
Quadrant II is made up of chemical processing technologies judged to have low
event ratios and a high percentage of near-miss releases.
Quadrant mII chemical processing technology releases are marked by both high
event ratios and high near-miss percentages.
Quadrant IV is made up of technologies that exhibit a high event ratio and a low
percentage of near-miss incidents.
Chemical processing technologies that have high event ratios experience an above
average number of system failures that culminate in the release of hazardous materials,
while those having low event ratios are comparatively more reliable. Technologies that
result in a low percentage of near-miss releases are relatively unforgiving, since when a
release occurs it tends to cause injuries, evacuations, or fatalities. High percentages of
near-miss releases indicate that the system failures that do occur are more manageable or
are less of a threat because they typically result in negligible consequences. Events ratios
and near misses may, we propose, be appropriate measures of the characteristics of
interactive complexity/linear interaction and tight coupling/loose coupling developed by
Charles Perrow to describe normal accidents. 4
Linear interactions are those in expected and familiar production or maintenance
sequence, and those that are quite visible even if unplanned. Complex interactions are
those of unfamiliar sequences, or unplanned and unexpected sequences, and either not
visible or not immediately comprehensible. A chemical processing technology that has
relatively linear interactions would be expected to have fewer system accidents, and thus a
lower event ratio, than technologies that feature higher percentages of complex
interactions and vice versa.
The degree of coupling is significant because it affects how well a system can
respond to component and subsystem failures. "In tightly coupled systems the buffers and
For purposes of accident prevention, combining data on the basis of chemical processing technologies
is generally more useful than simply combining data by chemical.
4See Charles Perrow (1984), pages 62-100, and Section C of Chapter IV, supra.
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redundancies and substitutions (to prevent system accidents) must be designed in; they
must be thought of in advance. In loosely coupled systems, there is a better chance that
expedient, spur-of-the-moment buffers and redundancies and substitutions can be found,
even though they were not planned ahead of time." 5 The existence of such slack in loosely
coupled systems could also be used to mitigate the severity of the consequences of failure.
Therefore, processing technologies that are relatively loosely coupled can be expected to
produce a higher percentage of near-miss incidents than tightly coupled technologies. In
other words, loosely coupled systems should have a relatively high percentage of near
misses, and tightly coupled systems should have a relatively low percentage of near misses.
Table D.2 classifies the AHE data into the four quadrants mentioned above. The
overall average event ratio was computed and used to distribute chemical-specific results
into high and low event ratios (or, alternatively, into complex and linear interactions). The
overall quadrant assignment for near misses (or, alternatively, for loose and close coupling)
represents a composite of the near miss percentages for fatalities, injuries, and evacuations.
The implications of these quadrant rankings are summarized below.
Processing technologies in Quadrant I: Low Event Ratios and Low Percentage
Near Misses (or Linear Interactions/Tight Coupling) will interact in predictable ways
when components fail. However, speed in responding is essential because the system is
tightly coupled. Therefore, a preprogrammed, centralized response can avert system
accidents. Employees should be trained how to respond, and to carry out the appropriate
response rapidly and without question. Another important safety measure in Quadrant I is
preventative maintenance, because the low percentage of near-miss incidents places a
premium on preventative approaches over reactive approaches.
Processing technologies in Quadrant II: Low Event Ratios and High Percentage
Near Misses (or Linear Interactions/Loose Coupling) tend to be the most inherently safe,
and accident prevention measures for these technologies can be either centralized or
decentralized. Therefore, these processes should be seen as candidates for replacing
technologies in the other groups, especially those in Quadrant IV.
Processing technologies in Quadrant III: High Events Ratio and High Percentage
Near Misses (or Complex Interactions/Loose Coupling) will produce relatively more
unexpected interactions among multiple factors, but the loose coupling tends to ensure that
there are enough resources, time, and alternatives to deal with the multiple failures before
they snowball into a serious system accident. Worst case accidents in this quadrant are,
with a high degree of probability, preceded by certain lesser accidents and failures of
-Perrow (1984), pages 94-95.
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Table D2 Classification of chemicals into accident prevention response categories.
I II
EVENT NEAR-MISS PERCENTAGES
CHEMI :CAL RATIO Death Inju Evacuation
Quadrant : Tight Coupling/Loose Interactions
Acetaldehyde 7.10 90.9 81.8 54.5
Aniline 19.43 100.0 80.0 86.7
Benzene 8.46 98.0 88.9 90.9
Bromine 12.82 100.0 60.0 0.0
n-Butane 0.09 100.0 50.0 75.0
Carbon disulfide 1737 100.0 77.8 .8
Carbon monoxide 6.67 85.0 75.0 85.0
Formaldehyde 11.41 98.4 93.8 87.5
Hydrogen bromide 10.26 100.0 75.0 0.0
Hydrogen cyanide 21.01 100.0 80.0 72.0
Naphtha 0.08 96.0 86.0 90.0
Nitric acid 11.48 97.8 903 88.7
Phenol 20.58 98.6 92.8 89.9
Quadrant II: Loose Coupling/Linear Interactions
Ethylene dichloride 6.10 100.0 98.7 98.7
Propylene oxide 3.49 100.0 90.9 90.9
Sulfuric acid 12.51 99.6 94.1 97.1
Quadrant III: Loose Coupling/Complex Interactions
Acrylonitrile 3137 98.9 893 92.9
Ammonia 22.14 99.6 88.1 88.5
Chlorine 33.26 99.5 83.7 87.8
Chloroform 33.16 100.0 923 923
Epichlorohydrin 88.11 100.0 100.0 100.0
Hydrazine 318.18 100.0 92.9 92.9
Hydrochloric acid 92.11 99.8 873 853
Hydrogen sulfide 51.44 98.4 92.8 90.4
Methyl alcohol 26.84 98.9 963 95.7
Methyl mercaptan 164.18 100.0 86.4 95.5
Toluene 35.44 96.8 92.6 95.4
Vinyl acetate 3337 100.0 97.0 94.0
Quadrant IV: Tight Coupling/Complex Interactions
Hydrofluoric acid 6431 95.0 77.5 87.5
Methyl bromide 166.67 80.0 20.0 20.0
Phosgene 2727 933 633 66.7
Phosphine 600.00 100.0 66.7 333
Phosphorus trichloride 64.71 100.0 81.8 45.5
Sulfur dioxide 243.90 100.0 81.7 86.7
Toluene-2,4disocyanate 78.15 95.5 75.0 75.0
I I I i I I I I I
mitigating features. A hazard warning system is a good safety measure to apply to this type
of processing technology. 6 Such a hazard warning system is appropriate and works best
when the worst case accident gives a high degree of warning, which correlates with a high
percentage of near-miss incidents. Those incidents can be used to trigger response actions
adequate to deal with the problem; these would range from increased monitoring to
automatic plant shutdown.
Process technologies in Quadrant IV: High Event Ratios and Low Percentage Near
Misses (or Complex Interactions/Tight Coupling) are the most problematic of the four,
because the demands on the accident response system are contradictory. Interactive
complexity requires time and imagination to determine the best response and therefore
favors decentralization; yet a centralized, preprogrammed response is also needed because
time is a luxury not available in tightly coupled systems. The best accident prevention
response for technologies that fall into this category is to replace them with an alternative
technology that produces the same product with more inherent safety. For example, based
on the classification scheme developed here, we have identified hydrofluoric acid as a
prime candidate for substitution while sulfuric acid's processing technology seems to be
inherently safer. Both of these technologies are currently used in competing processes in
the alkylation of gasoline in refineries; our analysis indicates that hydrofluoric acid should
be replaced by sulfuric acid in these processes whenever possible.
In conclusion, we consider this classification scheme to be an effective tool to help
identify promising primary prevention opportunities. However, we note that the
classification scheme and the boundaries of the quadrants might change with different data.
For example, if accurate records become available on near-miss component failures, some
of which did not result in an accidental chemical release, then the "hit" (as opposed to the
"miss" implied by the term near-miss) could change from deaths, injuries, and evacuations
to being any accidental release of hazardous material regardless of its consequences. Since
we did not have access to such near-miss data, we modified our near-miss definition to fit
the available accident statistics. We also note that it is possible to criticize our
classification scheme because the differences between the variety of processing
technologies represented are too small to justify classifying them into different quadrants.
Certainly the differences between the systems analyzed by Perrow (ranging from post
offices to nuclear plants) were much, much greater than, say, the differences between
producing linear low-density polyethylene in a gas phase reactor and producing high-
density polyethylene using liquid slurry in a loop reactor. However, slight differences
D-9
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between alternative processing technologies could have significant safety consequences.
Viewed in this way, the classification scheme presented here offers a potentially valuable
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